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During the Sino-Japanese War ( I937”!945), 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established behind the 
Japanese lines four bases in north China ’which eventually 
became the main source of strength for the Communist 
victory over the KM1 in 1949* In these bases the party 
played the leading role in uniting all anti-Japanese 
forces, and bringing the army under control, while good 
coordination was also maintained between the party head­
quarters in Yenan and the sub-bureaux behind the Japanese 
lines *
The thesis shows that up to 1940 was a period 
of expansion, when the Communists succeeded in extending 
their control into the village, putting tenants and 
poor peasants in hey positions to counteract the influence 
of the landlords* Mass mobilisation programmes were also 
successful* In I94I-I942, the bases suffered a recession, 
however, as a result of tremendous Japanese military and 
economic pressure* In face of this threat, the CCP 
adopted a policy of retrenchment• With the launching of 
the Rectification Campaign in Pebruary 1942, the Communist 
position in the bases was strengthened, and reform pro­
grammes made the party better equipped to reassert its 
leadership* Mass mobilization was emphasized and the 
village became the base for the launching of important 
campaigns like those for the reduction of rent and 
interest, which succeeded by 1943 in arousing peasant 
political consciousness and effecting tremendous expansion 
in the organization of the people!s armed forces of 
various descriptions* and the production teams* Japanese 
setbacks in the Pacific contributed further to Communist 
expansion, and by 1945? the CCP had become the dominant 
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The^ period 1937-1945 in Chinese political 
history is both interesting and intricate* Basically, 
the period was dominated by Japan's invasion of 
China from the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge 
Incident, which marked the beginning of eight years 
of undeclared war between China and Japan. Thereafter 
the poltical situation inside China was complicated 
by the actions of the various parties involved in the 
war*
Japan as the invader in China set up various 
sponsored governments headed by Chinese politicians 
in the occupied area during the period 1937-1940.
In March 1940, she succeeded in securing the co­
operation of Wang Chlng-wei > who had been
the second most important figure in the Chinese 
government since the 1920s. Wang's Rational Govern­
ment, set up on March 30, 1940, in Nanking, claimed 
central control in the occupied area, and his relations 
with Japan, especially in bargaining for self-government 
and autonomy, represent a fascinating and controver­
sial aspect of the history of the occupied area
2Iduring the period under discussion* In addition 
to this, Chinese resistance to Japanese invasion 
presented a picture of intriguing party politics, 
internal strife amongst the Chinese, and heroic 
defence against the invaders. It was Chiang Kai- 
shek's National Government which hore the hrunt of the 
war in the first few months of the war, gradually 
retreating into the hinterland until it took shelter 
in Chungking in late 1938* In the meantime, nego­
tiations with Japan were undertaken hy Chiang's
2Government in 1937-1940 and contacts with Wang Ching-
wei's government were also reported to have heen
3maintained throughout the war.
To add further complications, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) emerged from the dark, grim 
days of the Long March (October 1934-Octoher 1936) 
to play a decisive role in the anti-Japanese resistance 
movement. By July 1944, the CCP claimed control over
1. Ngok Lee, The Later Career of Wang Ching-wei with 
Special Reference to His National Government1s Op­
eration with Japan, 1938-1945, (M.A. thesis, Univer­
sity of Hong Kong) 1966, 59-203*
2. ibid*, 26-29, 88-110.
•A~ '
3* Ch'en Kung-po Ch'en Kung-po tzu-pai shu chi
ta-pien shu,t$^ t$jla (The Affidavit and Defence
Document of Ch'en Kung-po), n.p., (private document, 
own pagination), 32-36. Ch'en Kung-po became president 
of the Nanking Government in late 1944 after the death 
of Wang Ching-wei.
3one-fifth of the population and one-eighth of the 
total area of Ohina. In addition, the COP armed 
strength was put at 470,000 men, with a militia force
of oyer 2,000,000, engaged in resisting 60$ of the
4
Japanese troops and 90$ of the puppet troops* Although 
these figures may be exaggerated, they do not alter 
the fact that this tremendous expansion during the war 
contributed directly to the OOP's ability to challenge 
the authority of the KMT after the war and to take over 
the government in Ohina in 1949*
There are two aspects to the study of the OOP's 
past role in the war* First, the OOP's direct role in 
the war involved resistance organizations and programmes 
against the Japanese and the puppets* In addition, the 
OOP was involved with the KMT in relations which ranged 
from an anti-Japanese alliance to open armed clashes 
during the whole span of the war. This thesis conc­
entrates on the role of the OOP as the leader in 
organizing various nationalistic, anti-Japanese resist­
ance programmes, which inevitably also contributed to
4* K'ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-oh'i chieh-fang-ch'u 
kai-k1 uang 'ift b-i ft &X? /G (The St at e of
the Liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War), 
Peking, jen-min ch'u-pan-she A(KA"'^i^ i953, 1-4*
Communist expansion as a territorial power in 
China during the war* CCP-KMT relations will be 
dealt with only briefly* Investigations into 
CCP activities will be confined territorially to 
north China, where the area to be discussed will 
be referred to as the CCP bases, or ken-chii-ti
from the general term guerrilla base, yu-chi-ch'tl
region not as well established in armed strength 
and administrative position* Ken-chtt-ti embodied 
guerrilla bases, in addition to a well-defined 
stronghold. In terms of time, the thesis will be 
limited to the period up to the end of 19U3> as 
this year marked a well-defined turning point in 
the war situation in north China, with the CCP well 
on the way to undertaking the counter-offensives, 
which finally culminated in its being the master of 
north China territorially at the end of the war*
In regard to written work in English on the 
development of the CCP bases, there are some 
accounts by eye-witnesses during the war, like
term which needs to be distinguished
9 which in CCP terminology refers to a
5Professor George Taylor, who has written The 
Struggle for North China (1940),^ and Michael 
Lindsay, who was in the bases ±9b2-19kkf and wrbte 
his North China Pront in 19U5* These works provide 
valuable information but by no means give a complete 
picture. In 1951, two additional works appeared. 
Boyd Compton in his introduction to Maofs China, 
Party Reform Documents. 19U2-19UU gave a concise 
account of the bases against the background of party
7
reforms.' Professor Mary Wright has also written 
on the Chinese peasants and Communism, emphasizing 
the CCP!s success in mobilizing and rallying the 
support of the peasantry, and its role as the leader
Q
of a peasant revolution. The most serious and 
recent work on the development of the CCP bases is
5* George S. Taylor, The Struggle for North China*
New York, International Secretariat, Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 19U0.
6. Michael Lindsay, North China Front. London: H.M.
Stationary Office and the China Campaign Committee, 
19U5.
7* Boyd Compton (trans.), Maofs China. Party Reform 
Documents, 19U2-19kh» Seattle, University of 
Washington Press, 1952, xv-lii;.
8. Mary C. Wright, "The Chinese Peasant and Communism", 
Pacific Affairs. XXIV (1951), 258-259*
6Chalmers A. Johnson's Peasant Nationalism 
and Communist Power, published in 1962.^ Heavily 
documented from Japanese military archives, 
Johnson's work investigates Mao Tse-tung's success 
in mobilizing the patriotic sentiments of the 
Chinese masses against the Japanese. In commenting 
on Johnson's work Professor S.R. Schram has said: 
"He [Johnson] would have us believe that the 
acute consciousness of China as an histor­
ical and political reality ... [has] little 
or nothing to do with modern Chinese nation­
alism, which was somehow born ex nihilo in 
1937* On the other hand, he maintains that 
resentment by the peasants at the economic 
injustices perpetrated on them by the land­
lords and the tax-collectors played only a
marginal and negligible role in their decision
10to support the Communists.•*"♦
Chalmers A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and 
Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary 
China» 1937-19^5» Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1962.
10* S.R. Schram, Mao Tse-tun&:: Political headers
of the Twentieth Century» Penguin Books,”T 9S6, 
203.
7Apparently it was insufficient research into
the original CCP archives and documents, which
led Johnson into arguing that Communist success
in rallying popular support during the war was
due more to the CCPfs working with the peasantry
in opposition to Japan, than to its acting on the
peasantry’s behalf as a champion against landlord
11exploitation* One of the main themes of this 
thesis is to examine the importance of CCP leader­
ship in the north China bases in rallying the 
support of the peasantry, and in championing the 
cause of its proteges, i*e*, the tenants and the 
poor peasants* Whilst it cannot be denied that 
Japanese brutality during the war played a decisive
11* Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ••*, 19: u*.* the 
Communists achieved their greatest popular 
, following precisely during the period in which 
their unity policy was in effect* Clearly,
their acting on the side of the peasantry --
i*e*, their successful opposition to the Japanese
invaders --  had become more important than their
actions for the sake of the peasantry *..u*
8part in arousing peasant nationalism, it has to 
be emphasized that it was the CCP which directed 
such nationalistic sentiments into political 
channels through elaborate mass mobilization 
programmes and organization. It was the CCP!s 
perseverance in championing the peasantry against 
the Japanese, and eliminating at least in part 
economic injustices suffered by the poor peasants, 
that were mainly responsible for its success with 
the masses. This phenomenon bacame especially 
apparent in the period 19U2-19UU, when the CCP 
reforms effected great progress in mass mobilization 
in the bases of north China.
The Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government and the 
Formulation of the United Front.
Before tracing the origin of the CCP bases 
in north China established in early 1938, it is 
necessary to examine the position of the CCP in 
1935-19379 mainly because the bases in north China 
derived their source of strength and inspiration 
from the CCP Central Committee.
After dreary months making the trek of 6,000 
miles, pursued by KMT troops, Mao and other CCP
9military commanders arrived in Yenan in northern
Shensi with their Red Army contingents from
12October 1935 to October 1936, and began to set
up a base in northern Shensi# A point to note 
here is the significant position of northern Shensi 
as the CCP headquarters in relation to north China# 
Although Yenan was by no means close to the eastern 
part of north China, it still had accessibility to 
most parts of the region, especially the western 
parts of Shansi# Had the CCP decided to make their 
trek further west during the Long March to Szechuan 
and Sikiang, then it would never have been able to 
conduct any effective anti-Japanese resistance move­
ment in north China, or central China* This is 
because the CCP headquarters would then have been 
not only remote from, but also practically inaccessible 
to north China. .It was in May 1935 at Mao Erh Kai 
, Szechuan, that the CCP at its last stage
12. Maofs contingent arrived at Yenan in October
1935, whilst other contingents got there later 
on in 1936, and as late as October in that year# 
For details, see Jerome Chf§n, Mao and the 
Chinese Revolution, Oxford University Press, 
iii^b5B krT 957T l95»200 .
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of the Long March was confronted with an internal
split over the decision as to where it should set
up its headquarters* Mao commanding the First and Third
Front Armies, making up the main strength of the
COP forces, favoured north-west China which was
close to Mongolia and the U.S.S.R.. Chang Kuo-tfao
I y a n d  HstL Hsiang-ch1ien j commanding
the Fourth Front Army preferred to make for the far west
13in Szechuan and Sikiang. Had Chang heen able to
13* Miu Ch1 u-huang , Chung-kuo kung-ch1an-tang
Chlen-.yao li-shxh ( Brief His­
tory of the Chinese Communist Party),(First draft),
Peking, Hsueh-hsi^tsa-chih-she I957r
95-96; Hu Huai^ft^, Chung-kuo hsin-min-chu ^
chu-i ko-ming-shih ts1 aii-k * ao t su-1 iao vy (g)
( T T e T e r e i o e i n G r ^ N e w  Lemocra/tic 
Revolution in China), Shanghai, Commercial Press, 
I95I» 334-335* On the split within the CCP at 
Mao Erh. Kai, the above accounts accused Chang Kuo- 
t*ao of cowardice in under-rating the strength? of the 
CCP and in overestimating the KMT threat. Morevoer, 
the CCP censured Chang for illegally setting up ano- 
ther central authority on the Szechuan-Sikiang 
border after the Mao Erh Kai s£>lit. For Chang 
Kuo-tfao!s explanation of the above split, see 
Chang Kuo-^ao, "Chang Kuo-t'ao's letter to the 
people), K*ang-chan kuo-ts!e hsia chih chung-kuo 
kung-ch1 an-tang ®  ‘#rf' (Eke OCP
during the period of Resistance), Kweilin,1941,27* 
Chang explained that Mao insisted on marching north 
to Shensi, believing that the Long March had been 
a success* On the other hand, Chang believed that
the March had been a failure, and thought the Red 
Army needed time for recuperation, hence the necessi­
ty to retreat to Szechuan and Sikiang. According to 
Chang, this was the cause of the major dispute.
J
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prevail upon Mao, then the anti-Japanese resist­
ance movement in north Ohina later on would not 
have achieved the same result.
As it was, Mao's Bed Army contingents arrived 
in Yenan in October 1935, where they joined forces 
with OOP commanders Kao Kang , and Liu Ghih-
n^ 7~> . L—  ^ '
tan aitTT' , who had been fighting guerrilla war
with local warlords, and championing the tenants
14and poor peasants since 1931* Phis rendezvous 
marked the beginning of a tremendous growth of OOP 
power which blossomed during the later years of 
the anti-Japanese resistance from 1943 to 1945*
To re-establish party strength, the Workers' and 
Peasants' Democratic G-overnment was set up with 
policies similar to those enforced in the period 
of the Kiangsi Soviet 1931-1934* Peasants were 
freed of all debts whilst land was re-distributed 
at the expense of landlords. The area was divided 
into four regions, namely, Shen-pei Shang 
(Northern Shensi province), Shen-Kan Shang
14* Por a contemporary biography on Kao Kang, 
who joined the OOP in 1925 at^the age of 
nine, see Chi eh-fang jih-pao 
(Liberation Daily) November 9* 1941* Por 
activities of the OOP in the north-west before 
the arrival of the Red Armies from the south 
in 1935, see Mark Seldon, "The Guerrilla 
Movement in Northwest Ohina (Part II)", The 
Ohina Quarterly, No. 29, (January-March), 
1967, 61-81.
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(Shensi-Kansu province), Kuan-chung te-ch*tl
(Hie Special Region of Kuan Chung),
and Shen-fu te-ch*tt r) &  (The Special
15
Region of Shen-fu). The threat from the KMT 
still-existed as Ohiang Kai-shek organised in 
October 1936 his headquarters for the "exterm­
ination of bandits" in Sian, the capital of 
Shensi, engaging his own Central Army, Chang 
Hsueh-liang1 s North-eastern Army
(Tung-pei chlin) , and Yang Iiu-chf eng* s/
',/U t i^X, Shensi Army in attempts to strike 
at Yenan, The assistance of Yen Hsi-shan fi. /
the governor of Shansi, and his army, was also
15. For a short history of CCP activities in 
north-west China, see Kao Kang, Pien~ch*tjt 
tang-ti li-shih we.n-ti chien-t*ao
(An examination of Questions concern­
ing Party History in the Border Region), 
n.p., (CCP), 1943* This short work is a 
speech delivered by Kao at a high-level 
cadres* meeting in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningh- 
sia Border Goverhment, on November 17-18, 
1942. The Border Region assumed the 
official name of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia 
Border Government, with approval from Chiang 
Kai-shek*s government, in September 1937*
13
16nought to complete the blockade of the COP*
However, by the end of 1936, Mao and his Red Army 
had succeeded in setting up a permanent base in 
northern Shensi, from which he could strengthen 
CCP power, propagate Communist ideology, and 
inspire Communist insurgence in different parts of 
China. During the war 1937-1945, Yenan became the 
vital centre of ideological inspiration and the 
brain for the formulation of party policies, provid­
ing uniform leadership for the anti-Japanese movement
17in north China, especially from 1942 onwards.
16*’ Wang Chien-min , Chung-kuo kung-ch1 an
tang shih-kao, ^ r b  (A draft History 
of the Chinese Communist Party), Taipei, 1965^
II, 658 (Supplementary chart); Kag_Yin-chu^v^fStEL, 
Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih chi, ^ | f  s'Cj 
(A Chronology of Major Events in the Republic 
of China), Taipei, 1955, 409,412. A detailed 
.chart of the KMT troops employed against the 
CCP in October 1935 was given in Wang's work.
Also see J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revol­
ution, 202.
17* Prom February, 1942 to 1944, the CCP launched 
the Rectification Movement, having as one of 
its objectives party reforms, thus Yenan became 
the centre of a campaign aiming at effective 
party leadership. Por details, see chapters 
five and six.
14
As if fortune was beginning to smile on the
CCP, the months December 1936 to April 1937 saw
drastic changes in the political situation in China
which turned out to he in the OOP's favour. During
these few months, the CCP succeeded in prevailing
upon Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his campaigns against
Yenan, and join with it in forming a United Front
against the Japanese who had been encroaching upon
north China since their occupation of Manchuria in
September 1931* As early as January 1933, the CCP
had already been advocating an anti-Japanese United
Front, but Chiang Kai-shek was then all intent on
18attacking the Communist base in Kiangsi# On August
1» 1935j the CCP in a proclamation again called upon
the people in China to form an anti-Japanese National
19Salvation Front. Later on, in the summer of 1936, 
Wlao told Edgar Snow, the veteran journalist, of his
18. For the Communist advocacy of the United Front 
Policy in January 1931» see Hu Hua, Reference 
Sources on.the New Democratic Revolution in 
China, 318; and John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in 
Opposition, 1927-1935* Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, California, 1966, 351* For a summary 
of Chiang Kai-shek's five 1 CCP-extermination 
campaigns1 1930-1934, see Hu Hua, op. cit., 
314-333*
19* For a full text of the August 1, 1935 declarat­
ion, see Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New 
Democratic Revolution in China, 263-269*
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willingness to cooperate with Chiang in order to
resist the Japanese.*^
In view of the increasing threat from Japan
by 1935 and 1936, and the resultant nationalistic
sentiment aroused in China, the CCP appeal for a
United Front began to get a good response from the
public, especially since Chiang had implied in
November 1935 that his government favoured compromise
21and toleration towards Japan* Demonstrations were
launched and National Salvation Associations established
in different parts of China aiming at active resist-
22ance against Japan. The situation became tense 
when military commanders began to respond to the 
prevailing national consciousness. From June to 
September, 1936, the military forces in Kwangsi and 
Kwangtung, south China, launched a campaign not only
20* Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Grove Press,
New York', (first Black Cat Edition) 1961, 96-98.
21. In a report to the Fourth Plenary Session of
the 5th KMT National Congress on foreign policy, 
Chiang made the following statement: "Peace is 
not to be given up unless there is absolutely no 
hope, and no sacrifice is to be made unless the 
final stage is reached". See Kao Yin-chu, Major 
Events in China, 412.
22* Shen CMn-yu , et. al., T1 uan-
chieh yu-wu ti chi-ko chi-pen t1 iao-chien jyu _ , 
“tsui-ti yao-chiu )¥] &^ ^ 1 ^
(Several Basic Terms and Minimum Demands in the
16
against Japanese aggression, but also against the
government1s inert attitude. This amounted to a
secession movement when the United Anti-Japanese
National Salvation Army was formed in July, with
Chfen Chi-t'ang ) */[\ of Kwar^ung as Commander-
in-chief , and Li Tsung-jen^^j—  of Kwangsi as
deputy. Pai Ch'ung-hsi , Li's close military
colleague from Kwangsi, also took an active part .
The whole coup only lasted for three months, with
the secessionists coming to an agreement with Chiang
23Kai-shek in September. The most important result 
of this coup was that military leaders who were dis­
satisfied with the central government, and were keen on 
active resistance against Japan, were encouraged to
22. ( cont.) United Effort against Aggression),n.p.,
1935* The Anti-Japanese National Salvation Front 
"became active "by November 1935, with the publica­
tion of its_ weekly journal Ta-chung sheng-huo
/“E~ (Life of the Masses^), in Shanghai.
Shen CMn-yu , Soong Ch! ing-ling Ho Hsiang-
ying 1 U ^ ^ ^ a n d  Chang Nai-ch1 were some
of the important leaders of the movement. A 
typical article in the journal is t 1 Min-chu^chieh- 
fang ytln-tung ti hurrsheng** ^ I ? ) Ki-f lft7) ^ 0
(An appeal of the National Liberation Movement), Ta- 
chung sheng-huo I, No.9,(Jan.11,1936), 231*
23* Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, 432; Kao Yin-chu, 
Major Events in China, 420-423*
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take active measures to realize the United Front, 
in which the cooperation of the COP was to he sought.
It was under these circumstances that the
dramatic Sian Incident hegan on December 12, 1936.
This turned out to be a victory for the OOP in
securing Ohiang Kai-shek's agreement to the formation
of a United Front. The initiator of the Incident
was Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been appointed deputy
commander-in-chief of the Bandit Extermination
Campaign for the north-west in October 1936. Chang
is from Tung-pei jjlj b  , (Manchuria), and ever since
the occupation of Manchuria in September 1931, he
and his army had had to live in exile. Naturally,
Chang was more interested in fighting the Japanese
in order to return to Manchuria rather than fighting
24the Communists. On December 12, 1936, Chang 
"kidnapped" Chiang Kai-shek in Sian, with the latter 
having arrived earlier to promote new campaigns 
against the CCP and attempt to check pro-CCP sympath­
ies for the formation of a United Front. On the same
24. E. Snow, Ked Star Over China, 433-^34; also see 
Hsi-an shih-pien chen-shih dh Import-
ant Documents on the Sian Incident) X, Ch'un- 
chiu tsa-chih-she, Hong Kong, 1965, 1-2, and 
J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 202.
18
day, Chang and Yang Hu-cheng (Commander of the
Shensi Army) sent a telegram to Lin Shen ,
chairman of the National Government, laying down
an eight-point programme. In essence, it called
for a cessation of the civil war. Ihere was to be
a reorganization of the Nanking Government to admit
other parties for the purpose of securing national
25salvation against the Japanese. fo put it another 
way, Chang demanded an end to the campaigns against 
the CCP, and the realization of a KM1-CCP cooperation 
against Japan.
Chang Hsueh-liang had actually been establishing 
contacts with the Communists as early as July 1936, 
and there seemed to be some understanding between 
the CCP and Chang, especially when CCP delegates were
25• Por the^text of the telegram, see Kung Hsiangx^ 
hsij5^T!£- ,HHsi-an shih-pien hui-i-lu"
\^ t^£^(Memoirs of the Sian Incident), Important 
Documents of the Sian Incident, 95-96; also see 
Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the New Democratic 
Revolution in China, 346-362. Of the various 
books on the controversial Incident, the following 
three can perhaps provide different angles of 
approach: J.M. Bertram, Crisis in China: The Only 
Story of the Sian Mutiny, Macmillan, 1937; B. Snow, 
Red Star Over China, 431-471; and Chiang Mei-ling, 
Sian, a Coup d'Eifat, Ihe China Publishing Company, 
Shanghai, 1948 (Por Chiang Kai-shek*s own account 
of the Incident, see 109-115)•
19
immediately sent to Sian from Yenan after the
Incident. The delagates were Chou En-lai/
b
r ^
Ch.'in Pang-hsien /~ § ^ y  » and Yell ohien-ying
/jr-, \ <
"jjL » an(^  negotiations with Chang and Chiang
Kai-shek took place. Chiang was eventually rel­
eased on December 25 , 1936, with Chang Hsueb-liang,
the "repentant" general, accompanying him hack to 
27Hanking.
The decisive outcome of the Sian Incident was 
Chiang Kai-shek's agreement to the formation of an 
Anti-Japanese United Front hased on KMT**CCP co­
operation. From February 1937 onwards, KMT-CCP 
negotiations took place with Chou En-lai as the 
CCP delegate at Hanking. The results of negotiat­
ions can be traced from declarations proclaimed by
26. H.H. Kung, "Chang fing-fu ta-shih ssu-fan mi- 
pao" , (The four secret
reports from Ambassador Chiang Ting-fu), 
Important Documents of the Sian Incident, 112- 
113* In his fourth report dated December 17, 
1936, Ambassador Chiang, who was then residing 
in Moscow, told the Soviet Government that Chang 
Hsueh-liang definitely had connections with the 
CCP before the Incident. Also see J. Ch'en,
Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 202-203*
27. E. Snow, Red Star Over China, 445, 456-464; 
also see Sehram, Mao Tse-tung, 198. Chiang 
Hsueh-liang is still under house arrest in 
Taiwan.
20
"both parties in February, 1937# On February 10, 
the GOP sent a telegram to the Third Plenary 
Session of the 5th MIT Central Executive Committee* 
In it were OOP demands for the cessation of civil 
war to concentrate all resources on efforts against 
Japanese aggression; the release of political pri­
soners; and the guarantee of basic human rights.
In return, the GOP made concessions to the KMT on 
certain issues. The Red Army was to be renamed 
the National Revolutionary Army (Kuo-min Ko-ming 
chilin) under the command of the
central government. The GOP base in northern Shensi 
was to be renamed the Special-region Government of 
the Chinese Republic (Chung-hua min-kuo t’e-ch1^  
cheng-f u ) y^j (J Democratic prac-
tices based on universal suffrage were to be adopted
in the OOP administration and the confiscation of
28landlords* properties stopped*
The MIT officially accepted the above con­
ditions on February 21, 1937 in the resolutions of 
the Third Plenary Session, which were worded in 
KMT phraseology, expressing its generosity
28. Wang Ohien-min, History of the OOP, III, 102- 
103; J* Oh*en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 
231*
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29in accepting the "surrender" of the OOP. Chiang
Kai-shekrs statement on February 24 clarified the 
situation further, when he expressed conditional 
approval of the three maQor issues, that is, 
freedom of speech, full utilization of man-power 
from all parties, and the release of political
prisoners..
It is perhaps necessary to mention here that 
the CCP advocacy of the United Front was not with­
out opposition from within the party. Both Mao
pointed out that some CCP members, especially the 
leftists, were against a peaceful solution to the 
Sian Incident, and it is not improbable that some 
extremists might have contemplated taking the life 
of Chiang Kai-shek as revenge for his attacks on 
the CCP. Indeed, Chang Kuo-t*ao, who arrived at 
Yenan with his Fourth Front Army just before the 
Incident, observed that "... with the outbreak of 
the Sian Incident, the various high officials of 
the CCP central authority at Yenan could not help
291 Ibid.,? Ill, 103-105•
30. Ibid., Ill, 105-107.
30
and Liu Shao-ch*i in their later works
22
31having temperamental and impulsive plans .
On the other hand, Mao accused Chang of being a
leftist favouring an attack on T'ungkuan >JL]%P\ ,
the strategic point between Yenan and Sian, during
32the Sian Incident* In 1942, Liu Shao-ch’i also 
spoke of the Sian Incident, and pointed out that 
some comrades then believed that the KilT-CCP co­
operation could have been brought about through an 
alternative solution, or even without a solution 
to the Sian Incident* Liu added that these comrades
only committed individual errors which were therefore
33easily corrected later on*
31. Chang Kuo-t’ao, ’'Chang Kuo-t’ao’s letter to 
the p e o p 1 e " , The OOP during ... Resistance,
Kweilin, 27-28. Also in an interview with Chang, 
Wang enien-min of Taiwan was told that CCP members, 
who wished to do away with Chiang Kai-shek, were 
stopped by Stalin’s telegram from Moscow, see 
Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 728, n.27*
32. "Wei cheng-ohtL chien-pa-wan cMn-chung ch’in- i
k*ang-Jih,min-chu tung-i chan-hsien erh tou-cheng",
<$9 * T  B ^  ® d ) j f ? ( rj} o
struggle for the sake of winning hundreds of 
thousands of people to join the Anti-Japanese 
National United Front), Mao Tse-tung hsten-chi, 
Peking, (1961) ,1^ 270, n*5*
33* Liu shao-ch’i, Lun tang-nei tou-cheng,‘~T^ ?>fX
(on Intra-party Strife), n.p., n.d.,
Su-chung-s:he , 23, cited from Wang
Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 98. Liu Shao-
ch’i was then making a speech in the Party Central
School on March 2, 1942, when he revealed the 
above party differences during the Sian Incident.
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One© the United Front "began to come into
shape in early 1937? visible changes in CCP policy
on its immediate objectives were evident. This
can be seen in the “Letter to all CCP comrades from
the CCP Central Executive Committee11, dated April
3415» 1937* The opening passage reads:
“Ever since the peaceful settlement to the 
Sian Incident and the holding of the Third 
E M  Plenary Session, the Chinese Revolution 
has entered a new stage. The duty at this 
stage is to consolidate the internal peace 
already secured, to fight for democratic 
rights, and to realize the anti-Japanese war.#*".
In the same letter was the reiteration of the 
CCPfs determination to follow Dr. Sun Yat-sen's
K
revolutionary Three Principles of the People. An
earlier statement by the CCP to the same effect was
36made in August 1936. In an interview with Agnes 
Smedley, the American journalist, in March 1937,
Mao made it clear that the CCPfs ultimate goal was
34* Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 107*
35* Ibid., III, 109, Dr. Sim's three Principles 
were Nationalism, Democracy, and People's 
Livelihood.
36. Schram* Mao Tse-tung, 200-201.
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still Communism, but before achieving that, it had
37to save China from destruction* The specific and 
immediate aims of the CCP became all the more explicit 
with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 
1937* In the report to the Sixth Plenary Session of 
the CCP Central Executive Committee (October-November, 
1938), Mao emphasized that the ideals of Socialism 
and Communism would not be given up, but these ideals 
could only be brought about after the success of the 
“democratic revolution led by the bourgeoisie’1 (tzu- 
ch ’ an chi eh-chi min-chu ko-ming) JA- f'J'J *
Moreover, the war of resistance against Japan was 
defined as a stage inihe democratic revolution which 
had as its guide the Three Principles of the People, 
and that there was no basic clash between Communism
•3 Q
and Dr. Sun’s principles. Mao also argued that
the Principle of People’s Livelihood (Min-sheng chu-i)
-T* r 39was in fact Communism.
37. . Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 201.
38. Mao Tse -1 ung, Lun hsin chieh-tu&n % go v
(On the New Stage), Chungking, Hsin-hua jih-pao- 
kuan, 1939 (January I), 75-77*
39. Chung-kuo kung-ch* an-tang^'^ ,_____
chan wen-hsien, 8c (Collection
of Articles during the War of Resistance)
Shanghai, Hung-mien ch’u-pan-she S b ,
1946, 38. This is an interview of Mao by report­
ers on February 2, 1938, in which the former stated 
thatihe Principle of People’s Livelihood was in 
fact Communism.
25
This realization of the democratic revolution 
embodied not only a political rapprochement with 
the KMT on a United Front, but also an alliance 
with the bourgeoisie with particular reference to 
economic policy# Oh'en Po-ta , the OOP's
theoretician, wrote in 1944 of the necessity for 
the GOP to ally with the national and petty bourg-
40eoisie, because of the changing economic situation.
In another work, Oh'en quoted from Mao, who maint­
ained that a united economic front with the national
bourgeoisie was essential because of the backward
41economic situation in China, which had indeed 
particular relevance in the OOP .context, as northern 
Shensi was an unproductive area. The same applied 
to OOP bases behind enemy lines, where economic 
hardship resultant from the war made an alliance
40. For details of Oh'enfs thesis, see Oh'en Po- 
ta, kuan-yu shih-nien nei-chan
(on Ten Years of OiYil War), Peking, 1953, 
43-45*
41. Oh'en Po-ta, Mao Ise-tung lun chung-kuo k'o- 
ming —t vsf (Mao Tse-tung
on the Chinese Revolution), Peking, 1953* 
38-39.
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42with the bourgeoisie absolutely necessary.
This revised OOP ideology on an economic 
alliance with the bourgeoisie in effect formed a 
much broader United Front during the war than the 
political cooperation between the COP and the KMT. 
With the deterioration of relations between the two
parties by January 1941, military coooperation was
43 'diminished, but the broader economic united front
with the bourgeoisie remained the guiding principle
for Yenan and the bases behind the Japanese lines.
By 1943, another change within this frame work of
the economic united front was evident in the Shensi-
Kansu-Ninghsia Border Eegion and the bases in north
China and other parts of the country. The CCP then
began to come more into the open in championing its
proteges, that is, the tenants and poor peasants,
against landlord exploitation, and thus could be
considered as having swung to the left. This swing
brought about significant support for the CCP in
42. Economic hardship suffered as a result of
Japanese pressure in the north China bases will 
be discussed fully in chapter 4.
43* For the deterioration of KMT-CCP relations in 
January 1941, see chapter 2, 37-38.
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north China, the details of v^ hieh will he discussed 
in clha-pters five and six*
CHAPTER II
A General Survey of CCP Bases in North China
With the outbreak of the undeclared Sino- 
Japanese War on July 7, 1937» the United Front 
between the KMT and the CCP began to take a definite 
shape, both politically and militarily* On August 
25> 1937, CCP forces were renamed the I8th Army 
Group under tbe command of the Military Commission 
of the Chinese National Government, comprising the 
Eighth Route Army stationed in north China, and the /
military alliance came ...into being in face of the 
Japanese invasion. In north China, the Eighth Route 
Army comprised three divisions, namely, the 115th
forces were all put under the Second War zone cover™ 
ing Shansi under the command of Yen Iisi-shan, with
I. Kao Yin-chu, Major Events in China, 437*
New Fourth Army in central China. Chu Teh s j fer was
-Jr a  ^fc, t - 'ql
commander in chief and P'eng Te-huai A ^  the 
deputy of these Communist forces.^ Thus a KMT™CCP
Division commanded by Lin Piao j , the 129th
Division commanded by Liu Po-rch* eng and
the 120th Division under Ho Lung . These
29
Chu Teh as deputy, and their total strength was
2specified to he limited to 45,000 men#
This KMT-CCP military merger was inevitably
spurred on by the rapid advances made by the
Japanese after July 7, 1937* On July 28, the
Japanese occupied the then Peiping, and on August
13, Japan attacked Shanghai, which eventually fell
on November 12. In north China, the Japanese
advanced westward along the Peiping-Suiyuan railway
and southward along the Peiping-Hankow line after
the fall of Peiping. By the end of 1937, the
majority of large cities in north China had been
3
occupied by the Japanese. To join KMT troops in 
resisting the advancing Japanese, the Eighth Route 
Army then stationed around Yenan crossed the Yellow 
River, and moved into Shansi in early September, 
as the Japanese closed in on Shansi from Hopei, and
i—/s. *7
2* Chu^Teh, Lun chi eh-f ang-ch1 tl chan-oh1 ang
(On the Battle Fields of the liberated
Areas), n.p., chieh-fang-she, 1949, 13; S.R. Schram,
Mao Ise-tung, 204-205* For a list of commanders 
and political commissars of the Eighth Route Army, 
see Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 96.
3. Kuo-fang-pu shih-liao c M  (KMT), (ed.)
-nien klang-ohan ohing-kuo kai-yaoy'\4- 
(A General Description of the * I 
Eight:/Years of Resistance), n.p., 1945, 10-11; 
also see maps 1 and 2 in the appendices in the 
same work for the major battles fought.
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Changchiak' ou 5^- ^  ^  , in Chalxar.4 In the
meantime, the COP on September 22 reiterated in
a declaration that its troops would take orders
from the Military Commission of the KM! Government
5in a United Front* The 115th Division had then 
ad wane ed towards Wut'aishan ^  in the
mountainous area of north-east Shansi, and part­
icipated in a united effort with KMT troops against 
the Japanese advance in northern Shansi. The 115th 
Division claimed a major victory over the Japanese 
in this operation at P'inghsingkuan , a
6few miles north of Wut'ai, on September 25* 1937*
4* Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields ..., 13; K'ang- 
Jih Chan-cheng shih-ch'i ti ohung-kuo jen-min 
ohieh-fang-chto^ X B 4 (The
People's Liberation Army during the AntiwTapanese 
War), Peking, jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, 10*
5. Chung-kuo kung-ch* an-tang k'ang-chan wen-hsien 
M7 , 1, Hong Kong, Hung-mien
ch'u-pan-she , 1946, 8*
6. For a detailed description of the battle at P'ing­
hsingkuan, see The People's Liberation Army 
11-22. J.M. Bertram, who was with the 120th 
Division in the beginning of the war, quoted from 
Wang Chen > commander of the 359th Brigade,
120th Division, who said that CCP forces arrived 
at P'inghsingkuan too late, and therefore was 
unable to hold the pass against the Japanese for 
too long in spite of the initial success, see J.M. 
Bertram, North China Front, Macmillan, 1939» 396-
397, and Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China, 
London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1944, 135*
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In late October, the major forces of the 115th 
Division left Wut'ai to assist in the defence of 
11 aiyuan > the capital of Shansi, and Hsink'ou
V2 , to the south-west of Wut'ai along the 
TUng-pu (TatUng-Fengningtao) line running
7JJ
north-south across Shansi. Nieh Jung-chen ^4 ,
the deputy commander, stayed behind with about 2,000
men, and set up the Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei military
region behind the enemy lines after the fall of
7
Hsink'ou and T'aiyuan in early November#
Ho Lung's 120th Division advanced towards 
north-west Shansi in September 1937, and the Comm­
unists claimed that Ho's troops played an important 
part in resisting the Japanese at Yenmenkuan 
and Hsink'ou, and even after the fall of T'aiyuan, 
they still undertook guerrilla activities around 
the capital. Ho Lung's position in north-west 
Shansi was most strategic as it served the useful
7# The People's Liberation Army .♦#, 26-28; 
32-33*
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function of linking up the Shensi-Hansu-Ninghsia
Border G-overnment with the various CCP "bases in 
8north China* Liu Po-ch*eng*s 129th Division moved
towards south-east Shansi into Liao Hsien ,
Ho shun f and Yushe in the
mountainous area of T'ai Hang and T'ai
Yueh y^N, iiA » In Decemher 1937, Liu's troops were
ahle to repel Japanese attacks on their base in
south-east Shansi, and therefore managed to establish
9their stronghold in that area.
Thus by the end of 1937, the three divisions 
of the Eighth Route Army had succeeded in entrenching 
themselves in different parts of Shansi, contributing 
directly to the establishment of the four major bases 
in north China from 1938 onwards. These bases were 
the Shansi-Chahar-Iiopei base centred around Wu'taishan, 
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base with headquarters
8. Lin leng , "Chien-ch* ih ti-hourk'jang-ch%n 
ti Chin hsi-pei ken-chtt-ti" ,
(The north-west Shansi base persisting in the war 
of resistance behind enemy lines) Chieh-fang jih- 
pao, July 8, 1944* Johnson, Peasant Nationalism 
.* *, 95• Por a vivid description of Ho Lung and 
other officers of the 120th Division, see J.M. 
Bertram, North China Brent, 312-317*
9. "I-erh-chiu shih yu Chin-Chi-Lu-Ju pien-ch'-tt ",
(The 129th Division and 
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region), 
Chieh-fang (iih-pao, August 14, 1944.
wmmnmm  imhi Hl*l ihm m T H '"■ '■ 'K ip  n !■ tChI i  r- —
33
at T'ai Hang, the Shansi-Suiyuan base centred
at north-west Shansi, and the Shantung base
characterized by scattered guerrilla activities at
the beginning of the war. It must also be mentioned
that another major OOP base was set up in central
Ohina around Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anwei, where the
New Fourth Army from 1938 onwards fought against
the Japanese and later on Wang Ching-weifs puppet
troops as well.^
In regard to the four bases in north Ohina, they
varied in nature, strength and development in the
period 1938-1943* The most exhaustive account in
11English of these bases is given by Johnson, who 
bases his work heavily on Japanese military archives, 
and therefore tends to fail in identifying the 
important role played by the party as the controlling 
force within these bases. This party strength was 
in fact particularly apparent from February 1942 
onwards, when the party launched the Cheng Feng Yto- 
tung (Beatification Movement).
10. For a comprehensive account of the OOP base
in central Ohina, see Hu Hua, Reference Sources 
on the History of the New Democratic Revolution 
in China, 435-441.
11. See Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 92-122.
34
The purpose of this chapter is to give a comp­
rehensive survey of the hases up to 1943 * whilst 
later chapters will be devoted to special aspects.
In particular, GOP administration and mass mobil­
ization programmes at the village level will be 
dealt with in detail, and investigations into 
party leadership during the Oheng Peng period up 
to the end of 1943 will be discussed in chapters 
five and six*
Before examining each of these four bases, 
it is convenient here to mention certain general 
patterns with which they conform in spite of their 
varied nature. Pirst, in the early years of the 
war, regular units of the Eighth Route Army rather 
than guerrilla forces constituted the main military 
strength in resisting the Japanese. The Shantung 
base was an exception as the resistance programme 
there was shouldered by local party cadres and guerr­
illas rather than the Eighth Route Army, as will 
be shown later. Second, a more stable OOP admin­
istration was generally established when civil 
organizations took over from army units as the 
local government body in the bases. Oivil organiz­
ations in particular were the channels by which 
the Communists could establish contacts with the 
local people, especially in conducting various
35
mass mobilization programmes* Third, the civil 
government in the bases formed a hierarchy in 
itself* At the top was the border government, 
under which were the sub-region administrative 
office (Hsing-cheng kung-shu) , the
prefectural commissioner’s office (Ohuan-yuan kung- 
shu) > the hsien, the district, and the
adminstrative village (Hsing-cheng . 12
However, it must be mentioned here that not all 
the bases in north Ohina had a border government 
established as the top-level adminstration.
Geographically, the strongholds within the 
bases were set up in mountainous areas, many of 
which had been military headquarters of COP troops 
since late 1937. As the bases expanded in territ­
ory and population, adjacent plain areas were 
included, but here anti-Japanese resistance was 
easily subjected to severe Japanese attacks, in 
view of inferior military strength and equipment 
in the practically indefensible flat terrain.
12* See appendix 3* 290, section on the admin­
istrative structure of the bases.
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Prom 1938 to the end of 1940 was a period of
expansion in territory and population, marked at its
climax "by the "Hundred Regiments1 Offensive" in
August-Deeember, 1940, in which over 400,000 troops
of the Eighth Route Army were said to have attacked
the Japanese simultaneously in five provinces in 
13north China* This extraordinary CCP strength was
demonstrated at a time when pessimism prevailed in
Chungking, with the possibility of a compromise being
14concluded with Japan. It has been suggested that
the Hundred Regiments' Offensive led to Japanese
reprisals in 1941-1942 when relentless mopping-up
15campaigns were undertaken against the bases, result­
ing in the shrinking of CCP territories, and the 
adoption of the policy of "cut troops and simplify the 
administration" (Ching-ping chien-cheng)"^”?r^ , a
retrenchment measure to face Japanese attacks. At 
the climax of Japanese attacks in early 1942, the CCP
13. For a detailed description of the Hundred 
Regiments' Offensive, see The People's Liberation 
Army ..., 108-118; Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields1 1 i ******
>.., 16, and J. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revol­
ution, 246; for discussion on the strategy involved 
in this CCP operation, see chapter 3, 107-109*
14. Sehram, Mao Tse-tung, 217; for preliminary talks 
between Chungking, Japan, and Wang Chliig-wei* s 
government in 1939-1940, see Lee Ngok, Later 
Career of Wang Ching-wei ..., 87-110.
15. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 58.
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also launched the vigorous Cheng Feng Movement 
which proved to be an effective weapon in strength­
ening the resistance programme.
If one considers the Japanese-CCP feud in north 
China during the war as a struggle for territorial 
power, then one must not forget the role played by 
KMT troops fighting guerrilla wars against the Japanese, 
although their part was relatively minor in north 
China. The relevant role of the KMT to be dealt with 
in the present thesis was its armed clashes with the 
CCP in north and central China from 1938 onwards.
These clashes generally involved relatively light 
casualties with up to as many as a few hundred men 
killed, but there were also a few serious incidents, 
and these cases will be dealt with in discussing the 
individual bases. Nevertheless, the New Fourth Army 
Incident of January 19U1 in KzLangsu, c;entral China, 
must be mentioned here since it represented a severe 
deterioration in KMT-CCP relations. Basically, a 
KMT-CCP agreement made it necessary for the New Fourth 
Army to move north of the Yangtze River before Dec­
ember 31, 19U0. For some unknown reasons, a CCP force 
of 9,000 still remained south of the river after the 
deadline, and on January h$ it was surrounded by KMT
38
troops and almost wiped out in a ten-day 'battle. Hsiang
“7" -T'
> the deputy commander, was killed and Yeh
.16■C'ing » the commander, was captured* Johnson
believes the Incident marked an end to the existence of
17the United Front, hut it may be argued that the United 
Front was a much broader alliance between the GOP and 
the bourgeoisie represented by the KMT, in economic and 
political terms, in addition to the military entente* 
Thus despite the armed clashes, Mao's ideology of a 
United Front with the bourgeoisie remained the guiding 
principle ior « .  in t *  Cne.e “  !» poliiicnl
terms, the United Front was demonstrated in the three- 
thirds system, which specified that Communists should 
only occupy one-third of the administrative posts in the 
bases, with the other two-thirds comprising KMT and non- 
aligned members, and great elaborations were taken in
16. For the GGP version of the Incident, see Chieh-fang
jih-pao, September 20, 1943; also see Robert 0* Worth, 
Moscow and Chinese Communists, Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, California, 1953? 191? J* Chfen,
Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 251-292, and Johnson, 
Peasant Nationalism ..., 136-140*
17* Johnson, Peasant Nationalism * * *, 13*
18. Mao's ideas about the economic United Front with  ^
the bourgeoisie have been discussed in chapter I,
. 24-26*
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19the bases throughout the war to observe this principle.
As Johnson indicates, the system was a CCP attempt to
win over all possible support from non-CCP leaders,
landlords, rich peasants and prominent local personnel,
though he thinks that it was not the device for rally-
20ing peasant support. In other words, the system did
demonstrate the existence of a United Pront, which
therefore did not terminate as Johnson suggests with ^
\
the New Fourth Army Incident. To press this point
further, the following is a CCP survey of the practice
21of the three-thirds system in the bases in 1942:
In the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government 
Assembly, only 46 of the total 134 members were 
indicated to have come from the CCP. In the Shansi-
19 . lung Pi-wufkl^^SChung-kuo ohieh-fang-ch>tt shih-
lu ^  (A True Account of the Liberat­
ed Areas in China), San Francisco, Ho-tsQ 1946, 17; 
Compton, Mao1 s China . ♦., xxy. R.C. North points out 
that the party controlled the administration in spite 
of the three-thirds system. Nevertheless, it remains 
true that the system was a means of rallying support 
from non-CCP elements. See R.C. North, Moscoy/ and 
Chinese Communists, 92-93*
20. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 13-14.
21. Wang Ytleh-fei > "Wo-men tsen-yang tsai ti-
hou ken-chtl-ti chien-she hsin-min-chu chu-i cheng- 
chiihu, tVW ^ ° (How
we establish new democratic rule in the bases 
behind enemy lines) Chieh-fang .jih-pao, July 7,
1942.
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Chahar-Hopei Administrative Committee, CCP members 
were reported to have constituted only 10J6 of the 
total with K1I mem'bers occupying 3Q$* In the north­
west Shansi Sub-region Office, CCP members comprised 






















































































































a). The Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Base
Having set up his headquarters in late 1937 in 
mountainous south-east Shansi, Liu Po-ch*eng and his 
129th Division began expanding their area of control 
behind the enemy lines. In December 1937, a contingent 
under the leadership of local party leader Li Ch'ing-yft
sent eastward into the Mopei-Shantung-Honan plain and 
southern Hopei, where guerrilla warfare was conducted*
iment, and in May 1938, forces under Hstl Hsiang-ch*ien, 
then cfeputy commander of the 129th Division, also
22undertook guerrilla resistance in southern Hopei.
Hs*V$ ach^h’^  also comcAclecl wit+L M e  bafWe d f
Hstlchou Ifr * , the important railway junction in
northern Kiangsu, where the Japanese and KMT troops
23
were engaged in a fierce battle* Further organization
22* Ting Ling J , I-erh-chiu-shih yu Chin-Qhi-Lu-
Ju pien Ch'll_ - (The 129th 
Divsions and the Snansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan 
Border Hegion), Shanghai, hsin-hua shu-tien, 1956,
23* An excellent map of the battle of Hstlchou is
given in Kuo-fang-pu shih-liao ch.1l (KMT), (ed*), 
A General Description of Eight Years of Resist­
ance , 12 and map 4 in appendices.
and commander Oh*en Tsai-tao was
In early 1938, Sung Jen-ch* rung1 s cavalry re 
II*
44
was undertaken in southern Hopei later by Teng Hsiao- 
p ' ingplp , then political Commissar of the 129th 
Division, and Yang Hsiu-feng >p| d ll)j' , commander of the 
western Hopei guerrilla contingent. The 129th Division 
also went further eastward, and by July 1938 was able 
to establish a military base on the Shantung-Hopei border
As­
under the leadership of Hsiao Hua^^f , commander of
the 343rd Brigade, who cooperated with local patriots
24and party cadres. Up to the end of 1940, in spite 
of Japanese attacks on the base, was a period of expan­
sion and consolidation for the 129th Division, and its 
most renowned achievement was participation in the 
Hundred Regiments' Offensive, which Liu Po-ch*eng 
claimed had succeeded in crushing Japanese designs to
25advance further towards Sian, Chungking, and Kunming.
The setting up of administrative organizations fo­
llowed in the wake of military establishment. The earliest 
upper level organization in the base was the setting up 
of the sub-region administrative office in soLithern 
Hopei in August 1938 with Yang Hsfru-feng as director, and
24* "The 129th Division and the Shans i-IIope i-Shantung- 
Honan Border Region", Chieh-fang jih-pao, August 
14, 1944. Por details of Yang Hsiu-feng's activit­
ies, his work in mass mobilization, see chapter 3,
97-98.
25. • Liu Po-ch*eng, "Ti hou k'ang-chan ti chan-shu wen-
ti", J/'bpCg (Tactical problems concern­
ing resistance behind enemy lines), Chieh-fang ,jih-
pao, July 7, 1943*
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Sung Jen-ch'iung as his deputy. In August 1940, the 
combined administrative office for southern Hopei and
- v tn.. ) —r?tk -6
T'ai Hang (Ohi-t'ai lien-ho pan-shih ch'u)^?^)^y & J
26was established with Tang Hsiu-feng as director. The
base obtained border government status on July 18, 1941,
with Yang as chairman, under which were the two sub-
region offices of southern Hopei and the Hope i-Shantung-
Honan plain, claiming control over 15 prefectural offices
27and 115 hsien. These figures seem exaggerated as the 
OOP included areas where only guerrilla activities 
were undertaken as being under its jurisdiction. How­
ever, the setting up of the border government repres­
ented a stable administration characterized by the three- 
thirds system with only 46 OOP members in the Assembly 
out of a total of 130. The United Pront policy was 
thus maintained in spite of the New Pourth Army Incident
being only six months earlier. Moreover, leading KMT
28commanders were also elected to the presidium* 
Nevertheless, OOP control became obvious in the inaugur-
26. Ting Ling, The 129th Division and the Shansi- 
Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region, 14, 35* ‘
27. Ohieh-fang .jih-pao, July 21, 1941 (On the Provis­
ional Assembly and administrative divisions in the 
Shansi-Shantung-Honan border region) •
28* Ohieh-fang .jih-pao, July 12, 1941 (On the Prov­
isional Assembly).
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ation of the "border government, as the latter was urged 
to observe the fifteen principal policies formulated
During the climax of the Japanese offensives in 
1941-1942, the plain areas of the base were particularly 
vulnerable to Japanese attacks, and the general policy 
of retrenchment, namely, to cut troops and s i m p l i f y  the 
adminstration, was observed. Intense party reforms in 
the Cheng Feng Movement were mainly responsible for 
recovery in 1943*
As for KMT-CCP clashes in this base, they began 
in late 1938. Trouble started when KMT commander Lu 
Chung-lin v under Chungking order was appointed
governor of Hopei, and set up the Hopei-Chahar war zone 
behind the Japanese lines. The COP was then ordered
30to abolish the CCP sub-region office in southern Hopei.
In June 12-16, 1939, in reprisal for KMT attacks on 
CCP troops in central Hopei in December 1938, the 129th 
Division in southern Hopei attacked KMT troops under
29. Chieh-fang jih-pao July 25? 1941, (On the Shansi-Hopei- 
Shantung-IIonan Border Government).
(An Account of Goverhor lu's return to Hopei from 
Loyang), n.p., n. pub., 1939?? 4, 11, 19-21. This 
is a KMT account of Lu*s activities in Hopei.
by the CCP Northern Party Bureau 29
Du Chung-lin and his lieutenant
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similar clash, occurred in the same area in January™
March 1940, and the OOP seems to have had the upper 
31hand* Another source of tension between the two 
parties was the stationing of KMT troops in northern 
Honan, south of the Yellow River, to the south of the 
OOP basey'SFhese troops were commanded by PJ-ang Ping™
O hsta/fe , and Sun Tien-ying , who
V
eventually defected with their forces to the Japanese
71 o
in 1943* In south-east Shansi, a bitter clash took 
place in December 1939* It originated from the New 
and Old Army Incident of December 1939 in western Shansi 
where troops loyal to Yen Hsi-shan clashed with Yen’s 
own pro-GGP New Army, and the Pirst and Third pro-OCP 
Dare-to-rDie Corps in south-east Shansi were attacked 
by KMT troops in the same month* The Communists suffered 
heavy losses, as four regiments of the Third Corps were
31. Chieh-fang .jih-pao, September 20, 1943 * (On KMT- 
CCP clashes since 193,8J^  Also |Pe "I*11 Chung-lin 
wei-f an kuo-ts1 eu , Jfl (Dn Chung-
lin acting against national interest) Chieh-fang,
70, (May I, 1939)? 5; and Johnson, Peasant Nation­
alism *. *, 121-122.
32. Por the location of the KMT troops see map in 
Headquarters, Tada Corps, Kyosanto JDkyo Sono Ta ,
. . . ,  S e n j i  ,&epjg? S h ir k s  $ $ % £ • * >  &  • ■ 0
(State of Affairs of Chines1© Communist Party,... 1 
War-time monthly report, March, 1941), R 115,
T 1008, F 26532-26540.
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33wiped out*
b) The Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei Base
Of the four bases in north Ohina, this one 
appeared to be the best developed in terms of civil 
administration, as the border government was established 
as early as February 1938, at P1 ingshan—" p ^  , in 
Hopei at the foot of Wut'aishan* Nieh Jung-chen was 
elected chairman, with Sung Shao-wen then in
charge of administration in north-east Shansi, and Hu
Jen-k'uei r^\ the magistrate of Tinghsiang
34 %thsien, Shansi, as deputies* At Pei-yuehj3 i t s e l f
in the Wut'ai mountain, four military regions were set
35up under Nieh*s direct command with a force of 12,000.
In April 1938, a sub-region administrative office was 
set up in central Hopei when two battalions under Lti
VD —r- 4^
Oheng-ts1 ao , the former KMT regiment commander,
wiped out some puppet organizations in that area. From
33*. "129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-
Honan Border Region", (continued), Qhieh-fang .jih- 
pao , August 15, 1944* For further information on 
the Incident, see 54 , n. 49 in this chapter, and 
chapter 3 * 97 *
34. See appendix 2, 286*and Johnson, Peasant Rationalism 
..*, 100.
35. Sun Tuan-fan^i^n, " pa nien chjjng-kang ti Chin-Oh' a
Ohi pien-ch'u"/. (The
Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei Border Region becoming like 
steel after numerous tests) Ohieh-fang jih-pao,
July 10, 1944*
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May 1938 to December 1939* Ho Lung*s detachment of 
the 120th Division also entered central Hopei, to give 
Ltl the needed assistance to defend OOP-held territory 
against the Japanese in flat terrain advantageous to 
the latter. Prom central Hopei, detachments under 
Sung Shao-wen and Teng Hua^lp^p advanced eastward into 
eastern Hopei in June 1938, whilst Hsiao . ,
deputy commander of forces in the base, advanced into
36areas north and west of Peking in the spring of 1939*
These activities were guerrilla in nature rather than
attempts to set up stable administrations, and Johnson
points out that the importance of military activities
around Peiping was, that they gave the Communists
control of that strategic area in the immediate post- 
37war period.
In Pei-ytleh, Japanese troops under Lieutenant- 
General Abe Norihide T advanced towards
36. Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei Border 
Region ...", Ohieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944. 
With reference to Lil Oheng-ts*ao1s activities, 
see Taylor, The Struggle for North Ohina, 102- 
103; and chapter 5 >
37* Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ♦♦., 115*
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Foup1 ing — the OOP stronghold in November 1939? 
hut failed to crush Nieh's forces, and Abe was
O Q
killed. Nieh's forces also participated in the
Hundred Regiments1 Offensive. The period 1941-
1942 saw intense Japanese mopping-up campaigns,
especially in central Hopei where Lti Oheng-ts'ao* s
forces bore the brunt, but the Communists began to
recover by 1943, and Japanese sources reckoned there
were five main COP military regions in the base in
the period September 1943 - June 1944, namely, in
western Hopei, central Hopei, eastern Hopei and areas
39to the west and north of Peiping.
In regard to civil administration after the 
inauguration of the border government in February 
1938, various administrative committees were set up 
at different levels. The general objective in 1940 
was democratically elected administration at all 
levels, and the GOP claimed that village elections
38. The People's Liberation Army 78-80; and
Nieh Jung-chen., f,Lun ti-hou ti k'ang-chan"
(on resistance behind enemy 
lines), Chtln-chung, (The M a s s e s V l l l  
no. 17, (October 16, 1943), 498.
39• Appendix 1, 286.
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were successfully held in 1940 with village chiefs
40chosen by the people. Party control of the civil 
administration also became apparent in 1940, with the 
COP Northern Sub-bureau issuing twenty principal 
policies to be followed by administrations at various 
levels.^ Democratic practices were elaborately 
observed with the evident purpose of gaining non-CGP 
support. In July 1942, it was claimed that the per­
centage of citizens taking part in local elections was 
78.3$ at hsien level, 81.4$ at district level, and 
83*9$ at village level. In .addition, the three-thirds 
system was said to have been observed with CCP members
occupying only 10$ of the posts in the administrative
42
committee of the base. In view of the intense 
Japanese pressure 1941-1942, the border government 
assembly was not convened till January 1943, when 288
40. Mu , "Chin-Ch* a-Chi chieh-fang-chJtl ti min-
chu chien^sheH , ® ^
(Democratic achievements.of the Shansi-Ohahar- 
Hopei Border Region) Chtln-chung. IX, No. 13 
(July 15, 1944), 553*
41. Ibid..
42. Wang Ytieh-fei, uHow we establish new democratic 
rule ... H , Chieh-fang tjih-pao, July 7, 1942.
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43members were elected to the assembly. By the end
of 1943 and early 1944, the GOP had established four
sub-region administrative offices in Pei-yueh;,. central
Hopei, the region north of Peiping, and eastern Hopei.
The first two regions were much more significant, with
82 of the total of 98 hsien the OOP claimed to control. ^
At the same:. time, the COP admitted that in these
hsien, apart from Poup*ing, none of the hsien cities
45were in Communist hands.
Serious KMT-CCP clashes in the base began with
KMT governor Lu CMng-lin's arrival in Hopei in the
summer of 1938, although M  Cheng-ts'ao and Lu did
4 6cooperate for a short period of time* In December
1938, L1!l Cheng-tsfaof s  headquarters was attacked by 
*
KMT troops under Chang Yin-wu, and some CCP cadres 
were captured and executed. In Pei-yueh, the CCP 
reported that KMT troops under Pai Chi-i sur-
I 10? A:
rounded the CCP hsien of K w a n g n i n g a n d  Hingwu^^M
43. Mu I, “Democratic achievements , chtin-chung 
IX, No. 13 (July 15, 1944), 553; and “Chin-ChJaj^ 
Chi pien-ch1*! tsan-i-hui ti ch1 eng-kung"
(The success of the assembly in the 
Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei Border Region), (editorial), 
Chieh-fang .jih-pao, March 10, 1943.
44. Mu I, “Deomocratic achievements ... “ , Chiin-chung, 
IX, No. 13, 553.
45. Sun Yuan-fan “The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border 
Region ...“, Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 10, 1944.
46. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 167.
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in October 1939» whilst the Japanese were attaching
47the Communists, and shot a number of CCP cadres*
c) The Shansi-Suiyuan Base
With his force entrenched in north-west Shansi 
at the beginning of the war, Ho Lung expanded his 
area of activities in September 1938 by sending a 
detachment into eastern, southern, and central Suiyuan, 
as well as the Chahar border to conduct guerrilla 
activities* Thus the CCP Included parts of Suiyuan 
in this base although the main area was really con­
fined to north-west Shansi. Another detachment was sent
to central Hopei between May 1938 and December 1939
48as seen in the Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei base. As has 
been mentioned earlier, the main function oflhis base 
was to provide a channel of communication between 
Yenan and the bases in north China, and being situated
47* Por LUL Cheng-ts1 ao1 s clash with KMT troops, see 
Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 20, 1943* Por 
clashes in Pei-yueh, see Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shansi- 
Chahar-Hopei Border Region •.» ", Chieh-fang jih- 
pao , July 10, 1944*
48. Lin Peng, ’The North-west Shansi base ..♦ behind 
enemy lines", Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 8, 1944?
The Peopled Liberation Army during the ... War, 
47-48.
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relatively further away from large concentration 
of Japanese forces, it was generally true that 
Japanese attacks on this base were relatively less 
severe.
The establishment of civil administration was 
started directly as a resizlt of the New and Old Army 
Incident in western Shansi. Yen Hsi-shan's New Army
was commanded by Hstl Fan-ting $|fwOj , a KMT member,
but was in sympathy with the Communists. The COP had
by 1939 also been organizing the Dare-to-Die corps
within Yen's camp under the United Front. Reacting
to this intense COP infiltration, KMT troops in
Yen's camp in December 1939 suddenly turned on these
pro-CCP forces stationed in western and south-east 
49Shansi. As a result of this clash, Hstfc's New Army 
and the Dare-to-Die Corps went over to the OOP camp.
HstL was also elected director of the north-west Shansi
50
sub-region administrative office on February 15, 1940.
49. O.A. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 105-106; 
G-.E. Taylor, Struggle for North China, 166. For 
further information on the New and Old Army 
Incident with reference to CCP mass mobilization 
programmes, see chapter III, 95-97.
50. Lin Feng, "The north-west Shansi base ... behind 
enemy lines", Chieh-fang ,jih-pao, July 8, 1944;
f m n— 11 ■ 1111 ii inn- ■■nil n i ' 1 ti - ~~i—r^n-V-|n ill i ■! i
also see "Chan-tou chung ch1 ang-jfch'J eng'- ti. Chin-sui 
pien-ch'il", a*1®
G-rowth of the Shansi-Suiyuan border region amidst 
combats and struggles) Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 
17, 1944.
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The years 1941 and 1942 in this "base wetc 
devoted to organizing village elections as a pre­
liminary to electing a north-west Shansi provisional 
assembly, which came into being in October 1942.
The usual three-thirds system was said to have been 
observed in the composition of membership in the 
assembly, which had 145 members. Party influence was
obvious as the assembly adopted the principal policies
51laid down by the party Sub-bureau for Shansi-Suiyuan.
By the end of 1943 and early 1944, the OOP claimed to 
be in control of six hsien cities in north-west Shansi, 
the two main centres being Lin Hsien and
Hsing Hsien^til^ The GOP forces then were mainly
composed of Ho Lung's 120th Division, HsflL Pan-ting's 
Anti-Japanese New Army, and the Second and Pourth 
Dare-to-Die Corps.^
51. Por the inauguration of the provisional assembly
A.nr3 its Tifllifii.fiA. Rfifi "Ohu. Ohin hsi.-noi lin~tsfan—
Ghieh-fang jih-pao, November 17, 1942, (on north- 
west Shansi). Por the directions given by the 
party bureau, see Ghieh-fang jih-pao. October 31, 
1942.
52• The State of the Liberated Areas during the Anti-
nui" congratulations to
the north-west Shansi Provisional Assembly), 
(editorial), Chieh-fang jih-pao, November 4, 1942;
53* See appendix 1, 287.
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Situated farthest from Yenan, this base was 
also the only one in which the Eighth Route Army 
regulars did not arrive till the late spring of 
1939* Thus in the initial period, OOP activities were 
confined to cooperation with local guerrilla units 
organized by local Communist cadres. After the outbreak 
of the war, the Japanese advanced south from Peiping 
along the Tientsin-Pukow line. Techou i was
occupied in late September, but further advance towards 
T s i n a n ? H ^  1 capital, was put to a temporary
stop because of negotiations between Japan and Han 
Pu-ch*u /the governor of Shantung. This
bargaining eventually failed to reach an agreement, 
and the Japanese Second Army occupied the capital 
on December 24, 1937, and marched through Tsining 
southwards to T'aierchuang t? on the southern
border. Earlier, Han had ignored the Chinese Rational 
Government1 s order which commanded him to defend the 
provincial capital. Instead, Han fled with his army 
to the south, whilst at the same time ordering the 
majority of his administrators in the province to 
retreat. He was eventually sentenced to death and
57
executed for his cowardly behaviour on January 24,
n 541938, in Hankow. His exodus from the province
created a vacuum which encouraged the organizations
of local resistance against the Japanese. This was
especially so in Shantung, which historically was
famous for the organization of secret societies,
and where people were used to the idea of arming
themselves for local defence. The mountains in the
province, especially T'aishan in the central
part, also provided good shelter for guerrilla activ-
. + . 55lties.
In December 1937, the first resistance organized 
by the Communists appeared. In the eastern part of 
C h i a o c h o u p e n i n s u l a ,  Li Ch*i 1 ^ 3 ^  , secretary 
of the party area committee there, and seventeen cadres
54* For an account of the general advance of the
Japanese in Shan-tung, September-December, 1937, 
see C.A. Johnson, Peasant nationalism ..., 109- 
110; T.A. Bisson, Japan in China, Macmillan,
New York, 1938, 336-337• Taylor also believes 
that Han Fu-ch’u's refusal to fight the Japanese 
was no better and no worse than the other war­
lord Yen Hsi-shan, see G.E. Taylor, The Struggle 
for North China, 167♦
55. Hou shen^l^i^ , "Hsin Shan-tung ti ch1 ang-ehfeng11, 
- ^ s - v < v a ( T h e  Growth of new Shantung) 
Chieh-fang .jih-pao, July 21, 1944.
58
organized over a thousand peasants. Li Ch'i was
later killed in action. In central Shantung, Li
Yii , the Shantung party secretary, and about
forty cadres,* formed the nucleus of guerrilla resist-
56ance in the T'aishan area. The most active non-CCP
resistance was organized by Fan Chu-hsien ; a
former district official in Han's government, who
rallied a force of 1,600 comprising peasants as well
as young patriotic students in western Shantung on
the border with Hopei. The resistance activities
were complicated by the presence of KMT troops under
Shen Hung-lieh 5 appointed as governor for
Shantung to organize resistance forces. Fan was
killed in battle against the Japanese in November
1938 at Liaoch* e n g w h e n  the latter launched
a major offensive against guerrillas. The Communists
accused KMT troops of being responsible for the death
57of Fan, whose supplies were cut off by them.
56. IIou Shen, “The growth of new Shantung", Chieh- 
fang ,iih-pao, July 21, 1944; Hu Hua, Reference 
Sources on the History of the New Democratic 
Revolution in China, 433*
57* Hou Shen, “The growth of new Shantung", Chieh- 
fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944; Johnson, Peasant 
Nationalism ..♦, III-II2.
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The arrival of Ch'en Kuangfs Eastern
Advance Detachment of the 115th Division in the late
spring of 1939 strengthened the position of the CCP in
the province. Ch'en1s headquarters was in Ichou
southern Shantung. In the meantime, Hsiao IIuafs
detachment of the 129th Division had already been
active on the Shantung-Hopei border since the summer
of 1938. Uniform command of CCP forces in the province
was maintained in April 1939? when Hsfi Hsiang-ch1ien,
then deputy commander of the 129th Division, was put
in charge of the 115th Division in Shantung, as well
as the newly created Shantung Column (Shan-tung tsung- 
58tui). By the end of 1943, Hsil was in command of
all CCP forces in the Shantung-Kiangsu-Honan border
59region with headquarters in central Shantung.
The establishment of civil administration at the 
upper level did not materialize till August 1940, 
when the Shantung war-time administration committee
58. Por the location of GCP■forces in Shantung, see 
Headquarters,Tada Corps,.State-of Affairs of 
CCP. March 1941, R 115, T 1009, F 26532-26540.
59. See Appendix l, 287o
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,1:1
was set up south of Chtl Hsien 4-7 *y)\ in southern 
Shantung, with Li Yd, the pioneer of COP resist­
ance, as chairman* A provisional assembly was also 
60elected* By 1943-1944, the Communists claimed
to have established five independent regions within
the base with seventeen prefectural offices in control
6ILof ninety-six hsien organizations. This estimate 
obviously included areas with only guerrilla activit­
ies. The main centre of CCP strength was in fact in 
mountainous central Shantung, southern Shantung, and 
in the eastern part of Chiaochou peninsula, that is 
roughly coinciding with areas where CCP forces were 
stationed*
CCP clashes with KMT troops in 1938 described 
earlier became more intense in 1939* In April that 
year, KMT forces under Ch'in C h i - y u n g K ^  killed 
three hundred of the Shantung Column of the Eighth 
Route Army, including seventy officers, cadres, and 
the director of the political department. This was 
known as the T*aiho Incident at Poshan +4^ <A.\
central Shantung. In August, 1939, CCP troops were
60. See Appendix 2, 289*
61. Hou Shen, "The growth of new Shantung", Chieh- 
fang .jih-pao, July 21, 1944*
6 1
62again attacked by Gain's forces, but a KMT
source also shows that the GOP was not merely on
the defensive as Oh1in himself was eventually killed
63in clashes with the Communists.
62. Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu ^ 51 ^  ,
Lu-chung-ch'tli k*ang-Jih min-chu cheng-ch’tian, 
chien-she oh^i-nien lai ti chi-pen tsung-ohieh 
chi chin-hou chi-pen ,1en-wu\
- t ^ St» /Vf 1 ^  ^  (A Summary
of the Reconstruction of the Anti-Japanese Dem­
ocratic Regime in Luchung in the Last Seven 
Years and Its Future Tasks), n.p., same, 1945, 
2-3; also see Hou Shen, "The growth of new 
Shantung”, Ohieh-fang jih-pao, July 21, 1944.
63* C.M. Wang, History of the OOP, III, 362.
CHAPTER III
Village Administration and Mass Mobilization in
ng Feng Period (1938 - Jan. 1942)
Having given a general survey of the CCP bases 
in north China in the period 1938 - 1943, it is now 
necessary to examine Communist contribution to 
village administration and mass mobilization during 
the war* The present study concentrates on the pre-Cheng 
Feng period, that is, from 1938 to January 1942. It 
may be said that up to 1937, governments in China 
could exercise direct control only as far down as 
the hsien (county) level, and this applied without 
exception to the authority of the KMT government.
The administration of local governments below the 
hsien level was to a large extent in the hands of 
the landlord-gentry class. As early as the 192CLLs , 
the CCP with its peasants1 associations had experi­
mented with the disruption of hsien as a barrier to 
effective central control by organizing peasants
I. For a comprehensive explanation of how the 
la.ndlord~ge.ntry class controlled the local 
administration, and acted as a barrier to 
effective mass mobilization at the village 
level, see Kuo Ping-chia, China New Age and New 
Outlook, Penguin Books Ltd., England, I960, 
34-35, 63*
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from below at the village level, where the admini­
strative power was often taken over from the
2
landlords who were purged and persecuted. However, 
these early CCP attempts to exercise influence over 
the villages and organise the masses were compara­
tively small-scale operations, as the Communists 
themselves were then hotly pursued by KMT troops 
and they were fighting bitterly for their own survival.
With the setting up of the four major bases 
in north China covering extensive areas behind the 
enemy lines, the Communists by 1938 were given a 
good chance to organize the masses from below, that 
is at the village level. To a large extent, these 
CCP efforts proved to be a success in the period 
1938-1945 and contributed a great deal to the rise of
2. Por a detailed account of the anti-landlord 
movement led by the peasants' associations in 
Kiangsi, 1926-1927, see Chung-kuo^^lmng-ch1 an- 
tang ti li-shih tzu-liao M3l^ f / \ 7 & ^ ^  'jv 
collection of Historical Material on the Revolu­
tionary struggle in Kiangsi under the leader­
ship of the Chinese Communist Party), Kiangsi, 
Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1958, I, 242-255* Chang 
Kuo-tao, the leading CCP figure in the 1920s and 
1930s, also gave a critical account of the history 
of the peasants' associations in his^  memoirs:
Chang Kuo-tao, "Wo-ti hui-i" (my reminis­
cences) Ming Pao Monthly, Hong Kong, III, No. 3, 
95-98. Also see John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tnng in 
Opposition ..., 61-64, 101-103? 161-165, suid 
259-260.
64
Communist power after the Second World War. In 
addition, this stuccess in mass mobilization and' 
direct control of the villages meant that the 
Communists had successfully disrupted the hsien as 
a harrier to effective central control down to the 
villages.
It must he explained in the first place that
Communist local administration in the hases was to
a large extent controlled hy geographical position.
The series of Japanese military campaigns against
the Communists, and the building up of Japanese
commuhication lines linking strategic points which
were in turn well defended hy fortresses, necessarily
broke up the CCP hases into isolated positions no
more than a few villages in size, especially in
3
territories adjacent to the occupied areaf The 
situation was most acute for the Communists in 1941- 
1942, when the Japanese and their puppets launched
3. Many Communist sources described how Japanese
troops blockaded and isolated CCP bases, especially 
in the period 1941-1942: Ihe People’s Libex,ation 
Army during the Anti-Japanese War, 119-120, 137-145; 
Hu Hua, Reference Sources on the Hew Democratic 
Revolution in China, 454-455. Some aspects of the 
Japanese pressure on the CCP bases are also dealt 
with in Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 5,41, 
54-56. Japanese pressure on the bases in the period 
1941-1942 will be dealt with in full detail in 
chapter four.
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a series of four mopping-up campaigns in the Oh’iang-
hua chih-an y&n-tung (The movement
to Reinforce Law and Order), and an average of 10,000
to 20,000 troops was employed every time in attacking
4the various GOP "bases.
Although these mopping-up campaigns did not "bring
about results as fruitful as the Japanese would have
expected, they definitely caused a recession in the
strength of the OOP bases in north Ghina. This effect
on the Communists can be seen in the following statistical
excerpt from a report by Yeh Ghien-ying, the chief-of-
staff of the 18th Army Group which comprised the Eighth
5Route Army and the New Pourth Army:
4* Por details of the four mopping-up campaigns in
1941, including the report of unsatisfactory progress
of the campaigns by Wang I-tang , then
chairman of the puppet regime of the north China 
Political Council, see chapter 4, 134-137•
5. Yeh Ghien-ying, "Chung-loing k'ang-chan i-pan cheng-
k ’ uang chi eh- shao ”, M{y (An i nt r o -
duction to the general situation of OOP’s resistance) 






* OOP armed strength Included guerrillas as well 
as regulars.
1940 actually marked the climax of COP
power, hut 1941 and the first half of 1942 were
times of adversity, when the Japanese military
pressure was the heaviest ever since the start of
the war. This can he illustrated in the ratio of
6war casualties reported:
Enemy* : OOP
1937 (Sept.)-1938 (May) 1 : 1
1940 (June)-1941(May) 1.2: 1
1941 (June)-1942(May) 1.3: 1
*Enemy included hoth Japanese and puppet troops.
As far as the administration of local govern­
ments is concerned, the OOP in 1941 found it necessary 
to reduce the number of offices at the hsien and






oil'll (district) levels in order to meet the challenge 
of the Japanese onslaughts* For instance, at the 
12th administrative conference of the Shansi-Hopei- 
Shantung-Honan Border Government in December 1941, 
it was decided that the offices of some hsien should 
be incorporated into one, whilst some others were 
to take over the administration of districts under 
them. In addition, small size hsien were not to 
administer districts and the number of districts was 
in turn reduced by 40fo of the original* This was 
in actual fact part of the programme to cut troops 
and simplify the administration which became necess­
ary in view of the growing Japanese pressure since the 
beginning of 1941* The effect of the above on the 
local administration, as illustrated in the examples 
of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government,
g
was that it made the adminstrative village virtually 
the unit directly under the hsien in the graded levels
7* Chieh-fang .jih-pao, January 27? 1942.
8. The administrative village (hsing-cheng ts'un)
, was the basic CCP unit of local 
administration, consisting of several tzu-jan 
ts'un^^^j , or ordinary village.
68
of local government, as district administration was 
considered uneconomical to run,
Furthermore, the functioning of the administrat­
ive village hecame all the more important and fund­
amental where OOP controlled hsien were either too 
small or situated in marginal areas, where COP 
influence could only he extended to part of the hsien, 
the other part "being either in the hands of the 
Japanese or the KMT. Statistics compiled from cont­
emporary Communist sources, illustrating the number 
of villages per hsien and the population per village
in the CCP hases, also indicate the emergence of
9
the village as a significant local unit:
9- Sources were compiled from Chieh-fang ,jih-pao,
July 21, 1941, March 23, 1942, April 12, April 
20, 1942, and July 10, 1944. It must he emphasized 
that figures shown in the chart may vary slightly 
from month to month, in view of the tremendous 
number of military operations engaged in hy both 
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A few points from the chart on page 69 are worth 
examining. In north-west Shansi, where the terrain 
was mountainous, villages far apart, and the "base 
closest to the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Government (separ­
ated only by the Yellow River), the administrative 
village became a very realistic local authority, espec­
ially when each hsien comprised only an average of 11 
administrative villages. As for the average population
per administrative village, the figure 7,500 was surp-
10risingly high. In the case of the Shansi-IIopei- 
Shantung-Honan region, the average number of administ­
rative villages per hsien stood as high as 300, but 
each village was again an independent, hasic, admin­
istrative unit, especially in the sub-region of the 
Hopei-Shantu.ng-Ho.nan plain, where one administrative 
village was cut off from another by the numerous
Japanese fortresses, strategic points, blockades and
IIcommunication networks.
10. Activities of the administrative village in north­
west Shansi are given in Mu Hsi.n^f^rX , Qhin-sui 
ohieh-fang-oh,li min-ping k*ang-Jih tou-cheng san-
(Random Rotes of the Militia*s Anti-Japanese 
Struggle in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area), 
Shanghai, jen-min ch*u-pan-she, 1959> 1-8.
11. lao ChufS^y , 'JLun mu-chien ti-hou chan-cheng ti t*e- 
ti,en" On the characteristics of the pre­
sent war behind the enemy lines) Chieh-fang jih-nao, 
May 3, 1943* lao in his article explained how GCP 
bases in the plains were blockaded.
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Having seen the emergence of the administrative 
village as a practical and realistic local unit, the 
next step is to analyse the various administrative 
organizations at this local level, especially the 
work of mass mobilization. At the head of the admin-
— ?  —  / i' ^
istrative village was the chu-jen tai-piao 
or chief representative, with the village administ­
rative office (ts’un kung-so) ^ a s  his head­
quarters. Under him might he several heads of the
village as each of these administrative villages might
12comprise as many as ten ordinary villages. The 
chief representative was generally assisted by a 
village committee; for instance, in 1941, in the OOP 
sub-region of southern Hopei, there were as many as
13743 of these committees in the administrative villages.
12. A survey was done in north-west Shansi in which 
over 100 administrative villages comprising 1,000 
ordinary villages were involved, that is, an 
average of nearly 10 of the latter to each of the 
former. See Chieh-fang tjih-pao, April 20, 1942.
For a chart illustrating the administrative struct­
ure from the hsien to the village level in north­
west Shansi, see Research Section, Central Committee 
for the Extermination of Communism, SanseishU Sei- 
hokubu Hi.i(T ChUaa HUkoku il\$? %  vfc> j li ^
'fe % \ ( S u r v e y  of Banditry in Northwest 
ShansU Province), July 1940. B 114, F 26116-26118.
13. Leng P i n g ^ ^ L ,  ^ 'Chieh-shao Chin-Chi-Lu-Ju pien-
(To introduce the Shansi- 
Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region) Chieh-fang 
.jih-pao, March 23, 1942.
12
The term chief representative itself suggests elections, 
and indeed the OOP went to great length of elaboration
tatives, and the well-publicized three-thirds system 
was also observed as far as possible to ensure OOP
After the establishment of the various bases in 
north China, the Communists were intent on introducing 
village elections and wanted as many people participating 
in these elections as possible. For instance, statistics 
for village elections in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border 
G-over.nme.nt showed that in 1938, 40-50 fo of the population 
participated in these elections, whilst in 1940, it rose 
to 70 *fo9 and in central Hopei, it reached 80 and the
Communist strongholds in the mountains of- Shansi.,like P'ing-
ySV
shan and Ningshou ^  , nearly 90 i<> of the population in
the village voted in 1940* Apparently, the method of
14* Tung Pi-wu, A True Account of the Liberated Areas 
in China, 17*22*
15. ;figures were from Chi e h-f ang ,i ih-p ao , July lQ,1944, 
August 11,1941,July 7,1942;also The State of the 
Liberated Areas d^uring the Anti-Japanese War,31 *
to organize the villagers' conference (ts'un-min ta-hui) 
f t  k K t , with the purpose of electing these represen 
members did not appear to have dominated the situation 14
election was crude, and the show of hand method was 
very often preferred to voting by ballot because of 
the high percentage of illiteracy. Furthermore, the 
Communist cadres pla.yed an important part in guiding 
election procedures and the inert masses very often 
had to be encouraged to take part in these elections*
It is interesting to note here that the CCP did attempt 
to evolve a method akin to voting by ballot for the 
illiterate villagers, although its many drawbacks 
prevented it from becoming the prevailing practice in 
elections. Ballot baskets were attached to the back 
of seats occupied by candidates in elections, and a 
voter cast his or her vote by putting a bean into the 
relevant basket.*^
To understand CCP enthusiasm in fostering village 
elections, and in fact at higher local levels as well, 
it is necessary to survey the situation of the country­
side when the Communists set up their bases. Apart 
from the Japanese military pressure, it was local 
influences in the villages that stood in the way of 
effective CCP administration, and the CCP found that 
the best way to overcome these hindrances was to 
evolve these elections, so that undesirable elements 
in the local government could be eliminated and
16. Tung Pi-wu, A True Account of the Liberated Areas 
in China, 22*
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Communist orientated people could take their place*
These local influences which the Communists wanted 
to get rid of could be divided into three categories, 
namely, the secret societies, local bullies who were 
locally entrenched elements able to exert influence 
over local villagers, often through intimidation and 
illegal means, and lastly, the landlords, with the 
last being the most formidable opponent.
Superstition had for centuries established its 
roots in the countryside amongst peasants in China, 
hence the popularity of secret societies as exemplif­
ied in large scale rebellions like the White Lotus 
Rebellion at the end of the 18th century. In the 
Communist bases of Shantung and the Hopei-Shantung- 
Honan plain, secret societies seemed most active and 
their influence definitely infiltrated into the local 
administrations, utilizing superstition as the cement­
ing force amongst peasants. For instance-, the Lu,i 
Li Society , "the Pai Chi Society
and the Red Spear Society %  were particularly
active and influential in the Hopei-Shantung-Honan P1 ain *
17* Leng Ping, uTo introduce the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung- 
Honan Border Region11, Chi eh-fang jih-pao, March f 
23, 1942; Sun Ilstleh-lu » 1 Ohi-nan tung-hsin '
(News from southern Hopei) Chf tin-chung
II, No. 14, 641-642. Also see Chieh-fang 
,i ih-ioao, July 21, 1944*
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C.A. Johnson points out that the Communist Army-
advised oadres to adopt a hands-off p o l i c y  toward
secret societies in the various bases. This perhaps
18represented CCP policy in the late 1930s, but with 
Communist organizations established on firmer ground 
by 1942, actions against secret societies were taken 
in the north China bases. Por instance, in early 
1942, the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Govern­
ment decreed that participations in secret societies
19would be considered as traitorous behaviour.
The influence of local bullies was also apparent 
as Communist sources revealed that many of them 
managed to establish themselves in the village admin-
18. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..♦, 88. Johnson*s 
information on the activities of the secret 
societies in north China was quoted from Japan­
ese military archives of 1939: see n. 56 (chapter 
3), 217.
19. "The decree of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan
Border Government”, Chi eh-fang jih-pao, March 30, 
1942.
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20istration as deputy chief representatives, hut perhaps
they did not offer as much resistance to the Communists
as the landlords, whose influence prevailed over
Communist-controlled villages. This was mainly because
21of the CCP adoption of the United Front policy, which 
in essence tolerated the lesser landlords and sought 
the cooperation of the national bourgeoisie, especially 
in the CCP bases in north China, where the good will 
and cooperation of the landlords and rich peasants 
were even more needed because of the intense Japanese 
military and economic pressure, particularly in the 
years 1941 and 1942. In spite of the good work done 
by the Communists in safeguarding the interest of the 
poor peasants, landlords still had a great say in the 
economic life of the villages, mainly because of the 
great acreage of land they held and which they let to
20. For accounts of participations by local bullies in 
village administration, see Sun Yuan-fan, "The 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border region becoming like 
steel Chi eh-fang ,j ih-pao, July 10, 1944;
The State of the Liberated Areas during tne Anti- 
Japanese War, 31; and Research Section, Central 
Committee for the Extermination of Communism, Kichu- 
ku Ghubu Chiho Ni Okeru Chukyo No Minshu ICakutoku 
Kosaku Ji-faau.jo Ohoaa Hokoku, 1 i 
cr> (Field Survey of Chinese
Communist Efforts to Win Support of People in Central 
Hopei), May, 1940. R 114, T 999, F 26300.
21. The need for the CCP to seek the cooperation of the 
bourgeoisie in the United Front Policy was explained
in chapter 1, 25-26.
tjrj
their tenants* The following ohart relating to
north-west Shansi in early 1942 illustrates this 
22point:
rich middle poor
landlords peasants peasants peasant!
$ in the class 
structure* 2 . 8 5 $ 5 . 5 $ 3 1 . 6 $ 5 1 $
$ of land held. 1 4 . 6 $ 1 2 . 5 $ 4 5  $ 2 5 - 5  $
land held per 
head (in Mou, or 
1 / 6  acre)
8 8 . 2 3 3 . 3 8 2 3 . 8 9 . 5 8
* minor figures representing the merchants and intell­
ectuals are omitted as they hear no significance here.
Investigations in north-west Shansi on the rent­
ing and letting situation in December 1941 reveal; 
the following facts. In the two villages of Hsin 
Ts*un P a o ^ ^ ^ ~ £ ,  in Ningwu hsien, surveys Indicate 
that landlords did not rent any land from others, hut
22. Wei Wen 4 > “Ghin hsi-pei ti tu-ti wen-ti11,
(zo3 ^ X ) 3 (Land problem in north­
west Shansi) Qhieh-fang jih-pao, April 20, 1942. 
This survey was taken from 18 hsien in north­
west Shansi, with figures from 100 administrative 
villages and nearly 1,000 ordinary villages.
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only let it to tenants. On the other hand, five-
sixths of poor peasants1 land, and two-thirds of
middle peasants1 land were rented, in most oases,
23
from landlords. This means that landlords could 
therefore exercise tremendous influence over tenants 
because they had the right to take back the rented 
land .if they wished. This right was known as "ch'ou
ti»i or land repossession,^^ and it was not 
until 1943 that the Communists were able to safe­
guard the interest of the tenants and poor peasants 
against the exploitations of the landlords.
As it was, the landlord-class up to the period 
late 1941 and early 1942 had great power to dictate 
the economic situation in the villages. The pao-chia 
system for instance was very much under the sway of 
the landlords. To offset the landlords1 influence, 
the CCP utilized the election and re-election of
23. Ibid..
24* Por details of how land repossession offered
the greatest threat to the tenants, see 116-117.
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village heads and chief representatives as the means 
to elevate the position of its proteges, the poor 
and middle peasants* This was evident in north­
west Shansi in the percentage of class-composition 
of elected village., leaders in 1941* The figures 
were taken from 55 administrative villages selected 
from II hsien:
poor peasants, landlords and
tenants and middle rich
labourers peasants peasants
Chief represent­




53# 32 # 14#
The cadres were mainly responsible for getting 
the village elections moving and they were in the 
best position to see that their proteges were nominated
25* "Ohan-tou chung, ch*eng-chjang ti Chin-sui pien-
ch,fLM, ^ ^ ^ ^ ( T h e  Shansi- Suiyuan 
border growing up from combats) Qhieh-fang jih- 
pao, July 16, 1944i and The State of the Liber­
ated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War, 104*
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for elections. The whole democratic experiment was 
in fact quite paternalistic, hut even so, it was 
unprecedented in the history of village administrat­
ion. The important role of these cadres who acted 
as the pivot in villages can he seen in eager efforts 
on the part of the Japanese to eliminate them. During 
the climax of the Japanese pressure in 1941 and 1942, 
thousands of cadres were reported to have heen killed 
as they were regarded as the root of the problem hy 
the Japanese, and the heaviest casualties were in 
the plain of central Hopei, where defence was difficult,
and in the strategic, mountainous areas of the Shansi-
2 6Chahar-Hopei hase.
The general principle of democratic centralism 
can also he seen at work in the villages. Whilst 
elections symbolized limited democracy, cadres who 
were mainly responsible for supervising these elect­
ions took orders from seniors at levels above them 
as well as observing directives and instructions from 
above. Hence power was traced back to the respective
26. The State of the Liberated Areas *.., 32-33,
and Sun Yuan-fan, HThe Shansi-Ghahar-Hopei Border 
Region becoming like steel . , Chieh-fang ,jih-
pao, July 10, 1944*
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highest administrative organizations in the bases.
In addition, the party kept a close watch on the
administration with the setting up of party sub-
7 V P
bureau (fen-chtl) 7) , in each of the four bases
27in north China. These four party sub-bureauXin 
turn received orders from the Northern Party Bureau 
(Pei-fang Ch&)3t^)^?) , which was directly under the 
CCPCC. The power of the party central was felt through 
the issuing of party directives which were to be 
observed down to the village level, at least theoret­
ically, and cadres were to see that they were carried 
out. A typical example can perhaps illustrate how 
it worked. On August 13, 1940, the CCP Northern Party 
Bureau issued according to the principles of the CCPCC 
an outline policy which applied to and was to be 
observed by the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base. It specified 
that the Border G-overnment must not levy any additional 
tax in the base, and stricter measures were to be 
introduced to get rid of corruption, and to stop un­
necessary expenditure. This particular policy was 
then passed by the Border Region Assembly concerned,
27. Por details of the four party Sub-bureauXin 
the north China bases, see chapter 5, 181.
82
and the programmes were to toe carried out throughout
28the toase down to village level*
In view of the isolated position of the villages, 
one would hardly expect the directives of the North­
ern Party Bureau to toe otoserved to the letter in the 
villages, and a great deal of flexibility in fact 
existed in the execution of orders and directives, 
which was in the hands of the cadres at the different 
local levels* Before going into the difficulties of 
CCP efforts to maintain centralism at the villa,ges, 
it must toe pointed out that CCPCC directives and res­
olutions very often were carried out right down to 
the villages. Por instance, an important CCPCC 
directive on August 1, 1941, laid down that there 
were to toe scientific and statistical investigations 
and surveys into the different class structures, land
29problems and local condition m  the various villages.
resolution on investigations and research) Chieh- 
fang jih-pao, September 8, 1941* (The resolution 
was passed on August 1, 1941).
Hsiang Sheng J'Chin-Ch'a-Chi pien-ch*tl ts*ai- 
cheng chien-she chung ti chaiig-ch,tln7^ a’^' AiXt p^ 7^^I5^
(Spectacular progress in the finan­
cial reconstruction of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei 
Border Region) Chieh-fang jih-pao, September 7, 1941#
"Chung-kuiyg chung-yang kuan-yu t1 iao^ch’a yen-chiu 
t i  c h t t e h - t i n g ^  (COPCO
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By February 1942, detailed reports of the various
land problems in the bases were already published
with detailed statistics of landlord-tenant relations
30at the village level. An even more detailed report 
of the background and intellectual level of the 
various heads and chief representatives in the villages 
of north-west Shansi was published in March 1942 accord­
ing to the instructions of the central directive men­
tioned above.^
Whilst central authority could sometimes be felt 
as far down as the villages, defects in this machinery 
of democratic centra,lism were also inevitable, and 
the determining factor rested with the cadres. In the 
first place, there was often insufficient liaison 
between cadres a# different levels because of the 
growth of regional isolation resultant from the acute 
Japanese pressure. The result was senior cadres were
30. The report was on the situation of the rent- 
reduction programme in the COP bases:Huang Wei- 
wen ? "Kuan-yu ken-chtL-ti chien-tsu
chien-hsi--ti i-hsieh ts1 ai-liao1^
(Some sources on the reduction 
of rent and interest in the bases) Chieh-fang 
3ih-pao, Pebruary II, 1942.
31. North-west Shansi Commissioner1s Office^ "Hsing- 
hsien ts'un-ch1 ang ts * e-yen",
(Tests on village chiefs of Using Hsien) Chieh-fang 
jih-pao, March I, 1942.
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unable to extend to village cadres sufficient guid-
32
ance and leadership which the latter defintely needed.
In addition, the lack of liaison also led to long delays
in the passing on of party directives. For instance,
in north-west Shansi, regulations governing services
rehdered by villagers in the war of resistance were
released at top level in October 1941, but it was not
until January 1942 that chief representatives of the
33administrative villages received these directives.
As far as central control was concerned, this time-gap 
meant that village administration was often left to 
the discretion of the cadres in the absence of central 
directives, producing greater flexibility and less 
central control. The disadvantage of this flexibility 
was sometimes evident because of the inadequacies of
32. For accounts of these defects, see H0n party lead­
ership1^ (editorial), Chieh-fang ,jih-pao, October 24, 
1942; Ying Yung/jf^ , ,fltJl^ h-lun Ghin hsi-pei ^ ssu-_ 
ch'ft cheng-ch'dan kung-tso ti chtleh-tien1', <5
31 (£> brief talk on the defects of
the administration in the Fourth District of north­
west Shansi) Chieh-fang ,1 ih-pao, July 2, 1942; and 
Sugiyama Corps, Pacification Unit, Sanseisho" Wajunken 
chihcT kyosan chiku jokyo hokokusho B  ^
7I ( R e p o r t  on Communist Areas 
in Hoahun Hsien, Shansi), August 8, 1939, R 113»
T 944> F 24502.
33. Ying Yungv, HA talk on the defects in the Fourth 
District ...11, Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 2, 1942.
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village cadres, and the Cheng Peng Movement of 1942
therefore particularly saw that these mistakes be 
34corrected. The main weakness of locaJL administra­
tors was their low standard of education which often 
impeded the smooth functioning of the administration.
The majority of cadres were of peasant or working- 
class origin, and were therefore hardly expected to 
be able to read and write. A survey in early 1942 on 
the education level of the best 18 village heads from 
Hsing Hsien in north-west Shansi had the following 
results: of the II newly elected village heads, 2 had 
three years of education, 6 had two years, and 3 
were illiterate. Of. the seven re-elected village heads, 
one had three years of education, one had two years, 
and one was an intellectual, and four were illiterate.
In addition, out of these 18 administrators, 10
34. Ying Yung, nA talk on the defects in the Fourth 
District ...", Chieh-fang jih^pao, July 2, 1942. 
Also see Hi eh Jung-chen ? "Ch'flLan-mien
chan-k'ai cheng-tun san-feng ti hsueh-hsi yu 
cliien-ch'a " , ( T o  
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, pointed out the 
inability of local cadres in the execution of 
orders) flugiufamr iik-pao f Aug-2*7 J94*2..
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answered their questions put to them in writing, but
the other 8 had to answer orally. Twenty questions
covering different aspects of local administration
were put to them and the resultant scores revealed
some conclusions which throw important light on the
weakness of the village administration. The test
shows that village cadres were not able to understand
central directives and instructions correctly, hence
their personal interpretation of rules and regulations
might tend to impede the local administration. An
example of such weaknesses was the inability of cadres
to understand the new programme of rent-reduction
35enforced in 1941•
Up to the period ending early 1942, village 
administration in the bases was further complicated 
by the diversities of the various local organizations 
which were headed by different types of cadres, e.g., 
those attached to the army, the party and the locally 
elected bodies. Criticisms of the Cheng Feng Movement 
in 1942 indicate that there was a lack of coordination
35. North-west Shansi Commissioner's Office, "Test
on village chiefs of Hsing Hsien", Chieh-fang ,jih- 
pao, March 1, 1942.
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amongst these different cadres in the village, and 
they also implied that in the pre-Oheng Feng period, 
the local party headquarters failed to take up -uniform 
leadership of all party, army, administrative, and 
mass organizations.^
Having indicated some of the outstanding problems 
of village administration, it must also be emphasized 
that village ^^dres were far from failing to perform 
responsibilities entrusted to them. In the first place 
although these cadres received little or no education, 
they were mostly experienced mechanics well versed in 
the mentality of the peasants, and therefore were 
tremendously useful in mass mobilization. Many of them 
might even have a history dating back to the dark desp­
erate days of the Long March when their survival
Tang ti ling-tao pi-sui i-yuan huaH
(There must be uniformity in party 
leadership), (editorial), Qhieh-fang jih-pao, 
October 24, 1942. In view of party's inability 
to assume uniform leadership in the bases, the 
party central passed a resolution on September 
I, 1942, reasserting the importance of uniform 
party leadership over the various local organizat­
ions relating to the party, the army, the administ 
ration and the people.
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depended so much on the good will of the local 
peasants* The main functions these village cadres 
had to perform could he divided into two categories, 
namely, work involved in the various mass mobilization 
programmes, and the day-to-day administration of the vil­
lage, both of which were closely linked together*
Whether the village in the bases could withstand the 
Japanese onslaughts depended a great deal on the 
progress of the above mentioned work which cadres had 
to perform.
Mass Mobilization
With the launching of the Japanese mopping-up 
campaigns in 1941, the CCP found that the administ­
rative villages became all the more isolated. The 
interval of time between military engagements became 
shorter, and the Japanese blockades tighter. This 
acute situation made the cadres, the Eighth Route 
Army and the guerrillas all the more dependent on 
the villages they were in, and it became all the more 
urgent for the cadres to organize the people in the 
locality to help the Communist cause against the 
Japanese. The deterioration In KMT-CCP relations 
in the second half of 1939 resulted in KMT blockades 
on the CCP bases, whilst the Chungking Government
eventually resolved on terminating all financial and
89
military support for the Eighth Route and the Eew 
Fourth Armies. Consequently, Communist troops had 
had to depend economically on the villages they were sta­
tioned in*
Tao Chu who was then working in the chief-
of-staff office in Yenan and eventually became chief 
secretary of the office in 1944, calculated the extent 
to which the local people could support the troops in 
economic terms. Using CCP sources and investigation 
results, he reckoned that it needed one hundred people 
in the CCP bases to support two soldiers or cadres 
who were economically non-productive because of their 
responsibilities, and In areas adjacent to the occupied
38area, the ratio is even less favourable than 100:2.
It must also be mentioned that Tao Chu*s calculation 
was based on the assumption that the local people in 
the villages were willing to help, and were fully 
awakened to their sense of responsibility and patriotism
37* Chu Teh, On the Battle Fields in the Liberated 
Areas, 58-59*
38. Tao Chu^ "Tsai-t'an cheng-ping chien-cheng”/
(A further talk on the policy 
to cut troops and simply the administration) 
Chieh-fang jih-pao, June 25, 1942.
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in the war of resistance.
In order to rally the support of the people in 
the villages, cadres therefore had to undertake various 
programmes of mass organization. Perhaps the best 
description of the functions of mass mobilization was 
an article written by lung Pi-wu , the veteran
and one of the founders of the OOP, in July 1939» in 
which he listed the various responsibilities which 
people in the Communist bases behind enemy lines 
should perform. Near areas of military operations, 
Tung specified that the local people were expected to 
help the army, or guerrillas, by acting as scouts, 
agents, or doing the work of an orderly or medical 
assistant. In areas more remote from the battle field, 
people were expected to organize themselves for tran­
sport purposes, or against air-raids and enemy agents. 
In addition, they should look after the spouses and 
dependents of soldiers who were in active service in 
the front line. In terms of military organizations,
the power of the people was to be fully utilized in
\ -1 6^-- ^
such organizations as the tzu-wei-tui JejMI pJHself-
39defence corps) or better still, the militia. The
39* Tung Pi-wu, HWo-kuo k*ang-chanferh-nien-lai ti 
min-chung yiln-tung", ^  4 X. ;} ( i / f rfwo
years of the mass movement) Qhtln-chung, III, No. 
10, (July 23, 1939), 272-274.
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specific duty of these people's armed bands was
clearly specified in Teng Hsiao-p1ing's article on
40problems of armament in May, 1939* Teng asserted 
that mass operations should aim at demolishing Japanese 
military installations like communication lines and 
telegraph wires, whilst constructively, self-defence 
corps and the militia were trained to perform work 
like transport, carrying stretchers, or acting as 
sentries. Within the villages, they received political 
and military education and kept an eye on enemy spies. 
The following is a chart giving a clear picture of the
extent and scope of the mass organizations as they
41
stood in late 1941 and early 1942:
40. Chieh-fang, No. 72 (May 30, 1939)* 9-
41. Wang Yiieh-fei, "How we establish new democratic 
rule in the bases behind enemy lines", Chieh- 
fang tjih-pao, July 7, 1942* For a general class­
ification of the various National Salvation 
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The different mass organizations listed on page
92 were not of equal importance. The militia and the
self-defence corps obviously were the sources of
42
resistance against the Japanese, whilst the peasants*
association with its history dating back to the 1920,1s
played the leading role in recruiting the local people
in the villages for military purposes. Considering
the fact that the strength of the total Communist
armed forces and guerrillas in China was then about 
43440,000, it can be said that the army regulars were 
well supported by the auxiliary forces in the villages. 
However, it should be pointed out that the Communists 
were very fond of using statistics and figures to 
publicize the size of their organisations, and it is 
not uncommon for the size and scope of the mass org- 
anizationsto have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, it 
is without doubt that the CCP had up to this period 
been able to develop the mass organizations successfully
42. Michael Lindsay observed in 1942-1944 that
membership for the self-defence corps was pract­
ically compulsory for able-bodied men in the 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base. In other words, the 
CCP was aiming at maximum mobilization in resist­
ing the Japanese; M. Lindsay, North China Pront, 
15.
43* See first chart on p. 66.
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4 4against the Japanese.
The origin of these war-time mass organizations 
dated "back to early 1938 when various OOP bases were 
being set up in north Chins,. In fact, at that early 
stage, there was no actual distinction between mass 
organizations and the local administrations when 
local COP cadres began the tedious work of building 
up CCP strength behind the enemy lines from almost 
nothing. The Communists set up mobilization committees 
in the locality as a preliminary step leading towards 
the founding of local administrations. These commit­
tees had different names like "lin-shih tung-yuan wei-
mobilization committee) and formed the solid Communist 
foundation and the means to attract anti-Japanese 
elements to Join their camp, no matter whether they 
were KMT members or neutral elements. As far as the 
mass organizations were concerned, the mass mobiliza -
44-. 1,K‘I arucp—Ji.h kan-nbifJ-ti mi n —Ghnnff tM^a.n-t'i hflinp-
hui1 rovisional mobilization committee)
or "chan-ti tung-yuan wei-huiM-3^^^i^^^% (battle-front 
uimn. xit-g jen—w u ”, ~t /v u 't-vf-t \^c w-\M-1 x
(The nature and responsibilities of mass 
organizations in anti-Japanese bases), Chieh-fam 
Jih-pao, September 29? 1942. 
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tion committees were responsible for the growth of 
the self-defence corps and the militia. The most 
successful armed resistance programme organized by 
these committees at the early stage of the war was 
perhaps in Shansi, where the Communists had set up 
a military base in north-west Shansi, and the south­
east Shansi region which came under the Shansi-Hopei
Shantung-Hon an Border (Government.
m 45
Hsu Ban-ting, the pro-Communist KMT member,
organized a battle, front mobilization committee in
Shansi on the principles of the United Bront. With
the cooperation from Yen Hsi-shan, then KMT commander
n
for the Shansi region, Hsu was able to organize the 
Birst Provisional Division in Shansi, then known as
45. After the conclusion of the Sian Incident in
December 1956, Ilsh Ban-ting represented Yang Iiu- 
ch'eng, Chang Hsueh-liangTs partner in the Sian 
Incident, and made a report of the Incident to 
the people of Shansi and Yen Hsi-shan. With the 
outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War in July 1937,
Hsh became one of Yenfs senior staff officers, but 
with the KMT-COP clash in Shansi in December 1939, 
Hsti sided with the Communists in founding the 
north-west Shansi base in early 1940. e.Bor a bio­
graphy of fish, see Han Hsin-shen^04^.%- , Hsh 
Ban-ting t i ku-sliih Z 7jX9 X'lp (Bi ography




the New Army* Also in Shansi was organized the 
Sacrifice League (Hsi-meng hui)^'!^jjS> %  9 which was 
founded earlier on September 18, 1936, with the 
objective of mobilizing the people in resistance to 
Japan. With the invasion of Shansi by the Japanese 
in late 1937, Yen Hsi-shan sought the assistance of 
the League by arming it with 30,000 rifles. Thus the
f  _
Dare-to-Die corps (chueh-ssu-tui) was
formed with immense control by the Communists who 
became officials, political commissars, and commanders.
jl
~ 7$) *7 / '
The most prominent of these figures was Po I-po 
who was commander of one of the contingents of the 
Dare-to-Die Corps. In addition, the Labour Defence 
Corps (kung—wei tui) and the Political
Defence Corps (cheng-wei tui)7^^1^j) ^ were also organ­
ized, and all these forces operated in the various
46. HstL Pan-ting, "Chih Shan-hsi tu-huang-ti Yen^ 
Hsi-shan tii-f eng wu-chi en-yen shu11,
6*11 (A five-thousand-word letter to 
Yen Hsi-shan, the local tyrant of Shansi) Chieh- 
fang jih-pao, August 24, 1944; Lin Peng, "The 
North-west Shansi Base which stands firm in the 
war of resistance behind enemy lines”, Ohieh- 
fang jih-pao, July 8, 1943*
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“bases in north-west, north-east, and south-east 
47Shansi. Unfortunately, this hoom of mass mobil­
ization in Shansi under Communist patronage suffered 
a heavy set-back in December 1939? when the New and 
Old Army Incident broke out, with troops loyal to
Yen Hsi-shan attacking the Communist-inspired Dare-to-
48Die Corps and the Hirst Provisional Division.
In southern Hopei, the mobilization committee 
was set up in December 1937? and operated under the 
leadership of Yang Hsiu-feng, the former university
47* Hor activities of the Sacrifice League and the 
Dare-to-Die Corps, see K§ Han ^,7^ , "Chien-
ch'ih Hua-pei k fang-chan shu-niu ti Chin^Chi-.
Yu k1 ang~Jih keg-chii-ti11, ^
7v 0 'If:i; (The Shans i-IIop ei-Honan
anti-Japanese base, the key to sustaining the 
war of resistance in north China) Chttn-chung, 
III, No. I, (May 21? 1939), 842; "The I29th 
Division and the Shans i-IIop ei-Shantung-Honan 
Border Region", Chieh-fang nih-pao, August 14? 
1944* Taylor, The Struggle for North China, 165? 
and Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ...? 100.
48. The Incident has been discussed in chapter 2, 
see 54.
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49professor from Peking, who then became the commander
of the western Hopei guerrilla contingent. He had with
him a hand of intellectuals, mostly students and some
teachers, and they contributed a valuable part in
leading the various national salvation organizations,
which went under the usual sub-divisions of peasants,
workers, women and youths. There was an emphasis on
educating the local people because of the large number
of intellectuals Yang had with him. The self-defence
corps was also organized into units according to
village, district, and hsien levels, but the basic
50training centre was at the village level. The 
important function of the self-defence corps as reserves 
for army regulars was also demonstrated in southern 
Hopei, as reports by the Japanese troops indicate that
49. When the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Yang Hsiu- 
feng gave up his teaching post to join the army 
attached to the Paoting^/CHeadquarters in Hopei. 
However, when Chinese troops retreated from Paoting, 
Yang decided to stay in western Hopei and led the 
guerrillas against the Japanese. See Ting Ling,
The 129th Division and the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung- 
Ilonan Border Region, 9•
50. Sun Hstieh-lu, "News from southern Hopei", Ohtln- 
ChungTII, No. 14, 641; Yang Hsiu-feng*s report 
to the border government assembly is in chieh- 
fang ,1 ih-pao, July 26, 1941* Also see Teng Hsiao- 
p1 i n g / ' C h i e n - k u  fen-tou ti Chi-nan",?5i
(Southern Hopei in a bitter struggle) 
Chieh-fang, No. 71, (May 15, 1939), 14.
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these people's armed hands in six hsien of southern
51Hopei were elevated in 1941 to regular army units.
In the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, mass mobiliz­
ation was organized according to proximity to the 
occupied area. In areas adjacent to Japanese-held 
territories, the mobilization committee took up resp­
onsibilities of assisting regular troops in combats, 
and its chief duty was to organize the self-defence
corps. In areas further away from the battle field,
52the emphasis was on educational and political work.
When this region was set up, Nieh Jung-chen as deputy 
commander of the 115th Division had only 2,000 men, 
but by 1939, the good work of the mobilization committee 
had succeeded in convincing the local people that it 
was to their advantage to assist the guerrillas. For 
instance, reports in 1939 indicate that the Communists 
were able to mobilize as many as 23,000 people during 
guerrilla combats in just one single hsien, namely 
the COP stronghold of P'ingshan. Other main centres
51. Headquarters, Tada Corps, State of Affairs of 
Chinese Communist Party ... War-time Report,
March, 1941- R3.15, 1 1008, F 26504, p.5.
52. Lu Ting-iJ^ /L*'', "Chin-Ch*a-Ohi pien-ch'tl f§n-sui 
ti-jen ch'in kung ti chi-ko chung-yao ching-yen",
- T O #
(Some important experience in crushing enemy's 
attacks in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region) 
Chieh-fang^,,' n _ No. 67, (March 20, 1939) 29™
30; and Sun Yuan-fan, "The Shans i-Chahar-Hopei 
Border Region becoming like steel", Chieh-feng jih-
pan, July 10, 1944*
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like Chttyang and Eoup'lng also had reports of
53
favourable assistance from the people*
In the central Hopei plain under the leadership
of L1i Cheng-ts'ao, mass mobilization programmes were
most necessary to oppose the frequent Japanese attacks.
At the basic level, the village committee was the
centre of mass mobilization, supervising the various
national salvation associations, as well as the road-
54demolition unit. The demolition of communication lines 
became a very relevant work for the mass organizations 
here, as the plain was traversed by important railways, 
especially the Shihchiachuang-Techou line which ran 
east-west across the region.
A typical example of mass mobilization programmes 
in the central Hopei plain in 1940 was in Yungch'lng 
Hsien situated in the central part of the region.
The two important objectives here were the conducting
53* Lu Tlng-it"Some important experience in crushing 
enemy's attacks in the Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei Border 
Region11, Chieh-fang, No. 67 (March 20, 1939). 29- 
30; and ffihe People's Liberated Army during the 
Anti-Japanese War, 34-35 *
54. Research Section, Central Committee for the Exter­
mination of Communism, Eield Survey of Chinese 
Communist Efforts to Win Support of People in 
Central Hopei;;* May 1940, R 114, T 999? E 26292.
1 0 1
of the road-demolition campaign, and the collection 
of economic resources, especially basic necessities 
like cotton cloths and army boots. In addition, local 
defence was shouldered by the three graded forces, 
namely, the self-defence corps and militia, the guer­
rillas, and the regular army units. To support these 
forces the collection of revenue in kind also became 
the major work of mass organizations in Yungch'ing,
which was responsible for collecting 20^ of the re-
55venue of the fifth-region of central Hopei. To
indoctrinate the people, special efforts were devoted
to the preliminary step of teaching villagers how to
read and write, whilst undesirable social practices
like foot-binding were done away with. Party cadres
in the whole hsien also attended political lectures
so as to make themselves well equipped with the task
56of indoctrinating the people*
In the early stages, mass mobilization programmes 
were closely assoc&dlted with developments of the 
local government, but by the end of 1941, the OOP
55. Ibid.,, R 114, T 999, P 26301-26302.
56. Ibid., R 114, T 999, P 26310.
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tended to emphasize mass mobilization as an inde­
pendent movement which aimed at allowing maximum 
participation from the people and minimum interfe­
rence from the local government. In the Cheng Feng 
Movement of 1942, the party crticized local cadres 
for too much supervision over mass organizations, as 
such supervision made the local people think that these 
voluntary bodies were no more different from other 
government institutions. What the CCP wanted was to 
attract active elements in the villages so that they
could take up positions formerly occupied by cadres
57in supervising these voluntary organizations* To 
the Gbmmunists, this was the basic means to evolve a 
positive and active mass mobilization programme, and 
they kept a constant check on defects and weaknesses 
so that progress could be made*
57* The voluntary nature of the mass organizations
was emphasized by Liu Shao-ch'i in his "Lun chu- 
hsi min-chung ti chi-ko chi-pen yuan-ts'
(Several basic principles 
regarding organizations amongst the people) Chieh- 
fang, No. 70, (May 1, 1939)> 10-12. For the idea 
of attracting active elements to participate in 
mass organizations, see Nieh Jung-chen, "To launch 
a full-scale study and review ..." Chieh-fang 
j ih-pao, August 27j 1942.
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As early as 1939? the party realized one 
serious drawback to the mass mobilization programme. 
This was due to the result of an unexpected effect of 
the Communist tactics of ”ch*ing-pi k'ung-yeh1'^]^ ), 
or literally ’’clear the walls and empty the fields”.
The main purpose of these tactics was to off-set Jap­
anese military offensives by moving both the popul­
ation and supplies from a whole village, probably to 
nearby hills, in the face of an imminent Japanese 
invasion of the village. Unfortunately, this tactics 
had repercussions on the Eighth Route Army and the 
guerrillas who depended on villagers for supplies, and 
they very often found themselves deprived of assistance
expected when villagers all fled to the hills with
58their food supplies.
For various reasons, the CCP failed to achieve 
as positive and satisfactory results as they wished 
to have in so far as mass mobilization was concerned, 
although steady progress had already been made. A
58. Tung Pi-wu, ’’Two years of the mass movement”,
Chttn-chung, m ,  No. 10 (July 23, 1939), 272-274. 
For an example of the effect of ”Ch'ing-pi k'ung- 
yeh”, see Lung Ting-i, ’Some important experience 
in crushing enemy’s attacks ... ”, Chieh-fang, No. 
67, 34*
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closer look at the peasants’ associations, the 
source of strength in the mass organizations, may 
perhaps explain the situation further*
Detailed reports from Hoshun Hsien in south­
east Shansi reveal that as early as 1938, peasants*, 
associations there covered 80$ of the population, and 
their chief responsibilities were two-fold. First, 
they formed the chief source for the recruitment of 
self-defence corps and the militia, hence performing- 
all the relevant work of assisting the regulars in 
combat against the Japanese. Second, the association 
gave its patronage to the tenants and poor peasants in 
attempts to improve their standard of living, hence 
the organization of cooperatives which assisted the 
peasants, mostly in the purchasing of daily commo­
dities andfarming tools. In addition, loans were
59given to them at low-interest rates. These peasants' 
associations certainly did a good job for the poor 
peasants, but they were not as militant as their pre­
decessors of the 1920s which were in the real sense 
the champions of the poor in launching struggles and
59* Sugiyama Corps, Pacification Unit, Report on
Communist Areas in Hoshun Hsien, Shansi, August 
8] 1939* R 113, T 944, F 24457-24463*
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purges against the landlords* Thus, whatever 
benefits and welfare schemes the war-time peasants* 
associations up to this period had planned for their 
proteges were in a relative sense moderate and def­
initely not militant. These peasants* associations 
had not been able to challenge the authority of the 
landlords in the village whose economic control over 
the poor was considerable. The work of the peasants' 
association and in fact the whole programme of mass 
mobilization could only be considered as effective 
and positive if the poor peasants could free themselves 
of landlords' control. The most realistic way of 
doing this was for the peasants' association and the 
local village cadres to undertake a genuine rent-red­
uction programme. It was by so doing that the GOP 
could hope to rally maximum support from the masses.
As a matter of fact, this issue involved the whole 
problem of landlord-tenant relations and the rent- 
reduction programme which will be dealt with below.
There were two major OOP policies operating in 
this period which were mainly responsible for Communist 
inability to mobilize the masses fully to their 
advantage. The first was the military tactics employed 
by Communist regulars and guerrillas, and the second 
dealt with land problems and landlord-tenant relations.
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The Effect of QQP Military Tactics on Mass Mobilization
Up to the end of 1941, the COP employed as its 
major military taotics Yu-chi yttn-tung chan.vi)^
(Operational-guerrilla warfare). In essence, this 
did not rely entirely on guerrilla warfare, hut made 
operational combats involving a great number of reg­
iments an essential part of military engagements with 
the Japanese. In other words, the COP still relied 
on the Eighth Route Army regulars rather than guerrillas 
and militia as the major strength in resisting the 
Japanese. Mass organizations, especially the more 
military ones like the self-defence corps and the 
militia, only played a subsidiary role in assisting 
the regulars in the operational-guerrilla warfare.
The crucial point to note here is that the adoption 
of total guerrilla warfare was the only means of fully 
utilizing self-defence corps and the militia to bear 
the main burden of CCP resistance against the Japanese. 
Had that been the case, the various mass organizations 
at the village level would have found it unnecessary 
to give economic support to the regulars, as the 
people themselves would have taken over the defence 
of their own villages. The advantage of this kind of 
defence was that villagers could carry on economic 
production at the same time, whilst regular troops up 
to this period could not.
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As it was, OOP military commanders up to the 
end of 1941 still pursued the operational-guerrilla 
warfare which stood in the way of mobilizing the 
people to the fullest capacity. In 1939 and 1940,Chu 
Teh as the commander-in-chief of the 18th Army Group, 
and his deputy, P'eng Te-huai, had made it explicit 
that the GCP would not give up the idea of engaging 
the Japanese in major battles should circumstances 
be favourable. In an interview with reporters on May 
20, 1939, P'eng emphasized that in the defence of bases 
in Hopei, not only guerrilla, but also operational 
warfare must be employed. To elaborate his point, P'eng 
held that the Eighth Poute Army should, whenever possible, 
take the initiative in amassing armed strength with 
the purpose of undertaking flexible and yet positive
Piac, « «  commander of th. J U t h
60. P'eng Te-huai, "shih-pa chi-t'uan-cMn P'eng-fu-
chung-ssu-ling fan chien-ch'ih Hopei k'ang-chan yu 
kung-ku t' uan-chieh ", ®  ^
® ® - a^ (P'eng Te-huai, deputy commander- 
in-chief of the 18th Army Group, on the wa,r of res­
istance in Hopei and the way to strengthen unity) 
Chieh-fang, Nos. 75-76 (July 7, 1939), 20. P'eng's 
ideas were actually in conformity with Mao Tse-tung's 
policy of guerrilla warfare upheld in the period up 
to 1941* Mao believed that in the protracted war 
against Japan,, Chinese troops should aim at devel­
oping from guerrilla combats to operational warfare. 
See "Hsiang ytln-tung chan fa-chan",
(Developing towards operational warfare) Mao Tse- 
tung hsttan-chi (1961), II, 423-425*
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Division stationed in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border
region wrote as early as December 1937 that whenever
possible, the Eighth Route Army should muster its
61major forces in the defence of strategic points.
This tactical emphasis on operational warfare in 
which mass organizations played only a subsidiary role 
was fully applied by the Communists in their major 
engagement with the Japanese, from August to December, 
1940. This battle was the Hundred Regiments' Offens­
ive which the CCP claimed to be a major success against
62the Japanese. In order to disprove the KMT's accus­
ation that the CCP's success in this battle was a fake, 
Chu Teh quoted the address to the Japanese Diet by
61# LinJPiao, ''K'ang-Jih chan-cheng ti ching-yen",
~A7C § (Experience of the
Anti-Japanese War) chieh-fang, Wo. 28, (January 
11, 1938); 11.
62. P'eng Te-huai, "Pa-than ta-chan chih i-i",T)ljP)7\
(What the Battle of the Hundred Regi­
ments meant) Chtln-chung, V, (October 30, 1940)
Nos. 9-10, 204-205* P !eng gave a comprehensive 
description of the extent of the combat. The main 
CCP forces taking part included Ho Lung's 120th 
Division, Liu Po-ch'eng*s 129th Division and Wieh 
Jung-chen's Chin-Ch'a-Chi regional forces. P'eng 
emphasized the battle was a major CCP victory.
Also see chapter II, 44*
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To jo, then war minister in Japan, in which Tojo
admitted that OOP troops in north China had launched
63a relatively large-scale offensive in August 1940.
In spite of CCP's claim of success in operational
warfare as exemplified "by the Hundred Regiments*
Offensive, the reliance on a concentration of regular
troops to "bear the brunt of war caused the Communists
heavy casualties. It is interesting to note that
with the commencement of the Cultural Revolution in
China in August 1966, the Hundred Regiments1 Offensive
which was once regarded as a historical monument of
CCP military success, was revalued as a blunder and
a major risk, and both Chu leh and P'eng Te-huai were
fiercely attacked by the Red Guards for undertaking
the battle against the wish of Mao Tse-tung. The
basis of argument was that the success was off-set by
64the heavy casualties in the battle.
On December 7, 1941, the first indication of a 
public announcement of a major change in CCP military
63. Chu Teh "Pa-lu-chtln hsin-ssu^ chiJln^  k* ang-chan ti 
s su- chou-ni e n ",  ^N 5 ^  3{ ^  c4 ^  ^  ^
(The fourth anniversary of the war of resistance 
undertaken by the 8th Route Army and the New Fourth 
Army) 6hieh~fang jih-pao, July 7, 1941.
64. HTa-chthi-fa ta-yeh-hsin-chia Chu Teh ti t'ao-tfien 
t a - t s u i p ' v ( T h e  unfor-
givable sin committed by Chu Teh, the big warlord 
and ambitious man) Chan Pao , No. 6,
(February 24, 1967) cited from Ming Pao Monthly,
II, 6, 33.
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65tactics was made in Chieh-fang .iih-pao, ^ and guerr-
— ......  11 iia Hun m*»wirrr*t*uwm mm *rrnmimm« 1 11 wdwwuurWMrt *
ilia warfare was proclaimed more suitable than
operational combats* It was then realised by the
military commanders that in the face of heavy
Japanese onslaughts, the best answer to effective
defence was the adoption of guerrilla warfare.
The idea of major operational combats had to be given
up as the Communists could not afford to suffer any
heavier casualties, since the Japanese (with puppets):
CCP casualty ratio from June 19U1 to May 19U2 stood 
66at 1*3 : 1* Consequently, CCP directives specif­
ied that armed forces should avoid unnecessary 
sacrifices and casualties* The significant change 
was the reliance on the armed strength of the local
65* "Ti-hou yu-chi chan-cheng ti hsin jen-wuH
(The new duty of guerrilla 
tactics behind enemy lines), (editorial), Chieh- 
fang iih-nao* December 7$ 19U1* Also see Liu 
Po-ch^ngT^Tactical problems concerning resist­
ance be hi nd e ne my lines’*, Chieh-fang ,iih~nao* 
July 79 19U3* Liu traced the change in CCP 
tactics, quoting Mao Tse-tung's writings to 
explain how the earlier tactics of operational 
combat was later changed over to total guerrilla; 
warfare•
66. Second chart, 66.
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people, who were relieved of a, greater part of
the economic "burden imposed on them "by the army
regulars. The participation of the self-defence
corps and the militia in active guerrilla warfare
"by the "beginning of 1942 not only "boosted up the
activities of the mass mobilization programme, bp:t
it also enabled the GGP to pursue the policy of
"cut troops and simplify the administration". Once
the local people could take the place of regulars
in the defence of their villages, the GGP could
afford to cut down the number of troops so as to
ease off the acute economic situation which resulted
67from intense Japanese pressure.
In so far as the mass mobilization movement 
was concerned, the crucial point to notice was there­
fore the changing GGP military tactics which came 
about at the end of 1941* By the beginning of 1942,
67. "The new duty of guerrilla tactics behind the 
enemy lines", (editorial), G'hieh-fang ,jih-pao, 
December 7, 1941, and Liu Po-ch'eng, "Tactical 
problems concerning resistance Chieh-fang
3 ih-pao, July 7, 1943*
1 1 2
villagers in Communist bases found that they were 
given heavy responsibilities, and to them it was a 
sense of mission entrusted to them in defence of 
their mother country, hence the CCP was able to 
arouse what was termed peasant nationalism amongst 
the villagers*
Mass Mobilization and the Problem of Landlord-tenant
Relations
The most significant factor which impeded the 
Communists from effecting maximum mass mobilization 
in the period 1938-19M- was problems concerning land, 
landlord-tenant relations and the reduction of rent 
and interest* It has been mentioned previously that 
economic control of landlords in the villages still 
persisted in Communist-controlled bases, and it was 
responsible for the absence of any genuine rent- 
reduction programme* Until such reduction took place, 
the CCP could not possibly convince its proteges to 
participate whole-heartedly in the mass organizations*
In the first place, contemporary Communist 
sources indicate that under Communist administration 
which fostered a campaign to reduce rent and interest 
on land, the economic burden on tenants and poor
113
peasants did become much lighter. For instance,
in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region, the
average rent for the period 1937-19U1 was 33.3% of
the produce from the harvest, a great deal less than
6ftthat of the pre-1937 period, which averaged 5U%* 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that rent- 
reduction programmes in this region were exception­
ally successful, and such progress was by no means 
a common phenomenon in the other bases in the pre- 
Cheng Feng period. In the Shansi-Hopei-Honan region, 
it was calculated in June 19UI that there was an 
average rent reduction of 31$ in seven hsien. In
north-west Shansi and Shantung, there were similar
69
reductions in rent, some as much as 60% less. How­
ever, these cases were by no means common and the 
policy of rent-reductIon had not been well observed 
by landlords in general.
68* h uang Wei-wan, "Some sources of the reduction of 
rent and interest in the bases'1, Chieh-fang jih- 
pao, February 11, igi+2. —
69. Ibid.*
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A report of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan
Border Government indicates that rent-reduction was
70by no means widespread* Thus, in the Shansi- 
Hopei-Honan area, figures in October 1940 showed 
that of the 1,982 villages in the Third Sub-region, 
only 601 undertook rent reduction, and 911 house­
holds were given reduction in interest* In the 
Hopei-Shantung-Honan plain, of the 8,000 villages 
there in May 1941* only 620 had rent reductions 
carried out. The poorest results were from the 
Second Special District of western Shantung, with a 
return of only 2% of villages having rent reduced* 
The absence of a general rent-reduction pro­
gramme had a great deal to do with CCP central 
policy. A CCPCC resolution on land policy in the 
bases dated January 28, 1942, reveals some important
70* Ibid** also see The State of the Liberated Area 
* * * * 64 * In tracing the history of the Shansi- 
Hopei-Shantung-Honan border region, this Comm­
unist source admitted that up to 1941* mass 
mobilization had not been fullyutilized, and 
the rent-reduction programme was not making sat­
isfactory progress.
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71clues*f First, the resolution reasserted the 
CCP's policy of toleration for the landlord class, 
at least the nationalistic, if not the capitalistic 
ones, and its alliance with the petty and national 
bourgeoisie* The rich peasants were considered the 
bourgeoisie in the villages whose support for the 
CCP was crucial in the anti-Japanese war* The above 
was actually a reiteration of Mao Tse-tung's United 
Front policy enforced since the beginning of the war 
in 1937.
The. second principle of the resolution mentioned 
above stated that the CCP was there to help lessen 
the "feudalistic11 exploitation of the poor peasants, 
but it had no intention of eliminating all ,ffeudal- 
istic’* exploitations* In other words, although the 
Communists strived for rent reduction on behalf of 
the poor peasants, they also aimed at ensuring the
71* uChung-kung chung-yang kuan-yu kfang-Jih ken- 
chli-t i t'u-1 i che ng-1 s * e t i c htteh-1 i ng11,
a ( C C P  Central !s res­
olution on land policy in the anti-Japanese 
bases) Chieh-fang ,iih-pao, February 6, 19U2.
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rights of the bourgeoisie in view of their import­
ant role in the war of resistance.
The unfortunate effect of the above CCP princ­
iples was that for fear of losing the support of the 
bourgeoisie, the CCP could not afford to formulate 
positive and specific regulations and rules to see 
that the landlords did reduce the rent imposed on 
their tenants. Any reduction made was more by pers­
uasion on the part of the local cadres, or voluntary 
offers on the part of the landlords, which were 
rather rare. The tenants were still very much under 
the grip of the landlords because of one vulnerable 
point, and that was the lack of specific protection 
against landlords1 claiming their land back from the 
tenants. This lawful right of the landlords became 
their trump card in evading rent reduction. This was 
because tenants who wished to claim their rightful 
reductions had to approach landlords, but if they 
did so, they would very likely be subjected to retal­
iations from the landlords, who would find various 
excuses to exercise their right of repossession 
(Ch* ou-ti)•
The result was the poor peasants and tenants 
would then be robbed of their land. In the villages
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of Hsing hsien and Lin hsien in north-west Shansi
for example, there were reported complaints from
tenants and poor peasants of how landlords "illegally
seized their land" and defied CCP instructions on
72rent reduction* In some cases, although rent had
been reduced, the tenants dreaded the landlords so
much that they decided to return to the latter the
amount of produce, which they should have been
75entitled to because of the reduction.
In actual fact, if the Communists were to 
realize a genuine rent-reduction programme, they had 
to first of all promulgate specific regulations 
guaranteeing the rights of tenants against the threat 
of repossession, and second, the CCP had to train 
cadres to take up special responsibilities of guiding 
and organizing active elements amongst peasants to 
enforce the rent-reduction campaign. Specific CCP 
programmes aiming at genuinely enforcing rent and
72. Chieh-fang ,1 ih-pao, October 31, 1943* and 
January i57195mT"
73* HUang Wei-wen, "Some sources on the reduction 
of rent and interest in the bases", Chieh-
I *  mwwnii iTiiiirninr i > " ~~
,iih-pao, February 11, 1942.
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interest reductions appeared by the second half 
of 1942, and by 19U3* important results were brought 
about. In fact, village administration and mass 
mobilization in the Communist bases also began to 
undergo significant changes by the second half of 
19*4*2 as a result of the CCP’s introduction of the 
Cheng Feng Movement in February 19ii-2* Details of 
this important evolution will be discussed in 
chapters five and six*
CHAPTER IV
ie ana ruppex Measures against the QCP Bases, 
Especially at the Village Level, 1938 - 1942*
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The expansion of Communist power in rural north 
China in the early years of the war represents the 
first phase of the territorial struggle "between the 
CCP and the Japanese* By the end of 1940, especially 
with the successful record of the Hundred Regiments1 
Offensive, it can he said that the Communists were 
in a better position than the Japanese in rallying 
the support of the rural population and in exercising 
control over the rural area in north China. The CCP's 
efforts and organizations in the villages in the pre- 
Cheng Peng period described in chapter three provide 
an explanation for the growth of Communist power. 
However, attention must also be paid to anti-CCP 
activities undertaken by the Japanese as they inevit­
ably affected the development of the Communist bases 
throughout the war.
Indeed, in so far as the initial period of 1938- 
1940 in the development of the CCP bases was concerned, 
Japanese policy as applied to rural north China 
contributed indirectly to the expansion of Communist 
power. Anti-CCP measures undertaken then had a 
strong emphasis on the employing of political manoeuvres
1 2 0
rather than military actions, hence the slogan of
manoeuvres and three-tenths on military actions). This 
particular Japanese policy did not bring about as 
satisfactory results as Japan would have expected, 
whilst on the other hand it contributed to the expan­
sion of the COP bases. However, in 194-1-194-2, Japanese 
anti-CCP policy took a sharp turn, with new emphasis 
on severe military pressure on the CCP bases, result­
ing in a recession of CCP power in rural north China, 
although the Japanese also succeeded in alienating 
the local population in launching the various mopping- 
up campaigns.
The purpose of this chapter therefore is to 
examine in detail the various anti-CCP measures under­
taken by the Japanese in 1938-194-2, in order to 
provide a complete picture to an understanding of the 
development of the CCP bases. The emphasis of the 
study will also be on the actual application of elabo­
rate Japanese measures in the village rather than
pe.i ti  ^ 'iang-hua chih-an yiin-tung,f,
(The enemy's movement to rein­
force law and order in north China) Chieh-fang rjih- 
pao% January 15, 194-2.
1. Ti Huaf^  ‘ and Hsiieh
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explanations for the formulation of various Japanese 
policies.
Whilst the Communists were busy setting up their 
bases behind the Japanese front lines in 1938, the 
Japanese Army made its advance towards Wuhan in
H^ ipei, from the lower course of the Yangtze* By late 
October, 1938, both Wuhan and Canton, the capital of 
Kwangtung, were occupied by the Japanese, and it 
could be said that a stalemate had been reached in 
the Sino-Japanese war* In general, the Japanese were 
in control of the main urban centres and strategic 
points, as well as the major communication lines* On 
the other hand, KMT and CCP troops were still able to 
control a major part of the rural area. Thus the 
Japanese were said to have been able to control the 
points (tien) , and the lines (hsien) ,
whilst the Chinese could still dominate the rural area 
(mien) (5} ^
As the Japanese North China and Central China 
Expeditionary Armies began to consolidate their pos-
2. Mao Tse-tung, On the New Stage, 37-39* After
fifteen months of war, Mao argued that the Chinese 
who were in control of the rural area, could still 
defeat the Japanese who were dominating the urban 
centres in China.
it ion in 1938-194*0, the Japanese policy in the 
administration of the occupied area concentrated 
on the employing of various political manoeuvres 
rather than high-handed military actions* To the 
Japanese at that time, it seemed to be the answer 
to the rising threat of Communism, the best means 
of maintaining law and order, and preserving intact 
the economic resources in China* North China was in 
particular valuable to Japan, and the Japanese Economic 
Planning Board, which was in charge of the economic as-
3
pects of the realization of the New Order in East Asia,
3* On November 3* 1938, the Japanese Government made 
a statement which crystalized the aim of the New 
Order in East Asia: HWhat Japan seeks is the est­
ablishment of a new order which will ensure the 
permanent stability of East Asia* In this lies 
the ultimate purpose of our present military cam­
paign. The new order has for its foundation a 
tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordi­
nation between Japan, Manchukuo and China in poli­
tical, economic, cultural and other fields. Its 
robject is to secure international justice, to 
perfect the joint defence against Communism and 
to create a new culture and realize a close 
economic cohesion throughout East Asia*1. Quoted in 
H.S. Quigley, Far Eastern War 1937-194*1,vBoston, 
194-2, 114-115.
123
defined north China as within the Japanese "sphere of
self-defence" and an integral part of Japan in economic 
4terms* From north China she drew a major supply of 
cotton? coal and iron? and her economic ties with this 
region was there fore? closer than with any other part 
of Chi.na^ »
In 'view of the menace from the Communists? the 
Japanese realised they needed a more sophisticated policy 
to reinforce the strength of Japanese troops stationed 
in iforth China* Ihe policy of "setting Chinese against
4 *
-
iy£\7n u  ^  (Outline of Proposal for Economic 
Development of Japan? Manchuria and China)? Sept«
4?1940? R 109, T 798? F 18997-18998 *
5« As early as March 1937? the Japanese had already- 
had reports from Forth China as to estimates of 
economic resources which the Japanese could 
exploit in the coming war? see Yarious Army Officers? 
Hokuahi ovobi Manshukoku shisatsu hokoku 3 b \lft
1 Sl'fp-f(k^- (inspection Reports on Forth China and 
Manchuria)? Oot.6-18, 1937? *R 108? 1 767? F 18261? 
18458*™ 18439® Shigemitsu Mamoru? Japanese ambassa­
dor to Wang Ching-wei ’ s Hanking Gfovernment in 1942? 
and later Minister of the Cresler East Asia Ministry? 
described three phases of Japanese control during 
the Sino-»Japanese Y/ar® Coal and iron? to be follow­
ed later by cotton and salt were the main products 
and minerals sought* For details? also see Dee Wgok, 
The later Career of Wang Chtng~wei» with special 
Reference to His Rational GovernmentTs Cooperation
with Japan. 1938-1945? University of Hong Kong? 
(MoA® Ihesis)? 1966? 138-139®
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Chinese” was thus evolved? aiming at the establishment
of puppet administration from the top to village level?
and the need for Sino-Japanese cooperation .was especially
emphasized* Prom October 1938 to March 1940? the
Japanese went about setting up a Japanese-sponsored
Central Government in the occupied area* Lieutenant-
General Loihara Kenji^^S^the Japanese intelligence
chief in China? and others like Colonel Kagesa Sadaki
Chief of the Military Affairs Section? the
Ministry of War? began their search for a leading
Chinese statesman who might be persuaded into heading
6the puppet government*
T'ang Shao-i^f^‘M ^  a veteran cabinet minister of 
the early republican period? was approached? but his 
assassination in late: 1938 put an end to the attempt*
Wu Pei-fug^l^^T? the famous warlord of the Chihli Clique 
in the 1920s? was almost persuaded into heading a central 
government? but finally turned down the Japanese offer in
wanrt nc*» vr* r
6* Por the activities conducted by Lt•-General Loihara 
and Colonel. Kagesa in China 1938-1939? see Lee ITgok 
op.cit*? 53"“54? 60™61? 63 •
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late 1939? mainly "because of disagreement over the
extent of military power Wu could exercise and the
strength of Japanese troops to he withdrawn from
China! Japan1s offer was finally accepted by Wang
Ghing-wei? one time heir-apparent of Dr* Sun Yat-sen
in the early 1920s? and the second most important
KMT statesman in Chungking in 1938* Wang left
Chungking on December 18? 1938? for Hanoi and finally
set up the Japanese sponsored Hanking Government on
8
March 30? 1940«
As far as Horth China was concerned? the Horth 
China Political Council took the place of its predecessor? 
the Horth China Provisional Government? from March 30? 
1940? onwards*. The chief collaborators of the Horth 
China Provisional Government? namely? Wang I~t1 ang ?
7e Dor further information on Wu Pei-fu’s negotiations 
with the Japanese? see R*P* Soter? Wu Pei-fu: Case 
study of a Chinese War-lord? Harvard University,
*w  23 2-247.
8o I*'or Wang Ching-wei 1 s escape from Chungking in
Dec*. 1938? and his motives in cooperating with 
Japan? see Pee Hgok? op* cit*, 39-40? 51-53 » 
and for the establishment of Wangfs Hanking 
Government? see 66? 82-83°
1 26
I I _
*"T Q XZ~-'fc 6A-~T~Y/ang ICf e-min Y^Xiy^ Hsieh-yuan )?\ jcAj ? and
& KChu Shen ■'f'44 ? all cabinet ministers of the early 
republican periods remained in office in the new 
Council-? with Wang I~t ’ ang? Wang K ’e~min? and Chu Shen 
heading the new body at different times from 1940 to 
1943« In fact the governmental change in north China 
on March 30? 1940? was but in name? mainly to satisfy 
Wang Ching-wei’s forlorn hope of claiming control over 
north Chinas The North China Political Council was 
independent of Wangfs Nanking Government, as the 
former had its own currency? the Eederal Reserve Bank 
notes? its own "Peace-maintenance" Army? its own customs 
and revenue offices and its own flag<P However? both 
the Council and Wang’s government had. one common aim of 
expelling the Communists from the rural area? and as far 
as Y/ang Ching-wei was concerned? his determination to 
tackle the Communists was evident in his government motto? 
which was "Peace? Anti-Communism and National Reconstruct
9° Chinese Year Book? 1940-1941* Chungking? 262-264?
P




With, the setting up of the North China Political 
Council which became the chief political institution 
in north China to counteract Communism, the Japanese 
began to concentrate on the innovation of various 
political measures and doctrines in attempts to 
compete with the Communists in winning the support 
of the people, especially in the rural area, where 
the Communists were most influential* Thus in 1938, 
the Hsin. Min Hui^f^ (New People’s Society) came 
into being in north China* Tt was a publicity organ 
aiming at the propagation of an oriental ideology based 
on Sino-Japanese cooperation and the realization of the 
New Order in Past Asia* Pin-pointing Communism and 
western Imperialism as major targets of attacks, the 
Society criticized Individualism and liberalism as ideas 
borrowed from the West* Marxism was also regarded as an 
imported product* Confucianism with its emphasis on 
loyalty was exalted as the ideology on which Sino-Japanese
cooperation was based* Japan was depicted as a country 
which had attained the Kingly Way or uHuang-taoM
10o Ministry of Publicity, Kuo-fu Kuan-tu ti-erh-nien 
kuo-rain cheng-fu shih-cheng kai-k'uang
General Description of the v^ ork 1 
of the National Government on Its Return to the 
Capital), Nanking, 1942, 217 and 2235 China Annual, 
(Nanking), 1943 , 1200*
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and the Heavenly Sanction, or "lien-tao1*
2,600 years ago through sincerity, or "Cheng1
-4 \‘U')
and virtue, or "le" XJ- , as described in the Golden
Mean and the Great learning. Thus it was only natural
for China to cooperate with Japan in pursuing the Kingly
11
Way and attaining the Heavenly Sanction. In fact the 
doctrine of the Kingly Way preached by the New People Ts 
Society was based on the Japanese belief of Kodo 
which maintained that the cause of the Braperor was divine
and higher than the law of the land*
11. Kawarmura Munetsugu lung-fang ching-shen yu
Hsin-min-hui f (Ihe Spirit of t&e Orient and
the New People's Society), 1st collection, Peking, 
Hsin-min-hui, November, 1938, 1-30*
12* A detailed description of ICodo ha (faction) is given 
in Hillis lory, Japan's Military Masters: the Army 
in Japanese life, New York, the Viking Press?., T9J3, 
lYS~±73Z' Por activities of the Kodo ha, representing 
the extremist faction in the Army, see Richard Storry, 
Phe Double Patriots, a study of Japanese Nationalism,
londoHT, cKa/t'L£’0 T^ id~windus, 19 57, 136, 138, 243, and’”^
282;; W.G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan,




Ihe majority of the Horth China Political Council
officials were educated in the old Confucian school of
thought, and people like Wang K!e-min, Wang I-t’ang
and Ghu Shen might have been expected to be taken in
by this Japanese-orientated Confucian Ideology* However,
for the general public in the occupied area, these ideas
could not possibly have any far-reaching effect,
especially when set against the background of anti-
Japanese Nationalism generated in the first instance in
September 1931 with Japan1s invasion of Manchuria* By
1935-1937, there was a surge of anti-Japanese national
salvation campaigns which must have overshadowed whatever
the New People!s Society attempted to preach during the 
13 
War*
Perhaps more practical than the high sounding ideology 
was the actual anti-CCP work done by the New People fs 
Society at Peking and the various local branches* Pirst 
of all, the Society was defined as one of trChinafs,f 
institutions in close cooperation with the government, and 
yet not a part of the government, acting as the medium 
between the people and the administration* Its specific
13• Anti-Japanese activities in China in 1935-1937 
has been discussed in Chapter 1,15-18*
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duty was to educate and assist the people with a view 
to promoting good relations between the people and the
the President and concurrently a Councillor, as well as
the Japanese authorities, the Society took positive
steps in attempts to gain the support of the rural
population. Experimental areas were set up in villages
in which various welfare centres were set up, namely,
clinics, youth training1 centres, cooperatives and
l*autonomous village organisations;' (Through these welfare 
schemes, the Japanese hoped to seek the cooperation of
(Cooperation between the people and officials) against 
the Communists, who were depicted as criminals and demons 
standing in the vt&y of Sino-Japanese cooperation. Directed 
towards the same end was Japanese attempts to seek the 
cooperation of secret societies* The Ch'ing-hung Society
14* Hsin-min-hui 3-3 tvfu , Hs in-mi n-hui shou-tu chih-tao- 
pu kung-tso kai-k1 uang $1H General
Sescription of tEe Work of the Capital Guidance 
Department of the New People’s Society), Peking, 
September 1938, 82*
15. Iisin-min-hui, A General Description of the Work of the 
Capital Guidance Departmerrtr **« , especially 223 9 2T%Z 
258. G.E. layTor, Ihe^StruggTe^for North China, 70-76. 
Details of Japanese—sponsored rural organizations will 
be dealt with later in the chapter.
Under the leadership of Miu Pin itauthorities t
the people under the slogan of ,fKuan-min
131
^ southern Shantung, and the Huang-sha Society
$>*')% la Hopei, for example, were approached by the 
16
Japanese.
As to the effectiveness of the various Japanese
measures in rural control in 1938-1940, puppet reports
often indicated that only a limited control could be
exercised in the countryside* Bor instance, the puppet
Shansi provincial report in May 1939 reckoned that of
the 55 hsien in Shansi said to be under control, only
60-70% of the villages in 19 of these hsien were in fact
under effective puppet administration, whilst in thirteen
other hsien, only 30-40% of the villages were under 
17
control. Yi/hilst the Japanese made little progress in 
the countrysidef the period up to 1940 had been one of
■ H iH llb B d ts n lH M H fliM f
16* Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, l,fhe enemy1 s movement to 
reinforce law and order in north China*1, Chi eh- 
fang jih-pao, Jan* 15, 1942, and Chieh-fang 
pao Beb.12, 1942* It is interesting to note rne 
0(TFf s attitude towards secret society activities 
which were considered as a hindrance to its 
administration in the village, see chapter III, 
^5 s n, 18 and 19-
17* Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi Provincial
Government, Min-Qheng Chi-yao (Compen­
dium of Materials on Civil Affairs) II, 1940, 
(Appendix* report by Sung Ch!e 3^1^ , head of 
the bureau of civil administration), 1-2.
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expansion for the OOP bases in north China, as has
been seen in chapter three* Phus it became apparent
that the Japanese policy of concentrating seven-tenths
of their efforts on political manoeuvres and only three-
tenths on military actions had proved to be far from
effective in counteracting Communist power*
It was therefore not surprising that a major
revision in Japan* s anti “•Communist policy was evolved in
the beginning of 1941* Prom early March, 1941, to the
end of 1942, the Japanese Worth China Expeditionary Army
launched the Movement to He inforce Xaw and Order which
covered the occupied area as well as the CCP bases*
Yarious mopping-up campaigns were directed against the
Communist bases, employing as many as 10,000-20,000 men
in each of the major military offensives. Phe effect
10
was definitely felt in the bases* Phe main characteristic
feature of these Japanese campaigns had been described as
the "three-all1’ policy, that is, "Kill all, burn all and
— 19
destroy all” (sanlto-seisaku)^XXv/j<# Phe application
WKBmmmmmmbntu itti rrjaam
18* See Chapter 111,66* Phe effect of the Japanese 
military pressure was felt as shown in the Jap­
anese (including puppets)s CCP casualty ratio, 
which was I*2s I (June 1940-May 1941), and 1*3•
I (June 1941-May 1942) respectively* In the ear­
lier years of the war, CCP casualties were much 
less than those of the Japanese according to 
Communist sources.
19* C.A# Johnson, Pe as&nt 1ati onali sm * *«,5 5 *
of this tremendous military pressure can he considered 
as the alternative policy after the failure of political 
manoeuvres as the means of effective rural control. In 
addition, various circumstances in late 1940 in north 
Ohina also contributed to Japan’s determination to 
launch the Movement to Reinforce law and Order. It has 
been mentioned that the OOP’s victory against the Japan­
ese in the Hundred Regiments’ Offensive, August-December
20
1940, contributed to Japanese retaliations in 1941-1942*
Indeed, this demonstration of Communist military strength
made it necessary for the Japanese Army to take drastic
action in order to prevent further major CCP offensives.
Phis is especially so when Japanese plans of expansion
into south-east Asia, which had been drawn by late 1940,
made it essential for the Japanese Army to maintain
military supremacy over the Chinese troops, especially
the Communist forces, so that Japan could devote her
21attention to the southward expansion. Politically, 
late 1940 also saw the end of hope for a possible peace
20. See Chapter 11,36.
21* Johnson, Peasant nationalism. *. «, 57 5 for 
japan’s plans of southward expansion, see 
International Military Pirbunal for the 
Par East, Exhibit H o . D e f e n c e  Docu­
ment Ho. 2813, (Pojo’s Affidavit), 36280*
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settlement between Japan, Chungking, and Wang Ching-wei’s
Hanking G ov ernment. By the end of November, Japan there-
for committed herself to a closer alliance with Wang
Ching-wei by signing the Japan-Wang Treaty of Basic
22
Relations on November 30, 1940. With the end of hope 
for a possible settlement with Chungking, which also 
meant the end of a possible Japan-Chungking joint effort 
against the Communists, Japan therefore found it necessary 
to take independent action against the Communists, hence 
tremendous military pressure was applied to the CCP bases. 
In 1941-1942, major raopping-up campaigns were launched 
in north China, each representing specific plans to be 
achieved by the North China Expeditionary Army.
The initial campaign lasted from March to late June, 
1941, and was known as the '’defensive" period in which
22. From Spring to September 1940, constant contacts 
between Japanese and Chungking agents were made 
in Hong Kong and Shanghai in attempts to bring 
about a proposed triangular talk between General 
Itagaki, the Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese 
Expeditionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, and Wang 
Ching-wei. However, the proposed talk failed to 
materialise. These secret contacts were recorded 
by Chou Fu-hai)l)J^% Wang Ching-weif s finance 
minister, in his diary : Chou Fu-hai jih-chi 1940 
)iyi (The Diary of Chou Fu-hai, 1940),
Hong Kong, n.d., June 22,23 (104-105)? June 27 
(107)? July 18 (117)5 Aug. 18 (134)? Aug. 20 (135)? 
Aug. 30 (141)? Sept. 10 (146)? and Sept. 15 (149). 
Also see International Military Tribunal*..*, Exhibit 
3305, DefeSSTTEouSE^Fn^ T ^ ^ U ! I 3 I T ~ F o? a full 
text of the Japan-Wang Treaty, see The American 
Journal of International Daw .XXX1T. (SuppleraenYJ? 1941.
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the principle was to seek cooperation from the local
populace and eliminate undesirable characters in the
locality. The second campaign from July to late
October went one step further, utilizing strategic
points along communication lines as bases to set up
23blockades against the CCP bases. By the time the th;ird 
campaign was launched from early November to December 
25, the tremendous pressure on the CCP bases was obvious­
ly being1 felt. This period covered harvest time and one 
of the main objectives of the Japanese Army was to con­
centrate on the procuring of economic resources, especi­
ally food and commodity crops. Another objective was to
set up economic blockades between CCP bases and the
24major centres of economic supply. Details of the elab- 
orate measures undertaken, and the organization of self- 
defence forces with a view to establishing these economic
23* Fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force 
in North China, Greppo, 5 G a t s u b u n , ')»)(Monthly 
Beport for May, itflT^T'TIsT'^lOll, F.267OO, p.Ij 
Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The eneny’s movement to re­
inforce law and order* Chieh-f ang jih-nao,
Jan. 15,1942.
24* Fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force
in North China, GeppS, 9 Gatsubun, fl (Monthly
Beport for September, T97IT, BTTXS, T 1015, P 26857“ 
26859, pp.7-11? also see Ti Hua and Hsueh Hui, "The 
enemy’s movement to reinforce law and order...,",
Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan.15, 1942.
25
"blockades will be discussed later on in the chapter, 
fhe fourth campaign covered 1942 from April I onwards.
By then, the Pacific War which began on December 8, 1941, 
had already lasted for four months, and the aim of this 
campaign was therefore to bring the war in north China 
to a successful conclusion. Another specific objective
was to bring home the good work done in the third cam-
26
paign in putting economic pressure on the CCP bases.
Prom the specific objectives to be achieved in the
four phases of the Movement to Beinforce Law and Order,
it can be seen that the Movement was a gradual tightening
of pressure on the CCP bases in north China, and Japanese
brutality in the process was inevitable. Contemporary
Communist sources give the fullest details of such
brutality inflicted on the Chinese population by the 
27





TI Hua and Hsueh Hui, Mfhe enemy's movement to re­
inforce law and order..*n, Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan. 
15, 1942. Also see Ohleh-fSae^IE^pa^nm r i . 1942
The leople1 s liberation Army during’ the Anti-Japanese
tvmmmmi'm KWh#......t  \ t\ij  . i m w*u ,,£ am n*  i« tm m  * im ifc L iiM    um 'i  J i i i i —  ■■■■ i i l f f n  m i mitm m w
W ar rTl9^12 2? 142-145T. ^hu Teh, On the Bat t le Pi elds 
of the Liberated Area, 17# Por specific casesTJTKe 
intensrty“of ' Japanese mopping-up campaigns in
Hopei, see Johnson, Pe as ant Hat1onali sm«.«. 55; The 
People 1s Liberation Army*.#, 145-144.
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the rural population whose national consciousness 
was consequently aroused and support was therefore given 
to the Communists in resistance to the Japanese. Rather 
than going into details of the scope of Japanese anti- 
CCP campaigns, the present purpose concentrates on a study 
of Japan’s application of her military propaganda, and 
political machinery to challenge the rising CCP power in 
rural north China, especially in the villages and particu­
lar attention is paid to the period 1941-1942, when the - 
Japanese military pressure on the CCP "bases reached its 
climax *
Phe Road-protection Campaign and the Associated Ai-hu
Having occupied the major urban centres and communi­
cation lines in north China by the end of 1937, the Japan­
ese army began to use these strongholds as their bases not 
only to defend the occupied area against CCP attacks, but 
also to launch attacks against the Communist bases in the 
adjacent rural area* Phis campaign was known as hu-lu 
yun-tung''^ "f_h%^ )^ Ji’^ (road-protection campaign), and associated 
with it was the organisation of the Ai-hu (care and protec-
pressure on the Communist bases. Perritorially, this anti 
CCP movement could be regarded as an encroachment by the
village organiaati ons *
and the application of economic
138
Japanese from their so called "orderly" areas upon the
28
GOP bases, which were described as the "disorderly" areas*
The important railway network in north China
inevitably ran through almost the whole of the rural area
and the Japanese had the difficult task of protecting it
against GOP sabotage* The Japanese also understood very
well that the railway network was the only effective means
of maintaining economic and military control over north
China* As early as 1936, even before the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Government had already
drafted plans to specify hovj railways in north China
should be guarded* It was estimated that about 5>000
guards were needed to protect the five major lines, but
29
in war-time, 9,000 men were needed.
28* The Japanese classified territories in China into
three categories, namely, "orderly”, "semi-orderly", 
and "disorderly". The "orderly" territories were 
obviously Japanese strongholds, whilst the Commun­
ists claimed that what the Japanese called the 
"disorderly" areas in fact corresponded to OOP-held 
territories* See The Peopled Liberation Army.**,,
119-120? and J. Ch*en, Mao and the Chxnese Eevolu- 
tion, 246-247-
29- Commander in Chief, Japanese Expeditionary Force in
China, ELtmitsu shorui chosei no ken % Sh^wa II nendo
fci* tf>i iiT iirTir*ii ii.nn  i ■cimmi — .m u i hi ii " i f i  t« i  ' » n m i m nii i i ri H i i urr m ^ i i r i iiin iam  i i i '^nn -n ri  11 ip m  i irr 11 i t  n  i r r  t i i rr  ......... .. ................... mf nm ni 'r inn  T ~ n r
of Secret Documents
Concerning Administration of Occupied Territory of 
horth China for 1936), Sept. 23, 1936, appendix 3b,
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With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, this
road-protection campaign began to come into full operation.
Closely associated with it was the setting up of Ai-hu
villages along strips of rural areas on both sides of the
30railways lines. Ihe specific duty of village heads in 
these villages was to see that the section of the railway 
running through-the village be well guarded against damage# 
fhe Japanese went to great lengths of elaboration in 
organising these villages with a view to mobilizing the 
support of the rural population for the protection of rail*™ 
ways, as well as for the founding of bases against the 
Communists. ITaturally the Japanese method in going about 
mobilizing the rural population was very different from that 
of the Communists. Whilst the CCP made full use of peasant 
nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment, the Japanese took 
advantage of every means from persuasion to coercion and 
intimidation. Ihe result was the local people either 
willingly or unwillingly had to serve under the Japanese
30. Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, Special 
Be onoraic Investigation Of fice (EMI), c omp• and pub., 
Jjun-hsien-cHu chih ti wei hu-lu cheng-ts !e Iff ^
(STe'^nemy and Puppai^Road-protection 
Policy in the Occupied Area), Chungking, April 1943 > IB 
double pp. This M l  source gives analytical and unbiased 
information on the Japanese road-protection campaign 
and the Ai-hu village organizations#
in the promotion of the road-protection and anti-OOP
campaigns. In 1941 and 1942, when the Japanese scored
successes in their mopping-up campaigns, there was also
a boom in the development of the Ai-hu villages, which,
well supported by the Japanese Army, stood as the greatest
resistance to OOP mass mobilization programmes in the
villages* It must be emphasized that the extent of rural
organization undertaken by the Japanese was on a much
smaller scale than that of the CCP; but even so, the many
successful aspects of the Ai-hu village organizations can
be regarded as a unique feature in the history of the Bino-
Japanese War. Phis is because they demonstrate some degree
of Japanese success in rural control, no matter however
limited in scope, against the strong tide of peasant
nationalism. By early 1942, even the COP admitted that
the Japanese successfully occupied some extent of the”mien”
or rural area, stating that puppet authorities could
exercise control over an area 5-10 li from the ’’points*1 and 
31
’’lines”. Phe Japanese method of rural organization in 
these Ai-hu villages thus deserves further study.
31* Pi Hua and Hsueh Hui, ”Phe enemy’s movement to 
reinforce law and order”, Chieh-fang jih-pao, 
Jan. 15, 1942*
Ai-hu villages were set up along the major railway 
lines and occxipied an area about 10 li on either side of 
the tracks, an area known as the Ai-hu District. To make 
sure the terrain was suitable for operational purposes, an 
order from the headquarters of the horth China Expeditionary 
iirmy on February 12, 1939 specified a ban on the growth of 
kaoliang, mai^e, and any other crop of 5 feet or over in
height in areas 500 kilometres on either side of the railway.
32
In the case of mo torero ads, the area was 300 wide.
In north China, about ten railway lines served the east- 
west and north-south traffic and Ai-hu villages were set 
up at strategic points along these lines. The condition of 
protection along these lines can be classified into three 
categories. First, there were the lines which were almost 
free of guerrilla activity or banditry. Here Ai-hu villages 
prospered and it was not difficult to secure the support of 
local villagers. These lines included the Ching-shan line
. <£,. ....  r
(Peking Shanhaikuan) and the Ching-ku o line
32. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Japanese Expeditionary 
Force in EortJa^China, lokumu Kikancbo kaigi ni kansuru 
ken H t7 Yfcjfopx>(-1 -Tkeport*s on Meeting of Chiefs of
Special Intelligence Bureau), Oct. 31, 1939* R 114,
T 967, F 25264, p.7. Also see Central Bureau of 
Investigation and Statistics, The Enemy and Puppet Road-
15 OMeh-fam .jih-pao, Aug. 11, 1941,
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(Peking-Chengte). Second, there were lines which traversed 
areas geographically favourable to guerrilla activities. In 
this case, the main task of the Ai-hu villages was to guard 
the lines against OOP sabotage and the self-defence corps 
was given heavy responsibilities. These lines included the
west direction from Peking to Inner Mongolia across mountain­
ous terrain, the Peking-Hankow line as far south as Hsin- 
hsiang on the north bank of the Yellow Biver, the northern 
section of the Tientsin Pukow line, the lunghai and Ohao-tsi
ran within close distance of OOP guerrilla bases and in many 
cases, these areas were mountainous, thus favouring demoli­
tion and sabotage activities. Ai-hu villages here became 
the testing ground for the effectiveness of Japanese rule.
(Shihchiachuang-Techou) were in this category. The Cheng-t'ai 
line r.an west-east from central Shansi to central I-Iopei with 
bases closing on to the line from north and south. The T !ung-
Ping-sui line (PeldLng-Suiyuan) which ran in an east
(Chaochou Bay - Tsinan) lines running east-west in
■v 1 -  f
the southern part of north China, and the Pien-hsin line > r4
33
(K1 aifeng-Hsinhsiang). The third type of railway lines
The Cheng-t*hi (Cheng ting-Paiyuan), the T f ung-pu )
(Tat* ung-Pengningtao) and the Shih-te lines 'G 3 
33* Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics, 
The Enemy and Puppet Eoad-protection Policy...,
7 - 5 1 7- 8 .
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pu line was the main communication between north and south
Shansi, whilst the Shih-te line traversed central Hopei and
at the same time connected the Peking-Ifankow and the lien-
34
tsin-Pukow lines# 1'he present purpose is tor' examine the
organizations of Ai~hu villages along the three railway
lines in the third category mentioned above*
It was in Shansi that the Japanese came into close
conflict and clashes with the Communists* Ihe P'ung-pu
and the Cheng-t!ai lines either actually passed through or
were within striking distance of CCP-held territories*
Communist bases in Shansi included the north-west Shansi
base, the S;hansi-Ohahar~Hopei base, and the sub-region of
south-east Shansi within the Shansi-Hopei -Shantung-Honan 
33
base* Ihus it was not surprising to find sabotage activi­
ties were more frequent here than on other lines in other 
areas* Kural areas in Shansi through whdbh the lines ran 
became the focus of attention for both the CCP and the 
Japanese, who were both anxious to gain control over the 
local populace, and it was not surprising that in marginal 
areas villages changed hand several times over a relatively 
short period, for while the Japanese sought to extend their 
hold on the *!mienn, the CCP wanted to strike at the railways 
which were the artery of Japanese economic and military
34* Ibid., 5-8.
m i i—
35* See maps on 41 and 42.
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control in north China*
Thus the Japanese paid special attention to the 
organization of Ai-hu villages in Shansi* In the 61 
hsien which the North China Political Council could 
claim at least partial control in 1940, Ai-hu villages 
totalled 3,356 with 123,487 men guarding the railway lines# 
These villages Y/ere situated mainly along the Cheng-t?ai 
and T !ung-pu lines, which served as useful means of trans­
porting the economic resources away from Shansi. Portresses 
for the posting of villagers as sentries were set up along
the lines only several li from each other, and armoured cars
36 .
and cannons were on the alert at night* Statistics of Ai-hu 
villages in Shansi in 1940 indicates that there was an 
exceptionally large number of these villages in three hsien, 
which were all situated along the T !ung-pu line. Yutzu
A/— iA
Tft'l'/v ? 25 Km. south of f ?aiyuan, the capital of Shansi, was 
strategically situated where the Oheng-t'ai line crossed 
the T'ung-pu, and therefore had its 65 Ai-hu villages heavily 
guarded by 15,839 men. Yang-chtf fr) ^  , about 25 Km. north 
of T ’aiyuan on the T'ung-pu line, had 71 Ai-hu villages 
guarded by 11,195 men. P ’ingyao’" -ML , 100 Km. south of
37
I*aiyuan, had 15,564 men guarding’ its 143 Ai-hu villages.
36. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi Provincial Government, 
Compendium of Materials on Civil Affairs. 1941, III 
(Chart V), 2-6.
37- Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium of I 
on Civil Affairs. 1941, Illfchart Y ), 2*
aterials
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It was in Ai-hu villages like these in the above
three hsien that the Japanese could challenge the OCX3
In rural control# If the OOP was less open In admitting
Japanese success along such line? at least KMT sources in
1943 revealed that guerrillas along railway lines found
that in vie?; of the Japanese rural organizations? villagers
tended to refrain from giving Chinese guerrillas the needed
38
support? and instead acted as agents for the Japanese#
Theoretically? the Ai-hu villages were under the Tao
(prefecture) and the province In the ascending order
of puppet local administration starting from July 1939*
However? superimposed on this was control by the railway
39
authorities and the Japanese Expeditionary Army. There
yjere- three main railway authorities in north China under
the North China Transport Company? located along the Peking-
40
Tientsin line? and in Peking and Tsinan. These railway
38* Central Bureau of Investigation, Enemy and Puppet Road- 
protection Policy? 17*
39* Bureau of Civil Affairs? Shansi, Compendium? Civil 
Affairs? 1940, II? (Central legisTationTTl*
40. Por the three main railway authorities, see Headquarters 
Japanese Expeditionary Porce in China, Senden Oyobi 
minshti kakutoku ktfsaku ni kansuru chosa^ESkoku fcfiS
Survey Report on Effectiveness of Propagan­
da in winning Pavour of Chinese Masses), Peb#24,1940.
R 13.4, T 981? P 25486# According to Central Bureau of 
Investigation, The Enemy and Puppet Road-protection
T_ —  Hi rm  1 (1 1 mill  1 m 11 m 1 ni 1 -rir^Tiii nr" IT" “It*— *1 rmiTn"nr‘n1 r ri Hr'firmrrrn 1 i i 1 nT'~Tri>m — rTi ra~iini i inrunn rrnnrf iri Ti>riitjM n - 4-T n - ii'^ f^ M (
Policy, 3, the North China Transport Company was set up 
in April, 1959*
authorities functioned as the nucleus of operations,
directing the administration of the villages whilst
41
keeping in close contacts with the Japanese Arny.
They had under them the road-protection department £Ai~lu
vii-, w /?■
k'o)/^^- the road-protection bureau (Ai-lu chu)'^^ g) , 
in charge of the main lines, amd the road-protection section 
(Ai-lu hsi) set up in each of the main-line stations.
The main-line station-master was in charge of the road-pro­
tection district (Ai-lu chfu)^^/g°, covering about 10 li 
on either side of the track. Under the district were the
various Ai-hu villages where chiefs were appointed by the
42
Transport Company* Specific duties and schedules were 
assigned to these villages, in most cases by the railway 
authorities, and in return certain privileges were given 
to the villagers. The principal policy"of the Japanese 
was to make the daily life of the local populace inseparable 
from the road-protection campaign. Villagers were expected 
to report any damage to railroad tracks to the nearest 
Japanese garrison or security forces. They were also to 
render assistance to the authorities concerned in the 
reconstruction of damaged tracks and other precautionary
41- Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Japanese Expeditionary 
Porce in North China, Keport, Chiefs of Special 
Intelligence Bureau, Oct. 31, 1939>"Tf’-QTT T’lJioT,
3? 25278




me asures agai ns t C ommunis t s ab o t age.
Bor a successful operation of the different programmes 
in the Ai-hu -villages, the recruitment of man-power was 
evidently the determining factor* The bare truth is both the 
Japanese and the 0ommunists had to depend on the local popu­
lation for the recruitment of local forces like the self- 
defence corps and the labour units. As invaders in a 
foreign country, the Japanese could not be expected to 
employ persuasive measures to recruit their men. In fact 
they had to use force, and the climax of the press-gang 
activities coincided with the launching of the Movement to 
Reinforce Xaw and Order in 1941 and 1942, when the increased 
Japanese military pressure facilitated the rounding up of 
villagers, very often at gun-point, for military and labour 
service* If COP sources can on the whole be relied upon,
then they indicate a sharp rise in the Japanese recruitment
44
of men in north China in 1941-5.
43* Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil 
Affairs, 1940, II, (Central legisTaPTon}"7"2.
I t
44- Chung-Ch’ing-she v\ , f,Hua-pei ch'ing-yiin tung-tTaiu 
"if-:) ^ , (Activities of the youth movement in
north China), Chieh-fang jih-pao, Peb. 3, 1942.
Japanese recruitment of men in north China, 1938-1941
ya rT ifn r fMWUnjMM.Mii i i p , w ^  m »mht. ii« « hipi* W ib m »w^ »w m k M m M i jhu» .iijMww»i  ti.p itfim r.iim a . n m U ' W * i w — W M i i iMf n .ui. nmm ixiIppm* e.nawi ■ > i u » w i  .■w.imw.iwuwr.i.Ainuiim ] m m  MJMwm i—jiyt
CCP sources give detailed reports of the activities of 
Japanese press-gangs for obvious reasons, that is, to let 
the local populace realize they could not expect any mercy 
from the Japanese. These sources indicate the Japanese 
rounded up from a few hundred to a few thousand men at the
hsien level at any particular period over a few months* span 
Whilst OOP figures might have been exaggerated, it stands 
to reason that the Japanese, especially in 1941, were really 
concentrating on recruiting maximum man-power to support 
their mopping-up campaigns so as not to let the CCP benefit.
f
Any surplus of man-power would not have been overlooked by 
the Communists, who also needed reinforcements badly to
45* At the climax of the Japanese mopping-up campaigns
in 1941, the Japanese press-gang activities were most 
intense in^Shansi t from late April-late May, 1941 in 
Pu. hsien , north-west Shansi, 2,000 men were
rounded upi in August 1941, 500 men were rounded up 
in Tfaichti and Yutzu, south of T*aiyuan, 1,500 men 










Honan border area: See Chieh-fang jih-pao, July 11, 
and Sept. 2, 1941.
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resist the Japanese in their bases. It is interesting at 
this point to compare the above OOP figures with contempo­
rary Japanese records on the recruitment of Chinese in 
north China* For instance, the north China Expeditionary
Army in August 1941 revealed its plan for such recruitment
46
in the period August-Deeember. A total of 4,000 men from 
the Ai-hu villages in north China was to be sent to Man­
churia for temporary labour. The figures were s
2.000 from Ai-hu villages of the Tientsin Railway Bureau,
1.000 ,, ,, ,f ,, ,, Peking ,, ,,
1.000 ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tsinan ,,■- ,, .
The above Japanese information verifies the fact that 
although the CCP accounts might have been exaggerated, they 
were by no means fictional propaganda.
The next step is to examine the various activities of 
men recruited by the Japanese for local service in the 
villages. In the first place, these men were divided into 
two groups. Those within the age group of 17-35 were the 
main strength of local defence, and they received military 
training in the villages so as to cope with the task of 
protecting the railway lines. Those of the age group 56-45
46. Fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Force in 
Horth China, G-eppo, 8 gatsubun, (/'$0W(Monthly 
EeporT; for August, "1941), "Oct. 1941, R 115, T 1012,
F 26739, p.II.
had lighter work, mainly acting as sentries or messengers.
The Japanese concentrated on the training of young men, and
centres were set up in great number in north China, located
in almost all the major hsien cities and strategic points.
In Ch’angchih o 9 south-east Shansi, for example, the
number of young men trained totalled 4,500 in 1941-1942,
and the duration of the training programme ranged from 1-2
weeks to 1-2 months. In centres like this, young men were
indoctrinated with ideas like those of the New People's
Society and the emphasis was placed on the extermination of
the Communists and the realization of the new Order in East
Asia based on Sino-Japanese cooperation. Military training
also covered part of the course with drills, exercises, and
speeches delivered by instructors. Graduates from these
centres either served in the puppet forces or acted as anti-
CCP agents. Many naturally returned to their respective
Ai-hu villages, where they took up responsible posts in the
road-protection campaigns, and became leaders of the self- 
47
defence corps*
The North China Expeditionary Army believed that the 
Chinese were apt to organize themselves into local defence
47* C hung-c Ming-she , ’'Activities of the youth movement...", 
Chi eh-fang jih pao, Feb. 3, 1942, also see Bureau of
WMI | WW* l O— < Hfru— , W tuBf.ll n > . l  ar [I I » r* i W J l. l. r f t f iv t
Civil Affairs, Shansi, Compendium, Civil Affairs, 1940,
BMXPirviHir imfii5nira*naiLiMm.n*w ii:^ 'r t m m ii. . mir-»firM »^i<w«>g.rrMiiini . .  > .<>■ nr inn —
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corps for security reasons, especially in rural areas, so
48
much so that it had become a national characteristic.
(Thus the Japanese considered the strength of the local 
defence force as one of the chief means to repel 0ommunist 
infiltration in rural China. In Hopei, self-defence corps 
were subdivided into the Eastern CCP-~Ex termination Contin­
gent, the COP-Extermination Youth Contingent, and the 
National Reconstx-uction CCP-Extermination Contingent, whilst
in north-west Shansi, the Eastern Self-defence Corps
49
comprised regular and reserve contingents.
Under the leadership of the head of a Ai-hu 
village, men from the self-defence corps were posted along 
the section of the railway running through the village. In 
the initial stage of the road-protection campaign, thatched- 
roof huts were built for sentry purposes. Later, small 
fortresses took their place, fhis not only enabled the 
sentries to be better situated at vantage points, but also
48. Headquarters, Japanese-Expeditionary Eorce in North 
China, Kit a China Homengun jokyo hokoku A ) yX
•A r 7  ’' I      .......  .............. i m  mm nr      i>.i im urtliwn ■! h wii m n  nM rfii.ii i ^ u i . iiih w  iiwvhwhipi Boun in  I |
(Eeport on Stare of Affairs of Japanese Army 
in North China), March 18, 1941. R 114, I 1005, E 
26424, p.14.
49* BU&r.g Chien-t! o'^'^'S^/" jih-kj ou ^ tsai Hua-pei tsui- 
chin ti tung t 1 ai" * (Recent activities
of the Japanese bandits in north China), Chieh-fang 
jih-pao, Feb. 13. 1942; and »Chin-ti chaanFKuST™ 
cEih-an’S ^  (The reinf orcement of law and
order undertaken by the enemy in Shansi) Chieh-fang
,  .  i  n  .  Bm-r nim ..... . » IMTW.  i.IfTTinUi n m u  m vi fx
jih-pao, Dec.26, 1941.
tJwfahi fm r^wiL j lBiimii m'niBtf
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made it possible for the Japanese troops to station small
50
garrisons in these fortified bases for anti-OOP purposes.
By 1940, the Japanese railway authorities discovered the 
most effective protection against Communist sabotage of 
railway tracks was to dig deep and wide trenches on both 
sides so that the tracks* became inaccessible. These 
trenches were normally about 12 feet deep and 12 feet wide, 
but depth and width depended on the liability to OOP attacks 
so did the number of fortresses built along a particular 
section of the railway. Thus it was not surprising to find 
the Oheng-tT ai and the T ’ung-pu lines in Shansi were most 
heavily guarded. In the case of the Tientsin-Suiyuan and 
the Peking-Hankow lines, the trenches in 1941 were twelve
feet wide and twenty-four feet deep, whilst the fortresses
51
were closely linked, only five li from one another. Heavi­
ly guarded trai&s also went on patrol at night to inspect 
the railway tracks.
A point worth noting is the average strength of the 
self-defence corps in each of the Ai-hu villages. About
3-5 men kept watch on day and night shifts in each of the
52
fortresses under the administration of the village.
50. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Dnemy...Road- 
protection Policy, 3.
51® Ibid., 4-6, 16.
52. Ibid., 5, 7.
154
Statistics published by the puppet Shansi provincial
administration in 1940 indicated that out of the 61 hsiens,
there was a total of 5,356 Ai-hu villages with 123>487 men
guarding them, that is, an average of just over 36 men in
each village- However, in the case of the three specially
heavily guarded hsien in Shansi mentioned earlier, the
53
average number of guards per village was much higher.
Ihe very nature of these Ai-hu villages was to entrust
local defence to the villagers, and the Chinese heads of
village were in most cases held responsible for seeing that
the road-protection campaign was operating satisfactorily.
Perhaps the exception to this was at strategic points along
the Gheng-t'ai and the Ifung~pu lines where Japanese troops
54
also participated actively in the campaign. One might 
sometimes wonder how the Japanese were able to maintain 
control over these villagers who were likely to be sympa­
thetic towards their fellow countrymen, the Communists. In
53. Bee 1^3f n-37.
54* Central Bureau of Investigation, Ihe ffnemy...Boad- 
protection Policy, 10. ""
Average number of guards per vi
Yangchu
Yutzu over 243 
over 157
P* ingyao over 108
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the first place, the Japanese kept a strict control over the 
village heads -who had to r eport instantly any damage to the 
tracks to the nearest railway authorities or Japanese garri­
son. Very often telephone communication was available to 
speed up the repairing process. Failure to report could 
result in severe penalties to the guards and the heads of 
villages. For the purpose of detailed reports on the condi­
tion of the railway tracks, a log hook was kept in each Ai- 
hu village, and once every month, the village head had to 
present the log hook to the security forces at the relevant 
railway-station for examination and approval, after which the 
log hook would he stamped. For fear of Japanese retaliation, 
and because of this strict supervision, village heads very
often found it to their advantage to cooperate if they v^ anted
55
to stay alive.
Apart from intimidation and coercion, the Japanese 
railway authorities and the Army also innovated beneficial 
schemes in these Ai-hu villages. They must have had a good 
knowledge of the mentality of the rural populace. The living 
standard of an average peasant in north China was very low,
55- Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road-pro­
tection policy, 2,4, alsosee Headquarters, Japanese 
ExpedrETonaiy Force in Horth China? Survey Report on 
Effectiveness of Propaganda in Winning Favour of 
G H n e s T i E i i ^ i T ^ ^ T U S ^ ^ I l T l W r T ^  5 4 97
(Remark;.
Hence the greatest attraction to him was material aid, and 
the Japanese did not hesitate to invest on these villagers 
to seek their support and cooperation. Under the North 
Ohina Transport Company's supervision, a programme consist­
ing of eight items was drawn up to render aid to the vill­
agers ? comprising assistance in the agricultural, technical, 
medical, educational and recreational field.
The first concern was agricultural assistance. Special 
agricultural training centres were set up in major cities 
like Peking, Tientsin, Tsinan, Tsingtao, T1aiyuan, Hsuchou, 
Anyang and Paoting. About 250 young ment from 18
to 25 years of age from the Ai-hu villages were trained for 
three months in each of these centres, the courses provided 
including a wide range of training from stock breeding and
56
farming techniques to weather-for coasting. Along the T'ung- 
pu line, the programme of agricultural aid was best organi­
sed. In terms of technology, the railway authorities from 
T1aiyuan sent men to the Ai-hu villages to advise on irriga­
tion and drainage, on the improvement of fertilizers, farm­
ing implements and the quality of seeds. Virgin land was 
also allotted to villagers for cultivation* Some form of 
systematic financial management was also introduced. For 
the poorer peasants, loans were stated as being available 
although there was no detailed information as to the amount
— fcmaiw-iri —1 M W
56. Central Bureau of Investigation, The Enemy...Road- 
protection Policy, 8-11.
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and whether interest would he charged* The most basic
form of cooperatives for the sale of daily necessities
also rendered services to the villagers. To encourage
active participation in village affairs, organized tours
for village heads were held every year when they would
have the opportunity to visit major cities for observation
57
and inspection purposes.
Perhaps the kind of assistance best app? eciated by 
the local people was medical aid. In the rural areas of 
north China in the late 1930s and early 1940s, it could 
well be assumed that hospitals and clinics and the service 
of qualified doctors were a novelty. The railway authori­
ties established a major hospital with branches along each 
of the major lines. Ai-hu villagers could receive treat­
ment free of charge, whilst touring vans visited the vill­
ages with medical supplies and vaccination was made compul­
sory. The following is a table showing the distribution 
of hospitals along the major lines.
'Location of rail
way bureau
Pek- Tien- Shi ho hia- Tf ai- Chang- Isi-I 
tsin chuang yuan Chiak’ou nan in
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To make villagers satisfied with their home environ­
ment, schools were set up for the education of the next 
generation or even for the present generation in the !,Ai-
protection Welfare Institute)* Recreation centres known as
up along major lines with libraries, canteens, hath rooms, 
recreation rooms and lecture halls open to the villagers. 
Other benefits included special trains at fixed time-sched­
ule catering for Ai-hu villagers who could travel free of 
charge, thus facilitating communications between villages 
along the railways. Such transport must have been much more 
convenient to the villagers than the traditional means of 
transport they were used to. In addition, awards in the 
form of money were available for good performances in the
road-protection campaigns and casualties and deaths result-
58
ing from these campaigns would be compensated.
As far as the administration of the Ai-hu villages was 
concerned, the various Japanese welfare schemes and the use 
of coercion and intimidation served the same purpose as 
0ommunist nationalistic propaganda in mobilizing the rural 
population. KMT intelligence reports in 1943 admitted that 
because of the various welfare schemes the Japanese were 
able to render to the Ai-hu villages, the local people were
lu hui-min yen-chiu-so1 ^ Hoad
“Ai-lu chih Ghia" /?- ^(Road-protection home) were set
58. Ibid., 9-11•
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willing to cooperate with the Japanese, and this was espe­
cially so in north China, where Ai-hu villages were better 
organized than those in central or south China, so much so
that Chinese guerrillas found villagers refused to help and
59
instead acted as Japanese agents, This phenomenon reveals
the bare truth that in as much as one cannot neglect peas™
%
ant nationalism as a determining force in the Sino-Japanese 
War, attention to the daily, basic economic needs of the 
rural population was just as important if either the OOP or 
the Japanese hoped to exercise rural control in north China* 
The Model Districts*
iin i— IiHiii i in 11 imi 11 hi m i  m i l * *  mm     . . . . .. m u ■■nr ri»i iw
Another Japanese means of expanding from the 1 orderly1
areas to adjacent territories with CCP guerrilla activities
was the setting up of ,fMu™fan ti-chf utf (model
districts), embodying at least one important urban centre
and one railway line in each district. The following is a
map marking the various model districts as located by the
60
North China Expeditionary Army in October, 1939?
59* Ibid *, 17*
60* Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Report, Special 
Intelligence Bureau, R 114, T9&7, P 25259-252^2.



















































A study of the relative positions of the model dis-
61
tricts and the GOP bases reveals one significant point#
In terms of the territorial struggle in north China? the 
model districts represent Japanese efforts to strengthen 
territories held by them? and signify a response to the 
growing threat from the Communists who had been Intensify­
ing their guerrilla activities since 1938. On the other 
hand? the CCP bases tended to engulf the model districts 
in a movement to encroach upon the Japanese-heId urban 
centres? many cf which were included within the model dis­
tricts. A typical example of this Japanese-CCP confronta­
tion can be seen in Shansi and central Hopei, where the 
Japanese model district centred round Shihchiachuang was 
surrounded by the Communist Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base in the 
north? and the sub-region of lu ai Hang and southern Hopei 
in the south. It was in marginal areas that the struggle 
for rural control was most intense .
Por the Japanese, the model districts were each alloted 
funds up to 560,000? although Japanese sources did not 
make it clear whether the subsidy was on a yearly basis * In 
addition;? the Army had regular garrisons there to share the
61. I'he relative positions of the Communists and the 
Japanese can be studied by comparing the maps on 
, 42 aiid 160 *
1 6 2
burden of anti-OOP campaigns with the local defence corps.
The following is a chart illustrating the extent and the
62
strength of these model districts?
62. Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff? Report? Special 
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In these model districts, apart from the participa­
tion of the Japanese garrison, the pao-chia system in its 
various modified form also operated in the maintenance of 
law and order. Basically, 10 households formed one Chia^ ,
and 10 Chi a one Pao in accordance with the tradition-
63
al Chinese security organizations. Sometimes, several
villages with a total of over 100 households were Incor­
porated into one, and this was known as "ping-ts’un" \
(incorporating villages)** Elaborate measures and regula­
tions were drawn up to check the movement of each house­
hold. In Shansi, for example, a placard had to be nailed 
in front of the house and residents were required to make 
known their names, profession and age in it. Identity 
cards or citizen cards were also issued with finger prints
64
and photographs in them for easy identification.
63* Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi.Compendium, Civil 
Affairs,1940,II(central legislation77l4• It is 
interesting to compare the pao-chia system enforced 
by the North China Political Council with that in 
Central China under Wang Ching-wei's government.
There is a great deal of similarities, mainly because 
they had the same objective of nexterminating the 
Communists1 in their rural pacification campaigns.
Bee Lee Ngok,op.cit•, 168-179, and J.Ch'en, Mao and 
the Chinese Revolution, 247,*'
64. Bureau of Civil Affairs, Shansi,Compendium.Civil
Affairs.1940.11,(central legislation),8-1051941,111, 
(Shansi legislation) , 4* Also **Chin-ti chfiang-hua
chih-an yin-mou11 t ^  (The treachery of re­
inforcing law and order undertaken by enemy in Shansi) 
Chieh-fang iih-pao,Aug.ll,1941 and ”!Csui-chin Hua-pei 
^^eT^cEeng^chTE™ tung-t * w ^  ^  (Becent
Political,activities, of the,enemy and puppets in north 
Chxna; 0hxeh-fang ?ih-nao. Nov.19.1942.
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The whole pao-chia system in the villages was in fact under
the supervision of the police commissioner at the hsien
level* and in case the Commissioner was absent* the head of
the hsien, who might he the magistrate, or the chief of the
*lwei-chih huiM (maintenance society), a temporary
organization for the maintenance of law and order, would
65
take over the supervision*
It is generally true that the effectiveness of the 
Japanese-sponsored pao-chia system depended on the extent 
of support it had from the Japanese Army. Thus, the closer 
the particular rural area or model district was to urban 
centres and strategic points, where one would expect a con­
centration of Japanese troops, the better organized would 
be the pao-chia system.
The Economic Pressure.
Another important aspect of anti-CCP measures that 
needs to be discussed is the Japanese economic pressure 
on the CCP bases, especially in 1941-1942. In terms of 
the territorial struggle for power in north China,both 
the Communists and the Japanese employed various means to 
Restrict the out-flow of economic resources from their own 
area. On the part of the Communists, who were fighting 
guerrilla wars and whose bases were often raided by the 
Japanese Army, the economic tactics employed had been r,to
65. Buearu of Civil Affairs,Shansi? 0ompendium4 Civi1 
Affairs ,1940» H  (central legi slaPioii),"'''!^ .
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clear the walls and empty the fields" as described in 
chapter three. As for the Japanese, their economic war 
on the OOP was most elaborate. By 1939-1940, they rea­
lised the vulnerability of the Communists, who had to 
live off the land they were stationed in. (Phis not only 
applied to the Eigth Route Army, but also to people !s 
armed bands, i.e., the self-defence corps and the militia, 
whose livelihood also depended on the economic production 
of their particular locality. Phus the most effective and 
positive measure for use against the guerrilla was to 
exercise control whenever possible over economic supplies 
in both the occupied area and the CCP bases. Phe way to 
achieve this was to set up economic blockades and enforce 
rationing and commandeering.
Phe first point to note in discussing Japanese attempts 
at economic control of the rural area was the value of food 
and cash crops which were far more significant than paper 
bank notes issued by different banks, puppet or CCP alike.
In the vi 11-ages of north China then, the barter system was 
often preferred to money transactions. Po tighten the 
control over CCP bases, the Japanese therefore aimed at 
preventing the export of crops and goods of economic value 
from the occupied area to the Communist bases. Hence, the 
setting up of economic blockades became necessary. In 
addition, in marginal areas where the guerrillas could poss­
ibly get support from the people in spite of blockades, the
167
Japanese introduced rationing and commandeering so as to 
minimize the economic support the guerrillas could possi­
bly get* Whilst Japanese troops in rural China in face of 
CCP embargoes and economic blockades, could depend on the 
better developed urban centres for supplies and reinforce­
ment, the CCP guerrillas and regulars faced with a similar 
situation were in a much worse situation, as they had to 
be self-sufficient with no possible help from outside, esp­
ecially from 1940 onwards, when what little supplies there
66
were from Chungking were also stopped* We turn, then, to 
a detailed study of the Japanese methods of economic control 
Economic Blockades*
Support rendered by the lorth China Expeditionary Army 
was apparent in the establishment of economic blockades.
Eor instance, in the Shansi-IIopei-Shantung-Honan region, it 
was no coincidence that the committees directing economic 
control and blockades were set up in llovember-Pecember,1941; 
that was the period when the third mopping-up campaign in 
1941 was launched with the specific aim of tightening the 
economic control over CCP bases. Phe blockaded areas inclu-
66. ®KTang-Jih Shih-ch'i ti ching-chi wen-ti ho ts'ai- 
cheng wen-ti», (Economic
and financial problems during the Anti-Japanese 
War) Mao Pse-tung hsuan-chi, (1961), III, 893-894*
ded T'aihangshan in Shansi, the Yellow River area, and 
the Liao H o j ^ v J  area. The pao-chia system was utili­
zed extensively to establish liaison between villages.
Check points were set up on major roads between villages 
and on the periphery of areas blockaded. These check
points were known as "chien-ch'a so"^fe^'or "t’an-wen so"
67
^■^.f^^where goods and commodities were checked.
In general, Japanese-controlled rural areas were 
economically better developed with aacess to urban centres 
and Industrial towns. Therefore in these areas daily com­
modities and manufactured goods were usually available. 
These goods were badly needed by the less developed CCP 
bases where goods of economic value were mostl-y raw mater­
ial like hide, or medicinal herbs. Thus the main purpose 
of the Japanese blockade was to ban the export of specified 
goods from the occupied area. These included ammunition 
and firearms, food, medical supplies, cotton in its raw or
manufactured form, wool, and ink as well as the all import-
68 •
ant iron, coal and salt. Of particular interest was cotton
67* CCP news on Japanese economic blockades was given in 
Chieh-fang rjih-pao, Dec.8,15 1941, especially on the 
Shansi-Hopei-Shantung1-Honan Border Region. Also see 
Ti Hu a and Hsueh Hui, "The enemy !s movement to rein­
force law and order...", Chieh-fang jih-pao, Jan.1 5 ,  
1942.
68. Chieh-fang jih pao, Dec.15» 1941.
and salt. Cotton was essential as raw material for mak­
ing clothes, whilst salt was important to COP bases in 
the different parts of Shansi where transport difficul­
ties and the tremendous distance from salt producing areas 
made the product most needed. The fact that Communists 
during the Sino-Japanese War tried to achieve self-suffi­
ciency in the production of salt, and in the growth of 
cotton indicated that the Japanese economic blockade must
have achieved some results. The CCP could not depend in any
69
way on the Japanese-controlled areas for supplies.
Batxoning, Market-control, and Commandeering.
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The basic principle in the enforcement of rationing, 
market-control and commandeering by the Japanese was to 
restrict the supply of economic resources to villagers, 
so that there would hardly be any surplus which the guer­
rillas could obtain from the villagers. In enforcing 
rationing, the productivity and yield from crops were ass­
essed at harvest time in the villages and an annual budget 
was drawn up to determine how grain and food supplies were 
to be rationed, sometimes on the basis of supplies per head,
69* Bor a specific case of CCP attempts to maintain 
self-sufficiency in the growth of cotton in  ^] 
north-west Shansi, see Tsu-chr. ch’ir-lai
(Pet Us Organize), n.p, CMn-sui"7*l944,29•
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per clay* GOP sources give detailed descriptions of how 
the Japanese undertook rationing in the marginal areas, 
and although these sources might have exaggerated the 
severity of the case, for example, in the rationing of 
salt in terms of ounces per head per year, it could he 
assumed that they do give a. general picture of the posi­
tive economic measures undertaken Toy the Japanese against 
the Communists*
In north-west Shansi from 1941 to 1942, rationing was 
enforced on an annual basis. Just prior to the autumn 
harvest, villages in the proximity of Japanese-held stra­
tegic points were surveyed and assessed according to the 
acreage of land, population and annual production. After 
the harvest, each household was allowed only one to two 
months1 supply of food and grain, supplies for the rest 
of the year being sent to store houses. lvhe head of the 
household had to go to these store houses every ten to 
fifteen days for supplies, which were distributed at the 
average of about 20 ounces of grain per head per day* As 
to villages further away from Japanese strongholds, village 
heads or pao-chia organisations normally supervised the 
rationing of supplies, which were concentrated in one centre
70* General information on Japanese measures in economic 
rationing, commandeering, and market-control in 
Chieh-fang jih pao, Aug. 11. 5 5 Pec.8,15,1941? feb* 
T57l9?5.
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for home oonsiimption rather than for sale* In one 
extreme case of rationing* OOP sources reported that in the 
Ghiao-ch1 eng^H3^0onference of October 1941* held in 
Japanese north-west Shansi, it was decided that 25 house­
holds were to share only one flour-mill, and the others
71
were to be destroyed in three weeks from then.
In other parts of Shansi, the annual consumption of
food supplies required was assessed and listed by each
household rather than by the Japanese authorities. Hence
the severity of rationing might have been less than in
the case of north-west Shansi. The annual estimate was
then presented to the authorities for approval. Supplies
were then sold on a rationing basis and purchasing cards
72
were required. In Shansi in 1941, a special economic 
police force, generally known as Ching-chi ching-ch'a
was organized to supervise rationing. In addition, it 
was also assigned the specific duty of checking excessive 
rises in the price of daily commodities, especially when 
the stock in the market became scarce. As in the case of 
other measures of economic control, the Japanese Army
71. Por economic control enforced by the Japanese in 
north-west Shansi, see Qhieh-fang ,iih yao, Hov.
5, 1941 and Feb.13, 1942.
72. Qhi eh-f ang ,iih nao. Aug. 11; Pec. 8,15, 1941.
rendered the necessary military support needed by the
73economic police force.
It may perhaps be worthwhile at this stage to go 
into details of how daily necessities like salt and cot­
ton were rationed in the occupied area. Both the OOP 
and the puppet authorities in the marginal areas of rural 
north China endeavoured to control the production and the 
trade in salt. On the part of the Japanese, the north 
China Salt Company in the Tach’ing River area of the Shansi- 
Hopei-Shantung-Honan border region possessed in late 1941 
about 300 mou of salt pans. The CCP claimed that a total 
of 700 mou of salt pans was believed to have been taken 
away from the Chinese by the Japanese in the above area, 
and therefore complained that it resulted in great scarcity 
of salt and the local people suffered. Another CCP account 
from the same area estimated that salt was rationed at 4 
ounces per head per month, and the penalty for excess pur­
chasing included the amputation of the arm for any purchase 
over half a catty, and execution in the case of purchase 
exceeding one catty. The economic police force played
IWIMI1HII. BiM in IH— nr Iiwm
73* Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Report, Special 
Intelligence Bureau, Oct. 1939, R 114, T 967, ~ 
fr~25271>~P-30. Also see Forth China Political 
Council, Hua-pei Cheng-wu wei-yuan-hui shih-
twin—., im^ii !■ piff. 1M. wiifw  umipn 'pnniui>
cheng chi-yao , tjzj ^jfiyg Summari zed
Record of the Administration of the Forth China 
Political Council),Second Anniversary Commemo­
rative, Peking, March 1942, (section on Shansi 
Provinc e), 14-15 *
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its part to see that the rationing order was effectively 
74
carried out. In north-east Shansi, daily commodities were 
rationed on a yearly basis, and the local people were 
entitled to one sack of coal and about 14 feet of cotton 
cloth, hut the use of coal-gas was not permitted. A con­
tribution of five dollars to cooperatives was necessary 
to entitle individuals to the right of purchasing these 
rationed goods. Travellers from one village to another
were allowed to take one catty of food? ten ounces of
75salt and three packets of matches.
Cooperatives organized by the Japanese not only super­
vised the actual distribution of rations, but also served 
useful functions in controlling the marketing of economic 
resources like cotton and salt. Cooperatives were organized 
at the hsien level and were mainly in the hands of big mer­
chants* The Japanese favoured this monopoly arrangements 
because supplies and commodities could then be concentrated
in major centres in the hsien and were therefore easy to 
76
control.
74. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Dec. 8, 18, 1941*
75 * Chieh~fang jih-pao, Dec. 15? 1941.
76. Chieh-fang iih-pao? Aug. 11, Dec. 8,15? 1941* Also
see Fourth Section, Japanese Expeditionary Force in
North China? Monthly Deport for Sept. 1941, E 115?
_  . ^  _  m— rrrt—■ni-iii’BirniMiT -m V .i .uni "wh rrrrrn irnr r ■■■-inrmin-TriiiTinTiw iwii unmrwiM'' ■■■tfifin rrMUMin Hiiw mim h pim  im-nmr *
I 1015, 3? 26859, p.10.
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Another way of controlling the grain market was to 
purchase grain in large quantity from the people at har­
vest time. Each village had to contribute to the Japan­
ese authorities an average of about 10-20 shih towards
these purchases? and as many as 80 shih in some cases in
77
north-west Shansi* Consequently? there was a scarcity
of grain in the free market and the only alternative
left for the villagers was to obtain rationed supplies
from the store-houses.
The CCP also described how the Japanese resorted
to commandeering and even plundering food supplies in the
villages of marginal areas to prevent Communist guerrillas
from benefiting* These requisitions naturally became at
least in part supplies for the Japanese Army* In some
villages where the Maintenance Society was set up as the
temporary puppet authorities? it was estimated that each
village had to contribute without getting any money in
78
return an average of 10 shih. The CCP also accused the 
Japanese of plundering peasants' harvest In fact, it
fs m  timom m  m n  bbt»
77* Chieh-fang rjih-pao? Sept. 24? 1941*
78. Chieh-fang jih-pao, Peb. 13? 1942.
■wranasftjAimn M Q.’.wrr'i I a? i'xjJ iax3to«£33r»jB»3rL*
79* CCP sources gave great publicity to Japanese plunder­
ing at harvest time in north China? some accounts can
be found in Chieh-fang jih-pao? ITov* 15? Dec. 4?26? 
1942f Feb. 15, 1942.
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was apparently a "battle between COP guerrillas and the 
Japanese Army at harvest time with each side trying to 
forestall the other in requisitioning the grain. In 
defence of their crops in their bases and in marginal 
areas, OOP guerrillas, the militia, and the self-defence 
corps were very often faced with the problem of having 
to engage in combats with Japanese regulars who were bet­
ter trained and equipped. In these circumstances, guerri­
lla tactics involving swift manoeuvring and mobilization 
could not work satisfactorily as the guerrillas were pin­
ned down in the harvest area in defending their crops# On 
the whole, for the Communists^the extent of success in 
reaping their harvest depended on whether they could fore­
stall Japanese attacks by mobilizing the maximum number of 
people to gather the crops in the shortest time possible. 
In addition, it was relatively easier to defend the 
harvests in hilly terrain like the Pei-»yueh area of north­
east Shansi, where the Japanese Army would find little 
advantage over the guerrillas. However, in the plains of 
central Hopei and the Shantung-Honan border, it was diff­
icult indeed for the guerrillas to defend their crops, and 
the only possible solution was to amass military strength 
capable of resisting- Japanese onslaughts, especially since 
that particular area was of considerable economic value#
Tile great pressure from the Japanese on the OOP
bases was fully felt by 1942, and the various mopping-
up campaigns of 1941-1942 definitely caused a shrink-
80
ing in COP-territories and military strength. However, 
the various Japanese-sponsored political organizations, 
administration and measures of economic control, when 
backed up by the Japanese Army, proved to be an even 
greater menace to the OOP. The road-protection campaign, 
the Ai-hu villages, and the setting up of the Model 
Districts also indicate Japan's determination to build 
up her strength in rural north China in the hope that 
she would be able successfully to challenge the CCP for 
rural control there in the near future. The Japanese 
measures of economic control also revealed that the CCP 
bases were especially vulnerable in economic terms. In­
deed, had the Japanese been able to put on greater press­
ure on the CCP bases even after the period 1941-1942, the 
Communists might have found it necessary to retreat from 
north China back to Yenan in the North-west. However, the
80# In 1941-1942, the north China bases were reduced
by l/6th in size and the population down by l/3rd. 
See The People's liberation Army..., 122.
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changing international situation in the second half 
of 1942, and the GOP Rectification Movement which 
started in February, 1942, created new hope for the 
Chinese Communists, and their bases in north China 
began therefore to assume a positive and active role 
against the Japanese.
CHAPTER V
Party Leadership at the Upper Level, 19U2-19U3f — *■ 1 "  1  I f  a i l -  r H IT U - I l l rii ■ i I n*nr ■ ni nm n n»iTi"trr r i  ■m-nrnii ri ~ i i     i i n       r ^ r - u i   im u ■ nT^ * J * r ii h it *
With the intense Japanese military and economic 
pressure on the bases in north China in 19Ul-19^-2, 
the Communists experienced the greatest crisis since 
the beginning of the war, and it became apparent 
that drastic changes were necessary if the bases were 
to survive the intense Japanese attacks* Thus the 
Rectification Movement came not at all as a surprise 
when it was launched in February 19U2, with Mao Tse- 
tung delivering his lecture on "Reform in Learning, 
the Party and Literature” at the opening day cerem-
1onies of the Party School, in Yenan, on February 1*
As to what the Cheng Feng campaign was aiming 
at, Boyd Compton in his Mao's China stated that there 
was too little information on what transpired during 
the Cheng Feng period 19^2-19kkf but quoted from eye-
1* For the text of Mao's lecture, see Chie^r-fang-sh§
, Cheng-feng Wen-hsien (A
Collection of Rectification Documents; n*p*, 19kS, 
6-25• This work also contains other speeches by 
Mao, CCP central directives and resolutions, as 
well as speeches by Liu Shao-ch'i, Ch'en Ytin, 
Stalin and others*
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witnesses, one of whom unsympathetically described
the Rectification Movement as a reign of terror,
whilst another more objective view considered it
2
as an educational movement# Professor S.R* Schram 
believes the Movement was launched for two purposes. 
First, it was to strengthen the unity and discipline 
of the GCP in difficult circumstances. Second, it 
represented Mao’s attempts at1 sinification’ of 
Marxism, and with it the need to undertake intra­
party struggle against Wang Ming’s Comintern faction.^ 
The present purpose is to examine the development of 
the Cheng Feng Movement in the bases of north China, 
viewing it as the means by which Mao could ensure the
Boyd Compton, ____ _
19U2-19kk9 xxxv-xxxvi«
Documents,
S.R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, 2%p-222# Wang Ming >
also known as’MSTreiTshao-yuf^^S?r? 5 based his 
power on his connections with Russia and the Com­
intern, and the support given him by Russian trainee 
CCP members. Wang’s Comintern faction was in 
power in the CCP from January 1931 to 19339 and 
Wang himself remained prominent in party circles 
until 19^0. For Mao’s struggle against Wang from tl 
early 1930’s to the Cheng-feng period, see John R. 
Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition 1927-1933, 17U-176; 
23U-37; 277-85.
1 8 0
support of the bases in his intra-party struggle and 
by which the party oould reassert its position of 
leadership over the army and the administrative organi­
zations*
The source of party strength in the bases ob­
viously came from the four party sub-bureaus: under 
the Northern Bureau, whose secretaries were the 
exponents of COPCO policies and executors of CCP 
central directives and instructions* In view of the 
tremendous distance separating the bases from Yenan, 
and the frequent combats between the Communists and 
the Japanese, contacts between Yenan and the sub- r) 
bureaux took a matter of months to be established, 
and the CCPCC therefore could not expect to exercise
as direct and immediate control as it might have 
wished* Nevertheless, party leadership in the bases 
operated through CCPCC !s delegating power to the sub- 
hureaux. The pre-condition for success in this 
process was evidently that party secretaries and senior 
party cadres of the sub-bureaux had to be trusted dis­
ciples of the CCPCC* During the Cheng Peng period, 
the majority of these cadres proved themselves to 
be not only trusted followers of the CCPCC, but also 
faithful', disciples of Mao, in his bid for supremacy 
in the intra-party struggle against Wang Ming!s 
Comintern faction, which insisted on the application
1 8 1
of a strong Bolshevik line in China. The four party
Hang Sub-bureau, south-east Shansi, Lin Ben of
The strongest indication of their being Maoists
in the Cheng Feng period was that three of them were
elected to the CCPCC in the Seventh CCP Congress held
in April-June 1945, and the Congress itself signified
Maofs triumph over Wang Ming, and his supremacy as
5leader in the party. P'eng Chen seemed highly favoured
4*. Headquarters, North China Special Patrol G-arrison,
Lai ikki sakusen sentU shoho pp A ^ J -pfIp
(Letailed Report of Military Operations of Japanese 
G-arrison against Chinese Troops in North China) 
September 20, 1943 - June 9, 1944, R 134, T 1252, F 
52713, pp* 43-44* The location of the party sub­
bureaux is marked in the map given here* For a 
list of the sub-bureau secretaries see F 52743-52744*
5* Speeches and reports by Communist leaders at the 
Seventh CCP Congress,a list of the members of the 
Central Committee and two editorials from the Liber­
ation Daily were compiled in Chung-kuo kung-ch!an-
(Collected Primary Sources of the Seventh Congress 
of the CCP), n.p. (CCP), 1945* Also see Schram, Mao 
Tse-tung, 232-234, and Hu Hua, Reference Sources on 
the New Democratic Revolution in China, 391-399>
sub-bureau secretaries were P*eng Chen of the
Northern Sub-bureau with its headquarters in the 
Pei-yUeh area, Teng Hsiao-p*ing of the T'ai
the Shansi-Suiyuan Sub-bureau, and Chu Sui
4the Shantung Sub-bureau.
of
tang ti-ch^i tzfu tai-piao ta-hui yuan-shih ts*ai 
IZaohui-T) i en p  % t - XtVqc 7H~i % 4 
489-492.
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as he was placed 18 th amongst the 44 committee
members, whilst I eng and Lin ranked 28th and 36th
respectively* Wang Ming and Oh’in Pang-hsien as
leaders of the Comintern faction barely managed to
remain in the committee, and were placed in the last
6two positions* P'eng, who is a native of Shansi, 
in fact symbolized the ascendancy of^local party 
cadres in the bases* Under his leadership, the 
Northern Sub-bureau scored success in land adminis­
tration and mass mobilization, and the Shansi-Chahar-
Hopei base, which came under the control of his sub-
7
bureau, became one of the most progressive bases* 
P'eng's support for Mao in the intra-party struggle 
was evident in his article "On Understanding the Spirit 
and Substance of the 22 Documents" piiblished on May 
14, 1942, in which he stressed party policy must be 
formulated objectively to allow modifications accord­
ing to changing circumstances* He quoted from Mao's
6* Nor a list of the members and alternate members 
of the CCPCC elected at the Seventh Congress, see 
Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 154-155* Also 
see Wang Chien-min, History of the CCP, III, 166*
7* For P'eng Chen's biography, see Sources of the 
Seventh CCP Congress, 163; C.M. Wang, History of 
the CCP, III, 168; of the various works on the bio­
graphies of leading CCP figures, the most accurate 
and reliable source is evidently Sources of the 
Seventh CCP Congress, as it was originally published 
by the CCP itself in 1945* For P'eng Chen's achieve” 
rnent in land administration, see chapter VI, 242, 
244-245*
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1 On the Protracted War" to emphasise the need for
changes in the OOP’s resistance against Japanese 
8
Imperialism # In other words, he supported Mao’s 
policy of aiming at a national-democratic revolution 
and siniffcation of Marxism in opposition to Wang 
Ming's dogmatic interpretation of Marxism#
Mao's support in the hases was not confined to 
the suWbureau secretaries# Political commissars who 
acted as the party watch-dog over the army, also 
played a leading role in conducting Oheng Peng indoc­
trination in the various divisions and contingents of 
the Eighth Route Army. For those who survived the 
war up to the Seventh OOP Gongress, many were elected 
to the CCPCC as a reward for their staunch support 
for Mao. Kuan Hsiang-ying^fljj^^as political commissar 
of the North-west Shansi Army ranked 10th in the 
Committee, and Lo Jungr;hu9,n3jl^;t— as director of the
political department of the field-forces ( yeh-chan
— * *
pu-tui)3lj^vjf^in the I8th Army Group in 1940, and 
later as political commissar of the II5th Division in 
Shantung, ranked I6th. Lu Ting-i, head of the publi­
city department of the I8th Army Qroup, and concurrent 
ly the head of the party newspaper committee in the 
Northern Party Bureau, was also elected member of the 
Central Committee in the Congress. Two alternate
8# Chi eh-fang j ih-p ao, May 14, 1942#
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members elected were Oh.1 eng Tzu-hua , political
commissar of the Central Iiopei Army, the best or­
ganized contingent in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base,
political commissars of the leading divisions and
army units in the bases is given in Appendix I.
Support to Mao in fact was given not only from
locally trained cadres like P'e.ng Chen, but also from
Russian trained senior party cadres who might have
been thought to have more reasons to align with Wang
Ming. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lu Ting-i were examples of
support from this quarter. Liu, who as early as 1920
10was sent by the CCP Central to Russia for training, 
became Mao's chief exponent and theoretician on party 
policy in the Seventh Congress. In his report on the
9. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 154-155; bio­
graphies of these political Commissars are given 
in 161-163, 165, 170, 172. Also see C.M. Wang, 
History of the CCP, III, 168-69, 173*
10. Chang Kuo-t'ao, "My remininscenees,,, Ming Pao 
Monthly, I, No. 6, (June, 1966), 59* According 
to Chang Kuo-t'ao, Liu Shao-ch'i was one of the 
eight members of the youth corps sent to Moscow 
in the winter of 1920.
and Lo Jui-ch* ing^l^wl-J5, director of the political
department of the field-forces in the 18th Army
9Group as successor to Lo Jung-huan* A list of the
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revision of the party constitution on May 14, and 15,
1945, he made it clear that the correct party line was
a sinification of Marxism under Mao's leadership, and
praised Mao not only as the greatest revolutionary
and statesman in Chinese history, hut also its greatest
11theoretician and scientist. Up to at least 1942,
12Liu was chief of the party bureau in central China, 
and although he did not hold any office in the bases 
of north China, his numerous articles and theses written 
during the war and especially in the Cheng Feng period, 
had virtually become the directives and guidance for 
senior party cadres in the bases. The most represent­
ative of his writings were "On the Intra-party Struggle" 
and "The Liquidation of Menshevik Thought in the Party",
11. Liu Shao-ch'i, Kuan-yu hsiu-kai tang-chang ti pao-
Revision of the Party Constitution), Chung-kuo ch'u- 
pan-she, Hong Kong, 1949- For comments on Liu's 
attitude in the Seventh Congress, see Schram, Mao 
Tse-tung, 232-234*
12. In July 1940, Liu was reported to be in northern 
Kiangsu with the New 4th Army. After the New 4th 
Army Incident in January 1941, he was appointed pol­
itical commissar of that Army and also held the pos' 
of secretary of the party bureau in central China. 
It was also in 1941 that he delivered his famous 
speech "On the Intra-party Struggle" in the party 
school of central China. In 1942, he was ,reported 
to have returned to Yenan from Founing ' • Se
Who's Who in Communist China, Union Research Instit 
ute, Hong Kong, 1965, 410-411. For Liu's work in 
reorganizing the New Fourth Army in 1941, see 
Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ... , 140-141, J*. Ch'en
(The Report on the
Mao and the Chinese Revolution, 252
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which had as the common theme attacks on Wang Ming’s
13faction as deflationists. Lu Ting-i was sent to Rus­
sia for training in 1928 where he took part in the 
6th GOP Congress held in Moscow, and remained there
as delegate to the Comintern and did not return until 
141930. In spite of his former association with the 
Comintern faction, his support for Mao in the Cheng 
Peng campaign was clear-cut, as can he seen in his 
article "The Reason Why the Rectification of the Three 
Unorthodox Tendencies is an Ideological Revolution in
1
the Party" released on May 13> 1942. Lu supported in 
his article Mao's belief that China was undergoing a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution which had to be real­
ized before a socialist revolution could be achieved.
He therefore maintained that the party should emphasize
13. Por a full text of the two articles, see Chieh- 
fa,ng-she, Rectification Documents, 166-222; 
Chieh-fang jih-pao July 6, 1943* Por the translate
text of the two articles, see Compton, Mao's China, 
188-238, 255-268. Liu's specific attack on Wang 
Ming's faction is discernible in his article "On th 
Intra-pa.rty Struggle". See Rectification Documents 
175-176, 198.
14. Por Lu's biography, see Sources of the Seventh CCP 
Congress, 165; C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, III, 
169; and Who's Who in Communist China, 432.
15. Chieh-fang jih-pao, May 13> 1942.
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democracy and nationalism, and attacked deviationists 
who claimed to he true disciples of Marxist-Leninism, 
hut had actually erred in heing too dogmatic, and 
fussing over words and sentences* Lu's target of 
attack was in fact Wang Mingfs Comintern faction which 
favoured a dogmatic application in China of lessons 
learned from the Russian revolution. Finally, Lu 
supported in his article Mao's United Front policy 
which he thought had proved to he the correct party 
line in the five years of resistance.
Apart from their role in the intra-party struggle 
in the Cheng Feng period, senior party cadres in the 
hases played an even more important part in efforts to 
maintain party leadership under the most difficult 
circumstances since the war, and to strengthen party 
unity and discipline. On September.I, 1942, the CCP 
Central Polithuro passed resolutions on the need for
18uniform party leadership in the anti-Japanese hases.
In essence, the resolutions pointed out that various 
unorthodox tendencies and deviations had arisen in the 
hases, and they were accentuated hy the acute condition 
of the war. Subjectivism and sectarianism were pin­
pointed as the main deviations which resulted in dis­
cord in the relations between the party, the army,
16. Chieh-fang-she, Rectification Documents, 135-144•
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17the administration and the people* The above 
problems became the greatest obstacle to uniform 
party leadership, and senior party cadres had to 
shoulder heavy responsibilities in overcoming these 
obstacles*
Party-Army Relations
The most formidable obstacle to uniform party 
leadership was the immense power embraced by the army 
in the bases* In the senior cadres* conference held 
in October 1942 - January 1943? in Yenan, under the 
auspices of the North-west Party Bureau, Jen Pi-shih 
secretary of the OOPGC Secretariat, made 
his attack in January 1943 on Warlordism tendencies in 
the army and maintained that the senior cadres* conf-
17* Chieh-fang she, Rectification Documents, 135*
It may be noted that subjectivism and sectarian­
ism mentioned here, together with party formalism 
were denounced throughout the Cheng Peng period 
as the three principal unorthodox tendencies dev­
eloped within the party. Mao's speech "On Reform 
in Learning, the Party and Literature" was direct 
ed against subjectivism and sectarianism.
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erence must see that this deviation he corrected. In 
actual fact, warlordism as defined by the Communists can 
be of two kinds. First, there was the rising military 
strength of local commanders which tended to result in 
independent military actions in opposition to party 
instructions, and inevitably appeared in some regions 
in the CCP bases. On March 4? 1943? the editorial of 
the Liberation Daily on the role played by the senior 
cadres' conference pointed out that warlordism, part-
_V_  ^ , _S ^  I
icularism (pen-wei chu-i) \ , and independent
19tendencies still existed. The second kind of vgar- 
lord tendencies refers to the old-fashioned way veteran 
commanders treated their soldiers, like flogging, and 
their arrogant attitude towards other party and govern- 
ment cadres. Mao Tse-tung in his speech "Let Us Org­
anize" delivered November 1943 referred to this kind
18. Chieh-fang jih-pao, January 31? 1943* Also see 
Ch1 en P o -1 a, On Pen Years of Civil War, 62. The 
senior cadres' conference which was attended by the 
majority of leading CCP figures dealt with three 
major issues. They were, first, lessons learned 
from party history; second, the problem of uniform 
leadership, and third, current duties to be perf­
ormed. Concerning the anti-Japanese bases, an out­
standing problem as Jen Pi-shih pointed out was 
warlord tendencies.
19* Chieh-fang iih-pao, March 4? 1943. Particularism
n r e n w i i i B i i i H i i . i t n n n m  i h p i T .  i m l  t ■■ItTTi *11 i i i f
refers to deviations amongst army commanders who 
were self-centred and cared nothing about other 
army units.
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of warlord tendencies, which he claimed had on the
whole been corrected, although isolated cases still
20existed in the various OOP bases*
Apparently, both hinds of warlord tendencies 
were found in the OOP bases In the period 1942-1-943 j and 
in order to study them closely, it is necessary to 
examine the different major units, which tended to vary 
tremendously in origin, nature and organization. On 
the whole, three types of army units are discernible. 
Pirst, there were Mao's loyalists with history dating 
back to the Long March and the period 1930-1933, when 
the Red Army withstood the five KMT campaigns aiming 
at OOP extermination. Second, there were commanders 
who had the same long history but did not serve under 
Mao's Pirst Pront Army in the early 1930s. Lastly, 
there were the local military leaders with their local 
recruitments emerging as the vital strength against 
the Japanese. Independent tendencies generally sprang 
from the second type of army units, but even more so
20. "Tsu-chi ch'i-lai" (Let us
organize), Mao Tse-tung hs&an-chi (1961), III, 
937-938.
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from the last type* The Chart in Appendix I indicates 
the major armed forces in the hases.
Out of the commanders in the four border regions, 
Nieh Jung-chen and Liu Po-ch1eng were Mao's loyalists. 
Nieh was Lin Piao's deputy when the latter was comm­
ander of the II5th Division at the beginning of the 
war. Lin in turn had served under Mao in the Pirst 
Pront Army during the Long March. The fact that Nieh 
in 1937 also held the concurrent post of political 
commissar of the 115th Division meant that he was prob­
ably the military commander most closely connected with 
21the party. Liu Po-ch'eng had been Mao's chief-of-
staff in the Long March, and naturally was a most trusted
follower of Mao. During the war, Liu was commander of
the 129th Division stationed in south-east Shansi in
22the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base. In fact, this
21. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 166. Also see
>  1 r a n  1 11 if n  ~ r  n  ~i iik t t  t ~  : t - — - - - - - - ■- - -  — ■ —  — . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  — . . . . ■ - . — ^ * a l - - - - - - - - - —  f
Johnson, Peasant Nationalism ..., 35, 97* Por
Nieh's pre-1937 career, see C.M. Wang, History of 
the CCP, II, 637 and Who's Who in Communist China, 
463.
22. Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 164* Also see
C.M. Wang, History of the CCP, II, 637, and Who's 
Who in Communist China, 408, for Liu's career in 
the early 1930's. Por the location of Liu's troops 
in south-east Shansi, see Second Section, Staff, 
Japanese Expeditionary Porce in North China, Senji 
geppo Bhlryg. I gatsubun, 3K* % M  (- ft <V)
(Monthly Wartime Report for January, 1941), R 114,
T 1002, T 26385, p.7.
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region was particularly the source of loyalist strength,
as 0hu Teh’s troops were stationed there from 1941 
23onwards.
IT he second type of military commanders, who were
also veterans of the 1930-1933 period, were mainly
stationed in the other bases. Ho lung, as commander
of the 120tli Division in the north-west Shansi base,
had been commander of the Second Front Army in October 
2 4  11
1934* Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, as commander of the Shan­
tung-Kiang si-Hon an Border Region, had been the commander 
of the Fourth Front Army in the early 1930s, ^  It can 
be assumed that in spite of Hsu's long military career, 
he was the least trusted amongst the former commanders 
of the Red Army Corps because of his close association 
with Chang ICuo-t’ao, the leader of the Fourth Front 
Army, who left the CCP camp in April 1938 for the
23, For the location of Chu Teh’s troops, see map in 
Headquarters, fad a Corps, Kyosanto #i§kycT sono ta, 
senni geppir shirycr^
of Affairs of Chinese Communist Party . ••), March
1941. R 115 5 T 1008, F 26332-26540,
24. For a biography of Ho lung, see Sources of the Se­
venth CCP Congress, For his career in the early 
1930s, see Who's Who in Communist China, 201.
25* Sources of the Seventh CCP Congress, 161; Who’s
Who in Communist China, 237-239, and Second Section, 
Japanese Expeditionary Force, Monthly Report for 
January 1941. R 114, T 1002, jT2g3859 p.
19 3
26held Sian in Shensi. HstL's headquarters was in
southern Shantung, where another commander from the
second type also had his troops stationed there. He
was Gh!en Kuang, the former divisional commander of
the Fifth Front Army, who commanded the 115th Division 
27
in 1943 •
The Shantung "base was indeed the most likely 
region for the army to act independently of the party, 
not only "because it was the headquarters of non-Maoists 
like Hstl Hsiang-ch1ien and Ch'en Kuang, hut also 
because of the unstable situation which favoured a 
particular type of armed resistance against the Japanese. 
As described in Chapter II, before the arrival of the 
Eighth Route Army in the late spring of 1939, resis­
tance in Shantung was mostly guerrilla in nature, with 
local party cadres organizing guerrilla units. Constant 
attacks from the Japanese also made the setting up of
2regular and stable administrative organizations difficult.
26. Since March 1966, Chang Kuo-t'ao has been writing 
his memoirs in Hong Kong. The issue in June 1968 
in the Ming Pao Monthly deals with his career in 
1928 when C M  Chiu-pai was in power in the CCP:
"My reminiscences", Ming Pao Monthly, III, 6, 91-94
27. For the location of CCP troops in Shantung, see 
Tada Corps, State of Affairs of CCP, March 1941,
R 115, 1 1008, F 26532-26540.
28. Hou Shenf "The growth of new Shantung", Chieh-fang 
.jih-pao,July 21,1944.
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Before August 1940 the highest OOP authority in 
Shantung was in the form of a provisional committee 
for the promotion of war-time work. Even the 
Shantung War-time Administrative Committee set up on 
August 15, 1940, was not on the same parallel as the 
other three Bases which had their administrative org­
anizations termed either as Border government or suB-
29Border government. The aBsence of a staBle CCP 
government in Shantung also meant that military comm­
anders were often denied a permanent Base where they 
could station their troops. Consequently, comBats with 
the Japanese Became guerrilla in nature even for reg­
ular troops. CCP documents indicated that long-term
guerrilla warfare practised By regular troops was most
30conducive to independent tendencies. It was also m  
Shantung that the old fashioned way of treating soldiers 
was evident. Por instance, in the eastern part of the 
Chiaochou peninsula, Hsiao Hua, director of the polit­
ical department of the 115th Division, complained that 
commanders of different units often neglected the people, 
insulted and Beat up common soldiers, and.thus were
29* See the Shantung section in Appendix 2, 289.
30. "Chia-ch*iang tang-hsing ti tuan-lien'1,
(To strengthen the training of party character­
istics), (editorial), Chieh-fang .jih-nao, Sept­
ember 6, 1941.
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guilty of subjectivism and bureaucratism. Hsiao 
added that warlordism had also been responsible for 
the absence of good liaison between the officers and
The third type of military units was led by com­
manders who derived their strength from local support* 
including the recruitment of their troops. Some of 
them had been CCP members from the start, but many had 
only been associated with the OOP since the. beginning 
of the war, being either Communist sympathizers or .faen 
who found common ground with the CCP in the war of resis­
tance. ’Whilst their support in expansion and anti- 
Japanese activities was needed, the CCP also found it 
necessary to pay special attention to the checking of 
independent and warlord tendencies in army units of this 
type, The way for senior party cadres to control these 
locally entrenched leaders was to absorb them gradually 
into the party, and acknowledge their ascendancy by 
placing them in important party positions. The fact 
that many of them were elected to the CCPCC in the Se-
3venth Congress is a good indication of this party policy.
common soldiers. 31
31. Chiao-tung chtin-ch’tl, cheng-chih^
(ed.), Liang-chung tso-feng (Two Styles
of Work), n.p., same, 1945? 1-2.
32. See 200 and n. 38.
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ilaother significant method of containing these 
commanders in the Cheng Feng period was to make 
full use of political commissars* role as the party 
watch-dog to check warlordism and the growth of 
localism® Before going into further investigations 
of these party measures? it is necessary to refer 
to some of the more prominent figures amongst these 
locally entrenched military commanders* The most 
renowned non-OOP figure in this group was Hstt Pan­
ting? who was involved in the famous hew and Old 
Army Incident in Shansi in 1940 as described in 
Chapter IX* After joining the CCP camp? his forces
were then renamed the Anti-Japanese lew .Army with
33
it s he ad quart e r s in north-we st Shansi *
33* Chapter II, 54 , Also see Appendix I?
for Hsfl!s position held in the CCP Army.
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Party indoctrination and organization within the 
Hew Army therefore had only a very short history, 
counting even OOP efforts “before the outbreak of 
the incident* Hence Hstfi1s army units naturally 
"became a suspect as a potential breeding' ground 
for independent tendencies*
The most outstanding figure destined to rise 
in the OOP was Po I-po, who joined the party as 
early as 1926, and had been secretary of the 
Sacrifice League, and commander of the Dare-to-Die- 
corps before the outbreak of the Hew and Old Army 
Incident. After the Incident, he became chief 
commander of the Lare-to-Bie corps, and was
34
stationed in south-east Shansi under Liu Po-ch*eng•
In the Hopei region, there were three influential
figures. In southern Hopei, Sung Jen-chfiung who
had served under Inn Piao in the early 1930s, was
35
commander of the eastern detachment. Yang Hsiu-feng,
34® Por Po's biography, see Sources of the Seventh 
GOP Congress* 168; for t EeTUocatron onTTb^s 
troops after the Incident, see_Heactauarters*_ 
Shinozuka Corps, Kameti hijo vozu 
(Rough Sketch of BandTt’Iy”l^^niFraJurisdiction 
of Shinozuka Corps), Peb. 1941, R 114, I 1003, 
P 29400-20401.
35 ® Sources of the Seventh OOP Congress, 171, and 
Who1 s who in Communist China, 525-526
r-g J if lP  HWHU.Uav-innwiTM fflhW  ruM'iiP i iw iw w w a w
who had virtually founded the anti-Japanese base 
in southern Hopei in late 1937? was chairman of 
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government. 
His influence with the military units was tremendous 
as he was mainly responsible for organizing the
36
armed resistance since the beginning of the war*
In central Iiopei was lit! Cheng-ts * ao, who held the
post of commander of the Central Hopei Army.
His association with the CCP only dated back to
1937-1938 when he joined forces with Hieh Jung-
37
ehen and established himself in central Hopei*
36. Hor Yang’s role in mass mobilization
programmes in southern Hopei, see chapter 
III? 97-98*
37• Por M ’s biography, see Sources of the Seventh
OCT Congress, 172, 0#M. Wang, Hrstory of
tEe CCP, III, 173* Por M ’s military coalition
in central Hopei, see Research Section,
Central Committee for the Extermination of
Communism, Pield Survey of Chinese Communist
Efforts to I m  Support of People 111 Central
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She contribution of Sung, M  and Yang in the war 
of resistance was immense as they were the 
architects in sustaining the fierce Japanese 
attacks, which had as their main target the plains 
in Hopei in the period 1941-1942.
The power of these commanders was further 
augmented "by the fact that many of them also held 
concurrent administrative posts, thus wielding 
hoth military and administrative power. The 
chart in appendix 2 gives a list of leading 
administrators in the bases, and when it is compared 
with the chart in appendix 1 indicating the leading 
military commanders in the bases, it can be seen 
that many of these locally entrenched leaders 
held both military and administrative power. In 
north-west Shansi for instance, Hsft Pan-ting was 
concurrently director of the north-west Shansi 
sub-region office. In the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung- 
Honan base, Po I-po was deputy-chairman of that 
border government, whilst Sung Jen-ch'iung was 
director of the southern Hopei sub-region office.
In the Shansi-Ghahar-HopeI base, lift Cheng-ts*ao 
was director of the central Hopei sub-region office. 
These frequent examples of evident subordination
of administrative organizations to military power 
meant that the key to party control over the 
administration also depended on the extent of 
success the party had in containing the army*
As these leaders contributed tremendously to 
the war of resistance, what the OOP expected 
of them w&s cooperation rather than down™right
and unquestioned obedience to party discipline.
*
Of the five figures mentioned, Po I-po was
elected member, and M  Cheng-ts1ao and Sung Jen™
ch’iung alternate members of the COPCO in the
38
Seventh GOP Congress* Hetl Pan™ting and Yang 
Hsiu-feng were not included, most probably 
because they were not CCP members from the start, 
especially when Hsft had been a KMT member. By 
placing these men in important party positions, 
the COP hoped they would follow in spirit if not 
in letter the various party principal policies 
and directives. In other words, the CCP was after 
harmony with the army in the, bases, rather than 
total demand for party discipline to be maintained 
to the letter within the army, hoping in so doing 
that warlordism could be minimized.
58. Sources of the Seventh GOP Congress, 154-155
Another major CCP measure to control; the army
was to introduce Cheng Peng reforms into the army 
units through the existing party means in checking 
the army. The chart in appendix 3 illustrates 
how the party built itself into the army. It can 
be seen that party control came from two quarters. 
In addition to the actual party organizations in 
the army units, the political commissar was in 
charge of the conduct of the party affairs and 
the checking of warlordism. As the representative 
of the party, the political commissar was placed 
in the same rank as the military commander of 
the same level, serving as a check on the 'latter,
and also on commanders of the lower levels. A 
typical example was from the Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei 
base where Uieh Jung-chen was the commanding officer. 
Uieh, who had been concurrently deputy-commander 
and political commissar of the 115th Division in 
late 19379 was in fact the party watch-dog in 
the base throughout the wax*. Under his command
commander of the Pirst Independent Division, who 
rose from the rank of regiment commander which
39. Por detailed responsibilities of the political
commissars in the GOP army, see C.A. Johnson, 
Pe as ant Uati onali sm..., 81-82.
39
in western Hopei was
202
40
he held in October 1937* Japanese sources quoting
0h ! en Kuei™ jen J deputy head of the Intelligence
Bureau of the Independent First Division captured
by the Japanese, revealed that Hieh had wanted
to keep Yang Chieng-wu in check, therefore he
sent his henchman and party cadre Kao Pf eng
to he Yang?s deputy * According to Ch*en Kuei-jen,
real power in the Independent First Division was
not in the hands of Yang, hut Kao P!eng, who
41
took orders from Kieh. Perhaps Yang's personal
background had also made the party think the above
check necessary, as he was of rich peasant origin
and an intellectual, being a graduate of the
42
Anti-Japanese University. It is also interesting 
to note the same Japanese source reported that
40# See appendix 1, 286 ,and Besearch Section, 
Oentral Committee for the Extermination of 
Conimunism, Pokuritsu dai ichishi ni tsuite, 
Kisex hokokusho no m
£~ (Beporr on 1st Independent
Division of Communist Army in West Hopei),
July 1940, B 114? 1 996, P 26226, p.l.
41* Besearch Section Committee for Extermination 
of Communism, Beport on 1st Independent 
Division# „ *, B m T r ® ^ W r F " ^ T 2 T “ 13-14 *
42 # Ibid.
kbvsbuui w w n w
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many intellectuals in the division were ousted
by party members of poor peasant origin* and
43
the latter were then elevated as cadres * This
in fact represented class-consciousness on the
part of the poor peasants, which was encouraged
by the party as the means to counteract the
influx of bourgeois elements in the army resultant
from military expansion. Po the OOP, bourgeois
44
tendencies were the root of deviations.
As for the actual party indoctrination 
programme during the Gheng Peng period, the 
political commissars and party cadres took the 
lead in holding various study sessions and 
discussion groups in the army units, with the 
purpose of examining the principal Gheng Peng
43• Ibid., B 114, I1 996, P 26235-26236, pp. 20-21.
UMJUU-ILU -LOlUTT
44. Lu Ping-i believed that bourgeois deviation 
was one of the main reasons for warlord 
tendencies in the army. See Lu Ping-i,
HE 1 ang-chan san-nien-lai isio-pMn cheng-chih 
kung-tso ti ch:ien-t1 ao’V ^ =~
*^5^ = % (a review of the 
political work in our army during three 
years of resistance) Chien-hsien yueh-k’an 
(phe Prontnr6ntIly)TW.T” ™  
(Dec.1940), 28.
documents published since February 1942. Phe
twenty-two documents, mainly comprising OOP
directives, the works of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i,
as well as translated work bj Stalin, became the
45 46
test book for cadres® Articles by K'ang Sheng
V^J-J ? La ling-i, P'eng Chen and others were also
included* Army cadres were divided into the
senior, intermediate and junior sections according
to rank® Cadres of the brigade level and above
joined the senior section, whilst they in turn gave
guidance to junior groups® Phe intermediate section
was designed for cadres from the company level
upwards, and the junior section for company level
47
cadres of low education standard. For cadres
45. Most of the twenty-“documents are translated 
in Compton, Mao's China<
46. KDang Sheng was head of the Intelligence
Bureau and Minister of the Social Department 
during the war, and wrote numerous articles 
during the Cheng Feng period in support of Mao 
In the present Cultural Revolution, he is 
one of the leading supporters of Mao against 
Idu Siiao-ch'i.
47* Wang' Kuang-wei , n I-erh-ling-shih
cheng-f eng hstieh-hsi pao-kao «
(Report on Cheng Feng studies 
in the 120th Division) Chi eh-fang1 jih-pao,
Oc-t .30,1942.
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at the senior level* notes were expected to he 
taken during discussions, and the most important 
part of the stu&y-sessions was on self-criticism, 
and the examination of weaknesses and failings 
amongst comrades. The Cheng Peng documents served
48
as the guidance for the correction of all deviations*
As a rule, specific programmes and time-tables
were set for the discussion groups aiad study-
sessions to do research on specific documents*
For instance, in July 1942, cadres under the
direct command of the 120th Division were set
the specific programme of examining the central
resolution of April 3, 1943, Mao's lecture on
"Reform in Learning, the Party and Literature**,
and articles by K'ang Sheng, lu Timg-i and P'eng
Chen* According to the report by the 120th Division,
the study of those documents helped to pacify
comrades who felt restless, and a good attitude
49
towards learning’ was generally maintained- However,
48 Id Chen ■%-k , "I-erh-ling-shih shih-chih 
i-ko-ytteh cheng-feng wen-chien hsueh-hsi 
c hung-c hi e h ", — o ^ A ©
(A report of one month's study 
of Cheng Peng documents by the divisional 




mistakes and weaknesses in the study groups were
also pointed out and suggestions for improvements
made. It was also realized that emphasis should
he given to the role of senior cadres from the
battalion level upwards as leaders In the Gheng
50
Peng Movement. Many senior cadres were consequently 
sent down to lower levels to conduct reform 
programmes. Por instance* from June to October 
1942* the 120th Division sent two working teams 
headed by six cadres from the divisional political 
department to supervise Gheng Peng studies in the
51
5th and 8th sub-regions of the north-Shansi base.
It must also be pointed out that Gheng Peng 
campaigns undertaken in the bases were not as 
frequent and intense as those undertaken in the 
Shensi-Kansu-Hinghsia Border Government* in view of 
the constant military engagements * and study sessions 
could only be held at intervals between combats. In 
the 120th Division* cadres working In offices spent 
four hours studying Cheng Peng documents daily* 
whilst combating cadres spent an average of two
> i n mm i» i « m mi i ■ ■w wfrMHiiiiiii hi   i iim n r> i n  r TiiiTTiTTitnn i
50. 0hieh-f ang jili~oao. Sept. 27 > 1942 / (on army Cheng 
Peng programmes in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base).
51. Wang Kuang-wei, 'Report on Gheng Peng studies in 




A further indication of COP intention to
strengthen the party Gheng Peng programme in the
army was evident in the COP Central Politburo
resolutions on party leadership in the bases
passed on September 1, 1942. The third resolution
specified that members of the party committee at
the sub-bureau and regional levels, and the party
secretary at the area level, were to hold the
concurrent posts of political commissar in the
military region (chtLn-chfu)~^if° and sub-region
(fen-ch111)^7) ( either divisional or brigade
53
level) respectively. By the end of 1943? it was 
without doubt that the Cheng' Peng programme in 
the army had reached its climax? and the party 
was doing the best it could to seek the cooperation 
of the army, whilst simultaneously keeping it in 
check against all deviations.
52. Ibid
53* 0hieh-fang-she, Rectification Documents, 137• 
Also see Borth China Special Patrol Garrison, 
pai ikki sakusen sent 15 shoho
(Detailed Report of lighting in Phase 1 of 
Operations against Chinese Troops i-n- Central 
gopci Area), Sept.1943 - June.1944- R 134,
I 1255, 3? 52935-
Party indoctrination undertaken in the 
Cheng Peng period in the army in fact represented 
only one part of the programme which aimed at 
strengthening the unity and discipline within 
the CCP* It was realized by the party that 
success in resistance against the Japanese, 
and in expansion depended on leadership on the 
part of cadres in conducting and supervising 
the army units, and the administrative and mass 
organizations * The Cheng Peng programme in 
the army mentioned earlier can represent a 
cross-section of party work in these various 
organizations, but it remains to be seen what 
rules and principles were laid down by the 
CCP as specific methods of leadership to be 
followed by all cadres.
Methods of Leadership
In the various resolutions and editorials 
in the Liberation Daily during the Cheng Peng 
period, two CCP themes on the methods of 
leadership were discernible. They were the way
to establish good relations with the people, and 
the attitude towards work and specific programmes* 
The first prerequisite in mobilizing the people
20fc)
was that cadres must not keep themselves aloof
from the masses, and consider themselves superior,
or else contacts with the people would have "been
lost. Cadres who erred on this path were guilty
54
of bureaucratic deviations. As to the actual
method of mobilizing the people, it was based on
the CCP concept that Chinese society comprised
the active, neutral and inert elements, with the
first and last in the minority, and the second
forming the main bulk of the community. To
mobilize the people, cadres should align themselves
with the active elements to form a nucleus, aiming
at attracting the neutral elements, whilst the
55
inert elements were not to be neglected. Tremendous 
responsibilities were shouldered by junior cadres 
in mobilizing the people? as contacts with the 
latter were made mainly at the basic village level.
54* !,3?an-tui kuan-liao chu-i"
(in opposition to bureaucratism),(editorial), 
Chieh-fang jih-pao, Pea* 18.1942.
H       .m iii r V f .  t&5v»>  
55* MCCP central resolution on the method of
leadership*1,(passed by the Central Politburo 
on June 1.1945), Chieh-fang nih-pao, June 4*1945- 
Also see '^uan^u^ling'^ao^'fang-fa*ti yueh-kan 
wen~ti1 fcb -*> -y NySJL (S ome
problems on the method of leadership),
Mao Tse-tung hs.n’.an™chi (1961) III, 900.
23.0
Detailed methods and problems involved in all these 
important mass mobilization programmes will be dealt 
with as a specific topic in chapter six on party leader­
ship at the village level*
On the attitude and specific methods towards 
work9 Mao HJse-tung specified that there should be 
only one central theme in any project at any particular 
time 9 and cadres therefore had to decide at their own 
discretion the most urgent work to be done, and other 
projects had to be set aside as subsidiary* This also 
applied to directives from senior to junior cadres in 
which should be a distinction between the major project
56
other minor ones* By '1943 and 1944, this general 
principle was 011 the whole observed in the bases* For 
instance, in 1943? the most significant theme of work 
for cadres was to reinvigorate the rentreduciion cam­
paign and to safeguard the rights of tenants against 
landlords9 exploitation? whilst in 1944, the emphasis
was shifted to the launching' of an economic production 
57
campaign® On a smaller scale, especially at the
56* Mao™tse^tung, Kuan-yu ling-tao fang-f
( On the method of Leadership;, Peking,1952?8-9*
57« On the rent-reduction campaign and the economic pro« 
duction drive, see chapter six,237-255,263^268*
2 IQ.
local level? it was also realized that the major pro­
ject for cadres should vary with the season* For exam­
ple , during harvest time, the major theme should he the 
collecting of revenue, which in practice was the collec­
tion of grain, as revenue was paid in kind#
On specific methods of leadership, senior cadres 
were reminded constantly that as leaders, they should not 
involve themselves too heavily in daily routines to 
neglect their vital duty in formulating policies, or 
else they would have fallen into the trap of routinism 
(shih-wu ehu-i ) ^Y7) For directions to
junior cadres, senior* cadres were warned against the
58* 0 hi eh-fang jih-pao, November 16, 1941 ( On the col-
tea>at«w«fiii;urwwri»i naumr t> \
lection of revenue and party instructions)•
59® u Kai-ch!in ,ling-tao tso-feng ti i-tien chien-i n,
T X  X X X  ^ 'p \XX? h *- ( B ome sug­
gest ions of reforms regarding the attitude of
reform attitudes),(editorial), Chi eh-fang jih-pao,11 n i(ih i 1 nil win i > 1 a 1 ii# mi mi i i ii i mi nnfn*ii<i|iiin i # iJmiiinii n ni i i*n n i it
Nov® 10,1942* Boutinism refers to senior cadres * 
involving too much in routine works like checking mine 
details, meeting everyone who approached them, instead 
of leaving such work to junior cadres*
leadership;, (editorial}, Chieh-fang jih-pao, Sept# 
28,194^ and ’* Ti-kao ling-tao kai-tsao tso-fengu,
( To improve leadership and 
2 1 2
60*
danger of formalism. Criticisms were directed against 
directives and instructions which were too formal* rou­
tined, and carried no substantial content at all. In 
drafting these directives, senior cadres were also re­
minded that full considerations should be given to 
the actual situation of the particular area in which 
the directives were to be carried out. Por instance, 
in the Pei-yueh area of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, 
the party instructed that distinctions should be made
between the well-established regions and guerrilla areas
60
in the application of directives*
In general, the OOP realized the Importance of 
applying different rules in guerrilla areas, where its 
authority was not well established,and where the people 
suffered a great deal as a result of constant military 
engagements* Thus the COP allowed more flexible -policies 
to operate in these areas. In the Shantung base where 
COP rule had not been so well established, the COP re­
frained from insisting on rent being reduced to under
Chi eh-f axis jih-pao, September 11, 1942, (On party formalism 
rn the Shatisi-Ohahar-Hopei base).
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37*5 7° of the yield at harvest? and was satisfied with
61
a general reduction of 25 °i* on the pre-1937 rent*
In order that senior cadres could understand the 
actual situation at the local levels better? the CCP 
also directed that important research and investigations 
be made into local conditions? with respect to the so™
62
cial and economic situation as well as class-structure*
In March 1942 for instance? the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei party 
headquarters directed its cadres to investigate the econo 
mic situation in the villages? and to focus their atten­
tion on the relationship between the party? the adminis-
63
tration? the army,and the people • In north-west 
Shansi? details of the social and economic conditions
in iwi'iiiiTOv t *  '■ wra ^« 'i i. uh.. m l m ir iirTTmaii i 1 pm -T T frr rn rtffrT
61* Detailed explanations in chapter six? 237-255*
62* 1 CCPCC!s resolution on investigations and research1
Chi eh-
fang-she* Rectification Documents,57-60? for the 
same text*
63* 1 Directives of the CCP Sub-bureau in the Shansi-




in the villages were investigated in early 1942* She 
resolution of June I, 1943? promulgated by the Central 
Polithuro on methods of leadership further reiterated 
the importance of thorough instigations into specific 
party organizations, schools and military units, in 
order to understand their characteristics, history,
65
and experience*
The same resolution also indicated the partyfs 
determination to see that improvements in the method 
of leadership would ensure greater party strength and 
unity, so that the CCP would therefore he better equip­
ped in extending its control over the bases against
66
Japane s e attacks•
By the end of 1943? the effect of the various 
Cheng Peng programmes was evidently being felt in the
64• Chffter three,76-78*
65® Por CCP instructions on the method $f investiga­
tions in the resolution, see Chieh-fang jih-pao 
June 4, 1943, and the English translation in 
Compton, Maofs China.0 176-177*
66* Chieh-fang nih-pao, June 4, 1943*
imvrn. n «fiir 11 ■ inn   iifiiifrrrT n l- i it.n i ii-p y -wn " i r'B'Tnrrtfr^Trcn-njgnp* ^  *
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various bases. Whilst Mao was able to enlist the sup­
port of the senior party cadres? the COP itself was 
in the best position since the beginning of the war 
in maintaining leadership* Warlordism still existed 
but it had been greatly reduced through the persevering 
party efforts at controlling the army commanders. The 
Gheng Peng indoctrination of cadres in the party? the 
army? the administrate.onward mass organisations further 
strengthened the position of the party as the leader 
in the bases, furthermore? the sum total of the above 
achievements contributed directly to a change in the 
situtation of the anti-Japanese war* Before examining this 
change? it is necessary to investigate how the GGP 
operated during the Gpeng Peng period at the basic 
village level? where it placed tremendous emphasis 
on working through the people from below.
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CHAPTER VI
Party Deadershin at the Village Level, 1942-1945*
In studying GOP leadership at the village level 
in the OOP bases, the first evident principle seen 
operating was democratic-centralism. The party- 
branch (tang chih-pu) representing party
authority at the village level received orders and 
instructions from the party sub-bureaux, with the 
party committee at the area level (ti-fang tang wei) 
serving as the operation centre for the 
transmitting of GOP central directives to the villages. 
However, because of geographical isolation and 
frequent combats, it was difficult for the party- 
branch to establish constant contacts with party 
committees at high levels* Consequently, cadres in 
the party-branch very often had to interpret directives 
and instructions at their own discretion, and there 
was a great deal of room for initiative. Democratic
1. Por the position of the party-branch in relation 
to other organizations in the village, and the 
whole hierarchy of the GOP, see appendix 3* Por 
the role of the party committee at the area^level 
as a liaison centre, see fang ti chien-she % ^
(2?he Party*s Reconstruction) faipei, Tang Ming, 
195i? 26-27; this work is the third reprint of a 
COP document made by the KMD for its own reference, 
and contained revealing methods of CCP party 
strategy.
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practices under cadre supervision were noticeable in 
village organizations and the CCP proved that this 
policy was most effective in mobilizing the people 
from -below.2
The general aim of party cadres in the village was 
to organize the peasants who formed the main bullc of the 
population so that peasant consciousness against landlord 
exploitation and national sentiment against the Japanese 
could be aroused. To achieve the above in practical 
terms, the responsibility of village cadres was to 
mobilize all available economic resources to support the 
armed resistance programme, and to organize all available 
man-power into the people*s armed bands and active Anti- 
Japanese National Salvation Associations, especially the 
peasants* association. In so doing, the party branch 
would also have built up party strength in the village 
in rallying mass support for the CCP cause. Japanese 
sources gave a clear, diagramatical analysis of how the 
CCP mobilize local resources in the village.
2. The various democratic practices in the village 
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The party-branch itself comprised at least three 
members forming a committee headed by the secretary, and 
under it were party cells which were generally attached 
to village organizations, Ihe leaders of mass 
organizations and the people!s armed bands were normally 
in the party committee, thus explaining the source of 
party control at the village level.^ Mass mobilization 
programmes, which formed a significant part of the work 
undertaken by the party-branch, have been discussed in 
general terms with reference to the pre-Cheng Feng period 
in chapter three.^ However, the present purpose is to 
examine party leadership in mass mobilization programmes 
during the Cheng Feng period up to the end of 194-3*
The general method adopted by the party-branch in 
mobilizing the people was the same as the one adopted at 
higher levels, and in accordance with CCP central 
directions, that is, the party should ally itself with 
the active elements in order to win over the neutral 
elements who formed the main bulk of society.
 ^4-. Ihe Party1 s Reconstruction. 20; Lun Kung-chfan tang
(On the Communist Party)7 Huaper, hsxn-hua,“ 
1940, 369-375*
5* See chapter III, 88-118.
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As for Supervision over village administration and
organizations, the party branch kept a close watch over
the village chiefs. According to a KMT analysis, the
COP party-branch gave full support to village heads if
they were party members, who would therefore take orders
from it. In the case of non-party members being village
heads, the party-branch would supervise and assist those
who were active elements or intellectuals. For those
whom the party thought undesirable, various village
meetings, administrative committees and peasants'
associations would be mobilized to get them out of office.
Party control over village chiefs and their administrative
organizations was most essential because to the ordinary
people.,, the latter appeared to be the authority in the
village. Thp.s the party worked through the village
administrative office, the various committees, and the
representatives' conference to have village legislation
and orders promulgated, and elections and mass rallies 
7held. In other words, the village administration became 
the medium through which the party-branch could contact 
the people.
6. Chung-yang kai-tsao: TOi-yuan hui, ti-lim tsu (KMT)
( etU ) , HuQ-kuo ts'an-min ti kung-fei 
chun-shih!vr^ telR>^ fi-ffF(Betrayal of the Nation and 
Suppression of the People by the Communist Bandits1 
Army), Taipei, Chung-yang wen-wu, 1952, 24. This 
work deals with CCF politics and party-army relations 
as well as political activities in the army and militia.
7. administrative organizations, see 
chapt er III * 4*1^  *
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During the Cheng Peng period, the party began to pay 
special attention to improving the mass mobilization 
programmes. Various problems and difficulties involved 
were discussed and attempts at solutions sought with a 
view to maintaining party leadership in the village. In 
May 1942, Do Jui-ch'ing, director of the political 
department of the field-forces of the 18th Army Group, 
pin-pointed the main difficulties of party control at the 
village level. In his article on party relations with
o
the people published in the Liberation Daily, he 
emphasized that the party-branch was the best contact 
point between the party and the people, but then he went 
on to criticize the failings of cadres, who divided them­
selves into different factions, and committed bureaucratic 
deviations. Lo pointed out that cadres should not 
undemocratically take over the entire running of mass 
organizations. Instead, they should work through the 
people with the right kind of publicity, and patience was 
needed in explaining party policies to the people whose 
education level was inevitably low. Lo believed that the 
way to win the people*s support was to help the latter 
solve practical problems, which might most likely be 
financial or economic.
8. Lo *s article,"on party-masses relations,*is given in 
Chieh-fang nih-pao. May 24, 1942.
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Examples of success on the part of model contingents in the 
early 1930s in the Kiangsi Soviets, in winning the support 
of the people through the solving of petty economic and 
financial problems, were quoted* Finally, Lo made it clear 
that the opinion of the people must be heard so that the 
party could identify itself with the people, who would then 
confide in the former. This article practically represented 
the policy of the party in its attempts to improve relations 
with the people during the Cheng Feng period.
A major problem within the party which stood in the way
of mass mobilization programmes was the different standard
and varying quality of the cadres. This was actually a
problem faced by the party at all levels, but especially so
in the village, where cadres often had to act on their
initiative without directions from above. On the whole,
there were the veteran, experienced cadres dating back to
the early 1930s, and then there were the young intellectuals
who joined the OOP camp during the war. Disputes between
these two groups were often reported because of their
9difference in education and experience.
9. "Xen-mi tsu-chi tsun-shou fa-chi u T f a it!^ vift'fj 
(To tighten organization and observe discipline),
(editorial), Chieh-fang nih-uao. April 7> 1943. The 
editorial in particular pointed out that experienced 
cadres tended to work as if they were still in the 
formative years of the early 1930s in guerrilla 
environments, whilst the young and newly trained cadres 
erred on the path .of liberalism, i.e., failing to 
submit themselves to discipline.
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During the Cheng Feng period, the party took
special care to maintain harmony between the two groups,
whilst at the same time it aimed at improving the
standard of the cadres. For the Veteran cadres, for
instance, the CCP called upon them to improve their
standard of education and get themselves into the good
10habit of studying the Cheng Feng documents.
In order to rally maximum support from the people,
the party-branch realised that undesirable elements
11like local bullies, obstinate landlords and party 
deviationists had to be dismissed from the offices they 
held in mass organizations whilst every means had to be 
resorted to, in order to encourage voluntary partici­
pation of the people in various organizations ranging 
from the national salvation organizations to the militia 
A typical example of Cheng Feng reform in the peasants' 
association, the most active of all mass organizations, 
was in a village near Lin 1 in southern
Shantung. The village comprised about 500 households, 
with only five of them of rich peasant 
background, whilst the rest were either poor or
10. In August 1942, I'ang Sheng pointed out the nec­
essity for cadres of peasant and proletariat back­
ground, i.e.,mostly veterans, to improve their 
standard of education. His article appeared in 
Chi eh- f anr< ,i ih-n ao. Oct. 4,1942. P'en Chen 
wrote an article of similar nature which appeared 
in Chieh-feng iih-'oao. Jan. 16, 1943.
11. Undesirable local influences in the village have 
been described in Chapter 111,73-7^-
224
middle peasants. During Cheng Feng investigations in early 
194-3, district cadres at Lin I discovered many faults with 
the peasants* association in this particular village# Under 
a certain Chang / membership was found to fall to only
about sixty, because Chang dismissed all members who failed 
to attend meetings. Bribery was also practised and bureau­
cratism in leadership•evident• Consequently village cadres 
failed to establish good contacts with the people* To remove 
Chang from office, district cadres therefore conducted a 
thorough investigation with the support of active elements in 
the village. The truth was revealed during the second 
investigation and Chang was removed and cadres offending the 
law were arrested. According to this CCF report, the 
peasants* association was reorganized, the mass mobilization
programme rejuvenated, and rapid expansion of the association 
12achieved.
To encourage voluntary participation of the people in 
mass organizations, the party employed new policies in the 
Cheng Feng period, and the party-branch became the faithful 
executor of these plans. For instance, in CCP strongholds 
where the party had a comfortable control over the village,
w * ’ y12. Lin 1 i-ko ts*un chuang chun-chung kung-tso ti cheng-li,
27. i h  -  \v> --:": *
(Reforms in the work of mass mobilization in a village 
in Lin I) , Chieh-fang tjih-pao, June 13 >1943*
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the people were given some extent of genuine power in
administration, not only in elections within the democratic
superstructure, but also in important decisions like
judicial matters. Available COP documents indicate that
at least in the 1 1 ai Hang area of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-
Honan base under the leadership of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the
people were given unprecedented judicial power.^ In this
area, the Cheng Peng period up to the end of 194*5 coincided
with the transitional period in the judicial administration
of the region, when many laws were found no longer suitable
for the existing situation, and bureaucratic irregularities
apparent with the judicial staff, who In turn were too small
1 4 -in number to cope with the increasing number of cases, 
lo deal with the changing circumstances, the CCP evolved a 
system of public courts and trials in which the people made 
the final decision in the passing of sentence. Ihe impor­
tant cases entrusted to the hands of the people were tenant- 
landlord disputes and divorces in civil cases, and theft,
burglary, and treason committed as enemy or puppet agents,
15in criminal cases*  ^ Party directions specified that village 
party cadres must play the leading role in these trials,
15. An official report on the judicial work in I'ai Hang
revealed that the CCP entrusted to the people judicial 
power of no small degpee: I'ai hang chfu hsing-cheng
kung-ssu 1 1ai-hang ch!u ssu-fa kung-tso
kai-k1 uang i k _✓fj( Judicial Work in the 
f*ai Hang Area), n.p.,same, 194-6.
^  Ibid*. 1-2.
15• 18-19.
2 2 6
first by explaining in mass rallies the whole case to the
had to make sure the people did not come to a wrong decision.
were reminded of the need to provide the necessary guidance
to the people. In any case, under the direction of the
village cadres, witnesses concerned were called to attend
mass rallies so that the people coxald listen to views put
forward by both the plaintiff and the defendant. The
latter in particular was said to be given the chance to
17present has or her case, f The judicial report in T'ai Hang
made it clear that the people participating in the trial of
puppet and enemy agents, local bullies, and bribery suspects
should be allowed to pass the sentence on the spot, as the
report claimed that defendants in these cases were given a
18fair, public trial, To settle minor disputes in the 
village, conciliatory committees were set up in the T ’ai Hang 
area comprising village cadres, leading village person­
alities and above all, labour heroes and active elements.
18. Ibid.,2$,
17• Ibid.,16,
3*8. 3dxLdm ,18,30, The report claimed that in many
instances, the people were proved to be better judges 
than the judicial courts.
people before the witnesses were called. Second^ cadres
a case of homicide was found 
16wrongly returned by the people as suicide. Thus cadres
A-V’zai.*
227
In other .words, the people here were encouraged to settle
their own disputes under the guidance of party cadres* The
most common cases dealt with in this way were land and
19marriage disputes. ^
In justifying this practice of public courts and trials.
the T*ai Hang judicial report also revealed the primary
purpose of this unprecedented and unorthodox judicial
practice. The report claimed that the whole practice
represented consciousness amongst the people to demand
20democracy in judicial matter. Such consciousness was
above all believed to be a signal for the launching of a
mass movement against the oppression of landlords, the
bourgeoisie, the puppets and the enemy. The impact of this
judicial power given to the people was dynamic, as can be
envisaged in landlord-tenant disputes, in which tenants
must have been intent on getting even with their landlords,
especially when the CCP principle in the Cheng Peng period
tended to side with the poor peasants in their demand for
21rent reduction.
There is no doubt that this unprecedented judicial
practice in T fai Hang contributed tremendously to the
19. Ibid.. 11 .
20. Ibid.. 14.
21. Pox* details of the rent and interest reduction 
campaign and Its role in mass mobilization programmes, 
see 137-255.
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progress of COP mass mobilization programmes, with, the 
“oppressed”, i.e., the tenant and poor peasants, rendering 
their 'unfailing support for the QGB cause of expansion 
and resistance against the Japanese. What had been 
described in the T*ai Hang area in fact indicated part 
of an overall CCP policy in the Cheng Feng period to take 
a more progressive course in championing the tenant and 
poor peasants. Whilst the United Front policy in seeking 
alliance with the bourgeoisie was still maintained, 
various revised policies showed that the CCP had come out 
more into the open in defending the interest of its 
prot^g^s. The most significant movement which indicated 
conspicuously the above CCP principle was the invigoration 
of the rent and interest reduction campaign. The 
campaign was directed against landlords* exploitation and 
had the inevitable and dynamic effect of arousing the 
enthusiasm of tenant and poor peasants which culminated 
in a vigorous mass movement. To crown the success of 
the mass mobilization programmes, the CCP also revised 
its military strategy in the war of resistance and con­
centrated on guerilla warfare rather than operational- 
guerfilla warfare, thus relying heavily on the people’s 
armed bands, which represented the highest organized 
form of all mass organizations, for the defence of local
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areas* The invigoration of the rent and interest 
redaction campaign, and the expansion of the peoplefs 
armed bands as a result of GOP concentration on 
guerilla warfare, were in fact indicative of the 
climax of the mass mobilization programmes and of the 
success of party leadership in the village* However, 
before further investigations into these two achieve­
ments, it is perhaps necessary to pause and examine 
party-army relations at the village level, so as to 
provide a complete picture of relations between the 
party, the army, the administration and the people. 
Party-Army Belations*
At the village level, the party-branch not only
op
aimed at control over the company units which were 
stationed there, but also gave necessary guidance to 
these army units in order to effect active resistance 
against the Japanese* In addition, the party-branch 
wanted to establish good personal contacts with common 
soldiers in the companies and platoons so that the 
latter too could assist in mass mobilization programmes 
and the maintenance of good relations between the army
22. A standard GCP company (lien) 3-JL had about 130 
men, and usually three companies formed one 
battalion. Under the Company were three 
platoons (p'ai) , and each platoon contained
three squads (pan) of 13 to 16 men each.




The nucleus of party work in the company was the
political adviser ( Cheng-chih chih-tao yuan)i^X?^ m k  
who was placed at the same level as the company
commander on the principle of division of power and
mutual checks. The former was in charge of political
work whilst the latter concerned himself with military
affairs. The party-branch within the company assisted
the political adviser, with its secretary very often
holding the concurrent post of depixty political 
27>adviser.  ^Close liaison between the party-branch 
headquarters in the village, the party-branch in the 
company units, and the political adviser must have 
been maintained, especially from 194*3 onwards when the 
posts of political commissar in the military region and 
sub-region (either divisional or brigade level) were
23. For details of the relations between the company 
commander and the political adviser, see Chung- 
yang kai-tsao wei-yuan hui, j^ixlir tsu (ed.), 
Chungc-Kungc chUn-shih. ^  J
(The Chinese Communist Army), Taipei, Same,
19511 27-28; Chung-yang wei-yuan hui.*. « ,
Betrayal of the Nation ... 4-6-48.
Also see Appendix 3, for the Chaft illustrating 
party control in the Company. A description 
of the role of the company political adviser is 
available in Johnson, Peasant nationalism...82-83*
231
held concurrently hy the party chiefs at the equivalent
merger at the village level, the CGP's intention to 
tighten party control in army units had already been 
demonstrated. Under the political adviser were other 
party members and cadres at the company and platoon 
levels, who were mainly responsible for making the COP 
army live up to its name of an army under the control
fheir basic objective was to maintain as far as 
possible a 30% party membership in the comb at-platoons, 
and potential party members were mostly hand-picked
As for the specific work of the party in the 
company units, it was evidently to boost the morale of
i
the soldiers, especially during combat conditions, and
24. Phis important merger in the CCP has been mentioned 
see n.53 in chapter V, 207*»
levels.^* Although there was no indication of a similar
of the party, i.e., i-tang chih-chun
25from active elements and young men. ^
26to prevent desertion. During the Cheng Peng period,
Wang Shou-tao^ ITPa-lu chjqn chung kung-ch'an- 
tang ti kung~tso fVi™? (rfhe work of
the OOP in the Eighth Route Army) Cheng:-chih 
kung-tso lun-chung:
(Political Work in the Army), Pa-lu chun, 1941
57-58.
26. Wang Shou-'Tao ■> loc. cit ♦. 57-59; and Phe Party *s 
Reconstruction, 176-178.
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a reinvigorated campaign was launched under the 
leadership of the company political adviser to boost 
army morale. Discussions and study-groups were organ­
ized and self-criticism made. A useful tool for 
publicity purpose was the wall-newspaper with articles 
contributed by common soldiers under the guidance of 
party cadres. (These articles, written in the simplest 
possible form of the Chinese language, also served
indirectly as the means of educating soldiers whose
27standard was appallingly low. ( (The Cheng Feng spirit 
was manifested in study-groups and discussions as 
soldiers were given the opportunity to make known their
OQ
grievances against their company or platoon commanders. 
The general principle of democracy from below was there­
fore practised.
27* Wang Chia-hsiang3if^?'jE~, "Chung-kuo kp^ig-ch1 anT 
tang yu k—o-ming chan-cheng*1, ^
(The CCP and the Revolutionary War) Political ^ 
Work in the Army.21. Wang stressed the impor­
tance of wall-newspapers, and criticized, cadres 
for being too formal with the issues of these 
wall-newspap ers•
28. Ohiao-tung chun-ch*u, Two Styles of Work. 21-22.
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A report of tlie political department of the 
559th Brigade in Shantung during the Cheng Feng period 
illustrated ho?/ political work under party leadership 
progressed in the company units* In order to counter­
act bureaucratism, company commanders were instructed 
to listen to the grievances of the soldiers, especially 
in regard to mess conditions. Q3he report criticised
company commanders v/ho were opposed to the general
p q
opinion and demands of the soldiers* lhat the party 
was driving at was to gain the entire confidence of the 
soldiers through good relations between commanders and 
soldiers, and it hoped that army morale could thereby 
be boosted, and desertion prevented. In the 359th 
Brigade, officers were instructed to adopt the 
principle of persuasion rather than the application of 
sheer discipline in winning over the backward elements, 
who were described as either uneducated or too 
obstinate in their deviated bourgeois beliefs.
Officers at the platoon level, where the closest 
contacts with soldiers were possible, were particularly 
instructed to care for the welfare of those under
29. Ibid.
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their command in regard to food, supplies of clothing,
30health, and financial conditions.
As in other COP organisations, models and heroes 
were created within the company units to publicise
the importance of good officer-soldier relations. Yii
"/&■Lo-ting^ J  , a platoon commander of the 559th
Brigade in Ohiaotung, Shantung, became the hero of
army units in Shantung during the Oheng Feng period.
Xu's merits were said to he his care for soldiers and
the people, his ability as a competent military comman-
der and political cadre, and his good relations with
31his superiors. The general policy of the party was 
to create similar heroes based on Xu's model in a 
morale-boosting campaign. By late 194-3 * was report­
ed that in Ohiaotung, indications of some improvements
32xn officer-soldier relations were evident. The 
party-branch also held inter-platoon and inter-company 
competitions to increase the number of soldiers in the
50. Ibid., 26-36.
31# Xu Lo-ting joined the Eighth Route Army in Sept. 
194-1 and became a OOP member in March 194-3* Por 
his biography, see Pa-lu chun, Shantung Chiao-tung 
chun-ch' 1, Cheng-chih pu, ^
(ed.), Hsu eh-chan na-nien ti chiao-tung: tzu-ti ring 
(Ohiaotung Soldiers in the Sight Xears of a 
Bloody War), n.p. ,Hsin-hua, 194-5,194-204-; and 
Chiao-tung chun-ch'a, Two Styles of Work, 10-13.
32. Ohiaotung ChUn-ch*u, Ghiaotung Soldiers... .204-.
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•units through campaigns to recall deserters, and to 
attract new recruits.^ By late 194*3* reports from 
Shantung also indicated that the number of deserters 
returning to camp was increasing. For instance, in 
the central Shantung area, 3,000 deserters returned to 
their camps after a well-publicized campaign in which 
the Shantung provincial war-time committee ordered a 
general mobilization for that particular purpose.^ 
Whilst this campaign illustrates some Communist success 
in recalling deserters to their camp, it also points > 
to the fact that the CCP army, like other armies, was 
faced with the common problem of desertion, which 
definitely affected the morale of the soldiers. In 
194-1-194-2, when the Japanese military pressure on the 
bases was most intense, it must have been most trying 
for cadres in the political departments of the various 
CCP units in their efforts to prevent large scale 
desertion. However, as the campaign to recall
33* Shu lung ^  "Chun-ch'u^ TO-chuang tung^yuan 
kung-tso ti chung-chieh ",3$ ^  1r
A summary of work in military mobilization in the 
military region, ' Political Work in the Army. 
168-169.
J4-. Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu, A Summary of the
Reconstruction of the Anti-Japanese 3Democratic 
Regime in huchung; in the Last Seven Years and
its Future lasks. 27
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deserters in Shantung indicates, political work within 
the COP army had hy late 194-5 begun to score success 
in boosting the morale of the various units.
It can be seen from the above that the main 
concern of the party-branch in the company units was 
to maintain high morale and good officer-soldier 
relations. Although deviationist tendencies amongst 
company commanders needed to be corrected in Cheng Peng 
programmes, they were not as serious as those at 
higher levels, which amounted to warlordism, in view 
of the much greater military strength involved.
Pinally, it may be mentioned that the strongest tie 
of the company units with the people in the village was 
that the former depended on the latter for economic
'X c
supplies, and the CCP thei'efore realized that good 
relations between the army and the people must also be 
maintained. Ihus the political department of the 
Eighth Route Army specified that army cadres should 
assist the party-branch in promoting mass 
mobilization programmesHarmony and good relations
55* The Chart on218clearly indicates the army's
dependence on the village for economic supplies.
36. Wang Chia-hsiang, f,lhe CCSP and the Revolutionary 
War", Political Work in the Army. 23. In regard 
to the various political work among rural 
civilians undertaken by the CCP army, see Johnson 
Peasant Nationalism ..., 85-89•
between the various organizations in the village were
the ultimate objectives of the CCP, in order to
facilitate its mass mobilization programmes and to
build up military strength. It was therefore not
surprising that in October 194-3» a full scale campaign
was launched to promote good relations betv/een the
_ _
party, army, administration and the people. (
Having surveyed the army-party relations at the 
village level, it is now convenient to examine the t¥/o 
greatest achievements of mass mobilization programmes, 
i.e., the reinvigoration of the rent and interest 
reduction campaign, and the expansion of the people's 
armed bands.
The Rent and Interest Reduction Campaign.
It has been indicated in chapter three that 
although the rent and interest reduction campaign had 
been launched almost at the beginning of the war, the 
main obstacle to a vigorous programme was the genuine 
fear on the part of tenants that landlords might 
retaliate by exercising their right of land re-possession 
if the former claimed reductions which they were 
entitled to.^ With the launching of the Cheng Peng




Movement in Pebruary 194*2, various laws were 
promulgated by the OOP Central Politburo, and the 
various sub-bureaux in the bases aimed at achieving 
a genuine rent reduction programme. (The climax came 
in October, 194*3 when the Central Politburo issued 
a directive on principal? policies in the border 
governments. One of them specified that rent and 
interest reduction must be realized in all areas by 
the end of 194*3*^
Varying results were achieved in the reinvigora- 
tion of the rent and interest reduction campaign up to 
the end of 194*3 9 being most fruitful in the Shansi- 
Chahar-Hopei base and the least in the Shantung base. 
QJhe new impetus of the campaign was provided by the 
CCPfs determination in siding more openly with their 
proteges, the tenant and poor peasants. A .Shantung 
report on land administration in 194*4* contained a 
precise description of CCP policy, which summarizes 
the reinvigorated party attitude. It described the 
rent and interest reduction campaign as a revolutionary
39. "Chung-kung chung-yang cheng-chih-chu kuan-yu
chien-tsu sheng-ch'an yung-cheng ai-min chi hsuan 
chuan shih-ta cheng-ts’eti chih-shih” 4 ' ^ ^
1 1  ^
tlhe directive of the CCP Central Politburo on 
rent reduction, economic production%. support for 
the administration and care for the people, and 
the ten principal policies on publicity),
Chi eh-f a m  nih-uao. Oct.l. 194-3.
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movement in transforming the village and the class
structure. In other words, the COP encouraged poor
peasants to rise in social status through economic
improvement at the expense of the landlords, so that
the fffeudalistic", economic structure existing could
he weakened and eventually ti'ansformed into a pre-
40dominantly peasantry economy. Reiteration along the
same line in this period was reflected in the October
1, 194*3 directive, in which it was specified the party
and government legislation should stand on the side
of the people and peasants' associations in their
41struggle for rent and interest reduction. Although 
the United Front policy was still maintained, there 
was no more mention of the need for tenant and poor 
peasants to pay their rent and interest to landlords 
should they owe them to the latter.
Bearing in mind the above party policy prevalent 
in the Cheng Feng period, party cadres began their 
work of mobilizing the peasants in their fight for 
rent and interest reduction* Ihe whole campaign 
inevitably involved complicated* economic^problems
K 40. Pu-ti (chung-* chi eh p ao-kao zt~ (A Summary
Report on Land Reform) , n.p ., n .pub., (1944*? ), 2.
41. See the CCP Central Politburo directive on Oct.l, 
194-3» section on rent reduction, in which it was 
specified that the party should side with its 
proteges: Chieh-fang; .iih-oao. Oct.l, 194-3*
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of land administration and legal rights in disputes 
between landlords and tenants, which are beyond the 
scope of the present thesis, OPh.e main concern in 
this chapter, therefore, is to examine how far rent 
was reduced in percentage, and to investigate the 
guarantee given to tenant and poor peasants 
against landlords* exercising their right of land 
re-possession in the four major bases of Morth China. 
It is hoped that this survey will help indicate how 
mass mobilization programmes were given new 
incentives as a result.
Two types of rent reduction were enforced in 
the bases, First, in the initial land reform 
programme in the early years of the war, it was 
specified that there should be a general reduction 
of 25% on the rent which had been fixed in the 
pre-1937 period. Second in the Cheng Feng period, 
the Party went further to ensure as far as possible 
that rent should not exceed 37 • 5% of the yield 
at harvest, 2?his action was necessary because rent 
after a 25% reduction might still exceed 37«5%
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of the yield at harvest.^ For instance, a reliable 
Communist investigation into the percentage of rent 
paid by tenants in the pre-1937 period bad tbe follow­
ing data# In tbe various parts of Shansi, especially 
in tbe eastern, central, and south-eastern parts, as 
well as in western Hopei, it was reported that tbe 
pre-war rent ranged from 40% to ?2% of tbe yield, 
or an average of 54#.43 Klus when the GCP enforced
tbe 25% reduction in tbese areas, rent would still 
average 40*5%# Hence tbe Communists found it 
necessary in tbe Cbeng Feng period to specify that 
rent should not, whenever possible, exceed 37*5% of 
tbe yield*
In tbe Sbansi-Cbab.ar-H.opei and Shansi-Hopei- 
Shantung-Honan bases, tbe party was able to enforce 
in stable regions reduction on tbe basis of ensuring
42* P feng Cben, "Comrade P*eng Chen on land policy
in tbe Shansi-Cbahar-Hopei border region", given 
in Chung-kuo kung-ch'an tang, Chin-Ch1 §^ ~Cbi 
chung-yang cbii, Hsuan-ch’uan pu ,
(Pu-ti cheng-ts’e chunff-yao wen-cbien hui-chiH^ t 3%.
(Collected Important Documents on 
Land Policy),n*p.same, 19^6,46. In discussing 
land administration in tbe Shansi-chahar-Hopei 
base, P'eng also gave a survey of tbe general 
situation in rent reduction in tbe bases of 
North and Central China*
43# Hbang Wei-wen, "Some sources on tbe reduction of 
rent and interest in tbe bases", Chieh-fang 
,i ih-nao, February 11, 1942.
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that rent did not exceed 37*5% of the yield* In 
the Shans i-Chahar-Hopei "base especially, the rent- 
reduction campaign was well organized under the 
leadership of P*eng Chen, the party sub-bureau 
secretary*^ In the Shantung and north-west Shansi 
bases, the general rule was to enforce a 25% reduction 
of rent without pressing for further concessions from 
the landlords, mainly because mass mobilization had
46not been as well organized as in the,other two bases*
44* Por details of the percentage of rent-reduction 
in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan base, see 
"Provisional regulations on land utilization11, 
Nov* 1, 194-1 (articles 25*28) given, in__Ohin- 
Chi-Lu-Yu pien-ch 'ti cheng-fu '
Pa-ling hui-oien (Collected Laws and
Ordinances) 'n.p*, same, 1942; for details in 
the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region, see 
"Regulations on rent, tenancy, loans and interest 
in the Shan si- Chahar-H op ei border region11,
Jan.21, 194-3 (Article 5)/
Collected Documents on Land Policy (Shansl- 
Chahar-Ho'pei baseT^4^
45. $he good work done by P*eng Chen was evident in 
his report on land administration in the Shansi- 
Chahar-Hopei base, see P'eng Chen, "Comrade P'eng 
Chen on land policy.*.", Collected Documents on 
Land Policy. 44-45 ^
46. Por the percentage of rent-reduction in North­
west Shansi, see Ying Yung^ , "A short commentary 
on the defects of administrative work in the 
fourth district of North-west Shansi", Ghieh- 
fang .iih-pao, July 2, 1942. G}he article 
criticized cadres for being too ambitious in 
the rent-reduction programmes, and insisted that 
rent-reduction should be conducted on the 25% 
basis. Por the percentage of rent-reduction 
in Shantung, see Summary Report on Land Reforms 
(Shantung), 37*
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In tlie Shantung* base in particular, the unstable 
situation and the relatively weals GOP administration 
gave landlords the chance to exercise their influence 
in counteracting the rent-reduction drive there*
In areas where greater reductions were obtained, 
more guarantees against landlords1 re-possessing land 
were also ensux'ed. Thus more laws were enforced in 
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan and Shansi-Chahar- 
Hopei bases against land re-possession, whilst the 
Shantung base had difficulties in combating the 
landlords* The first guarantee against random land 
repossession appeared in the CCPCC resolution on land 
policy on Jan* 28, 194-2. Whilst article 2 specified 
that the CCP aimed at minimizing rather than eliminating 
"£eudalisticn exploitation of the peasants, it was also 
in the appendices of the same resolution that checks 
against land re-possession were specified,^ ^easan^s 
with the right of permanent tenancy were guaranteed 
against landlord intimidation. In cases where 
permanent tenancy was not specified, landlords had
4*7* Por the COP resolution on land policy passed
cm Jan* 28, 194-2,, and the accompanying appen^ 
dxces, see Ghung-kuo kung-ch'. jmtang_,
Chung-yang shu-chi shu
K'ang-chan i-Iai chung-yao wen-chien hui-chi 
IK. ^
(Collected. Important Documents since the 
outbreak of the sino-Japanese War), n.p.,n.pub., 
1942, 188-191.
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the right to re-possess their land, "but could only do 
so on the expiration of the contract. Moreover, they 
were encouraged to renew their contract with the 
original tenant on a long term basis of, say, five 
years or more, because of the economic hardship 
suffered during the war of. resistance. In the case 
of a change in ownership of land, the tenant was to
/lO
retain his rights until the expiration of the contract.
In the Shansi-Chahar-Hop ei and Shansi-Hopei-
Shantung-PIonan bases, the party continued to press
for further concessions on behalf of the tenants. On
February 4, 1945, the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Sub-bureau
promulgated new laws governing rent, tenancy and
49interest on loans. J Further to tenancy rights guaran­
teed in the resolution of January, 1942, the new law 
defined hereditary tenancy as permanent tenancy;^ and 
in cases where landlords who had re-possessed land, 
re-let the same land again after a lapse of under one
4-8. Ibid,, 190-191.
49* "Regulations on rent, tenancy and interest...",
Collected Documents on hand Policy (Shansi- 
cKiKar-tiooei base')." 63-6Q." ""
50. Ibid. (article 17) 66.
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year, the original tenant had priority in renting 
on the same conditions previously agreed upon in the 
original contract.*^ 0?he success of the rent-reduction 
programme in the Shansi-Chahar-Hop ei base can indirectly 
he seen in P*eng Chen’s article on land policy pub­
lished in November 194*4- 9 in which he warned against 
left-wing tendencies amongst peasants, who went to the 
extent of confiscating landlords* propei^ies in their 
struggle against landlord exploitation.*^ As regards 
the subsidiary campaign of interest reduction on loans, 
the general principle adopted by the GCP in the Shansi- 
Ghahar-Hopei base, as in other areas, was that interest 
should not exceed 10% of the loan. However, P ’eng 
Chen pointed out that in view of the shortage of cash 
and the acute economic and financial situation in the 
bases, interest of up to 15% should be allowed, or else 
peasants would not be able to secure the loans so 
essential to their livelihood.*^
51* Ibid.. (article 15), 65*
52. P*eng Chen, "P'eng Chen on land policy...", 
Collected Documents on land Policy* (Shansi- 
Chahar-Hooei base) ‘55-5
53. Ibid.,52.
The efforts of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan 
hase on rent-reduction were based more or less on the 
same pattern as those of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base, 
but perhaps less ambitious.^ In the Shantung base, 
laws against illegal re-possession by landlords were
cc
also based on a similar pattern,^ but the OOP had 
difficulties in enforcing the relevant laws there 
because of counteractions by landlords. For instance, 
it was reported that landlords as late as the spring of 
1943 were still in a position to resist the rent- 
reduction drive in Shantung, However, by winter 194-3* 
the drive was again re-invigorated as a result of the 
new impetus provided by the OOP resolutions of October 
1, 1943?^ As for horth-west Shansi, no official
54, For details on the rent reduction regulations, 
the rights of tenants, see articles 18-24 in 
"Provisional regulations on land utilisation", 
Collected Laws and Ordinances 
TShansi-Hodei-Shan^ , 24-25 *
55* See articles 22-30 in "Draft of Provisional 
regulations on rent and tenancy in Shantung 
province", Summary Re-port on Land Reform 
(Shantung), 41-42,
56* Summary Beoort on Land Reform (Shantung), I*
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government report on land administration seems 
available, but it is certain, from information in the 
Liberation Daily* that by late 194*2, great attention 
was being paid to the rights of tenants and by late 
194*3, positive action on the part of peasants was taken 
against landlords in their demands for rent redaction* 
The actual securing of rent reduction in the 
bases was conducted under the leadership of party 
cadres in the village, but they played only a super­
visory role behind the scene, applying the familiar 
method of mobilising active elements in the locality*
The headquarters for the rent-reduction campaign was 
the peasants1 association, symbolizing the strength 
and voluntary nature of mass organisations* Sent 
reduction societies were then organized by the peasants1 
associations with the special duty of calling mass 
rallies in which both tenants and landlords attended, 
and very often the latter were requested or advised to 
go. The climax of this type of demand for rent 
reduction in mass rallies began from October 194-5 
onwards in response to the OOP resolutions of October 1,
57* 4 detailed study of the rent-reduction campaign
xn Cctober-heAem^qr 194-5 in north-west Shansi
is given in gi£5$”.
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194-3* On October 18, 194-3 for instance, the Shansi- 
Chahar-Hop ei Sub-bureau issued a special directive 
emphasizing the importance of self-consciousness on 
the part of the people, who should mobilize themselves 
under party leadership, centring their strength in the 
peasants' associations, which should also be expanded, 
or restored in cases where they had been dissolved.^ 
In north-west Shansi, reports indicated tremen­
dous activities of rent reduction under the super­
vision of the peasants'associations in October - 
December, 194-3* Ihe following is a chart compiled 
from available sources in the Liberation Daily illus­
trating the extent of the rent-reduction campaign 
in north-west SBansi;
ffihe Extent of the rent-reduction campaign ingg 
north-west Shansi* October - December« 194-3#











Lin hsien (Oct) 1st,2nd 
3rd,5th
18 1,529 over 30
Linnan|f7^  (Oct) 3^d 4 151 unknown
Linnan (Dec) X 10 1,309 over 17





Ningwu (hov) 2nd unknown unknown unknown
K'olan^/^ (Nov) several 13 unknown 
_ _____
unknown
58* Collected Documents on Land Policy (Shansi- 
Chahar-Hop ei base), 86-87*
59* Ghieh-fang jih-pao,Oct.28,31;Nov.22.25;Dec.16,18,
1943? and Jan.14,1944*
It must be mentioned here that this rent- 
reduction campaign was not as successful as that in 
the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base. Ihus it is not surpris­
ing to find from the above chart that the campaign was 
undertaken in scattered districts in various parts of 
the base, rather than in the majority of the districts. 
However, in areas where rent-reduction activities did 
occur, there was tremendous enthusiasm and peasant 
consciousness was definitely aroused. The familiar 
pattern of COP organisation in north-west Shansi was 
to include tenant peasants into peasants’ associations. 
In the village, the ordinary, illiterate peasants 
evidently needed guidance from cadres in their demands 
from landlords for rent reduction, mainly because a 
great deal of mathematical calculations would be in­
volved in the process. For instance, in village X 
in the first district of Kolan, leaders of units under 
the peasants’ association often consulted district 
cadres in the evenings in order to familiarize
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themselves with the situation before their confrontation
60with the landlords. It was also in village X that
61a most vehement way of demanding the return of rent 
(t,ui-tsu)i^fiJby tenants from landlords tools place.
Here, twenty-eight tenants were organized into two 
units, and carrying hags with them, they approached 
landlords for the return of rent in kind. Apparently, 
these two units were well organized and supported by 
the local peasants' association and COP cadres, as it 
was reported that 30 shih were returned within seven 
days. The two most active members in the units,
Wang ssur^, and Ai CHang-taXj^were also elected
6?chief representative and deputy of the village.
In regard to benefits gained by tenant peasants 
in north-west Shansi in this period under discussion, 
they can be divided into first, the reduction of rent; 
second, the return of rent; third, the securing of 
land formerly re-possessed by landlords (shu-ti)^^^ ;
60. Chi eh-fang?: nlh-pao. December 16, 194*2 (on rent- 
reduction in Kblah).
61. As many landlords in north-west Shansi refused 
tenants the reduction of rent in the earlier 
period, mostly since early 194*2, the latter in 
Oct.-Dec. 194*3 began to demand from landlords 
the return of parts of the rent they were
IH'^ t iia ttgegSgii§An§fioSPd 4Sseiiorcec^pecified
62. Chieh-fang .iih-’pao. Dec. 16, 194*3
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and fourth, the signing of new land-contracts on a
relatively long term basis ranging from two to ten
years. The second and third categories were tenants1
efforts to settle old scores with landlords, and
therefore represented aAprogressive move than merely
demanding a reduction in rent. The signing of hew
contracts was another security measure on the part of
tenants to check possible landlord retaliations in the
future. In addition, these new contracts guaranteed
tenants long enough time to devote full attention to
their land with less threats from landlords.^ 
following is a detailed description of rent reduction
activities undertaken in the various villages of north­
west Shansi in October-December, 194-3*
In Linhsien in October 194-3 > out of the 16 
ordinary villages, 530 tenants had their rent reduced, 
and their land covered an area of 7>875*5 mou •
In the second district of the same hsien and in the 
same month, a most effective mass rally was held* 
Tenants who rented land from the same landlord, a 
certain K&afafi, managed to hold a mass rally with the 
latter attending. The tenants1 advantage in this
63* Chieh-fang rilh-pao. October 28, October 31 > 
November 22, November 25, December 16 and 
December 18, 194-3*
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case was they had the same common interest against 
Iiao, and therefore were successful in inducing the 
landlord to return rent equivalent to 20 shih out of 
the 1,000 mow of land he let to them. In addition, 
over 30 new contracts were signed on the spot in the 
rally, and land re-possessed by Kao in the spring of 
194-3 was returned to tenants.
In the four villages in the third district of
LinnanJ&^r October 194-3, 68 tenants had their rent
reduced from a total of 73 >254 shih to 4-7,256 shih,
i.e., 25,998 shih less. Seventy-one tenants had
their new contracts signed with terms ranging from two
to ten years In December, the Communists
employed e well-organised tactics in ten villages in
district X in Linnan. Ihree centres were established
with district cadres supervising discussions and plans
for rent reduction. In villages where peasants*
associations existed, leaders of units under the
associations conducted d&or-to-door investigations in
order to get accurate data in the rent-reduction
campaign. fhis method evidently required careful
planning and patience, but the results reported 
seemed most successful. After one and a half months,
64*. Chieh-fang; jih-pao, Oct. 28, 194-3/(on rent 
reduction in linhan and Linhsien).
65. Ibid.
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1,509 tenants in the district were reported to have 
288(sMJ^ of rent reduced, and 154 shih returned from 
17 landlords. Land formerly repossessed by landlords, 
but was returned to tenants, amounted to I, 898.2 mou. 
Oonfessions by individuals.landlords of their mistakes 
in a mass rally were also secured.^
In the second district of Ningwu, November 1943, 
the most constructive step was taken to guarantee the 
rights of tenants. New contracts signed were kept 
in triplicate, with the landlord, the tenant, and the 
village administrative office having one copy each.
The last party acted as the arbiter to see that con­
tracts were kept, and also mediated in landlord-tenant 
disputes. In exercising the rights of repossession 
in Ningwu, landlords had to apply to the village 
administrative office and the peasants1 association 
for approval, and tenants were to be notified in 
good, time.67
It may be concluded from the above activities 
that where the COP conducted the rent-reduction 
campaign in north-west Shansi, it succeeded in bringing
66. Chieh-fang nih-pao, Dec. 18, 1943 (on rent 
reduction in Linnan).
67. Chi eh-fang .iih-nao, Nov. 1943. (on rent 
reduction in Ningwu).
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home its objective of winning the support of the 
tenant peasants. Moreover, there were also indications 
of Communist success in mobilizing these tenant 
peasants to work for specific objectives after peasant 
consciousness was aroused as a result of the rent 
reduction campaign. For instance, in village X in the 
first district of K folan, the Communists organized 
the active elements into units within the peasants1 
association, with Wang Ssu and Ai Chang-ta as the 
leaders. Ihe target set for these units, besides 
demanding rent reduction from landlords, was to con™ 
central on economic production in 194-4-* and each 
individual was assigned in the coming year the task 
of cultivating 6 mou of virgin land, and increasing
6850% efficiency in the collecting of dung in winter.
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the Communists 
launched a large-scale economic production campaign 
in 1944 right in the wake of the boom in the rent 
reduction drive. Realizing the tremendous enthusiasm 
amongst the peasants as a result of the rent reduction 
campaign, the party immediately directed this peasant 
consciousness to support an economic production campaign,
68. Qhieh-fang .iih-oao, Dec. 16, 1945.
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the success of which depended on the effectiveness of 
mass mobilization* Thus Mao Tse-tung on November 29, 
19^-51 reiterated the urgent need for a full scale 
economic production campaign in the bases in his 
speech, "Let Us Organize", delivered in Tenan* Mao's 
instruction to the bases was "Do it yourself and 
overcome difficulties" as the slogan for the economic 
production campaign* Mao specified that the slogan 
could be and had to be followed, and predicted that 
the economic production campaign could result in a 
full scale mass mobilization movement in 1944*^
Thus it may be concluded that by the end of 1943, the 
re-invigoration of the rent and interest reduction 
campaign had resulted in triumph for the OOP, in the 
sense that the latter could then make full use of the 
peasant consciousness thus aroused to promote further 
drives and mass mobilization programmes#
69# Mao Tse-tung, "Tsu-chi ch'i-lai", 
fLet us organize)
Ohieh-fanff iih-nao, Dec* 2, 1943*
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The People1a Armed Bands.
The general activities of the people*s armed 
hands in the village and how their progress was 
retarded by the COP military policy of operational- 
guerrilla warfare have been mentioned in chapter three?0 
The present purpose is to examine the tremendous expan­
sion of the people!s armed bands in the Cheng Feng 
period• It was the CCP adoption of a policy of total 
guerrilla warfare from early 194-2 onwards, which made 
it necessary for the Communists to rely on the self- 
defence corps and the militia, which constituted the 
people*s armed bands, rather than regular troops, for 
the defence of the villages* The advantage of this 
change was that it helped lessen the economic burden 
on the COP in the village, because unlike regtilar 
troops, the people*s armed bands were self-sufficient 
economically, meaning that they caxrried on economic
production whilst fighting the Japanese and puppet
71troops at the same time* This also meant that the
70* Bee chapter three /10^112*
71. For the change in CCP military strategy in early
194-2 see Chapter I I I » for the self- 
sufficiency of the mxlitiaT’see MChu-li yu min- 
ping”, — VTrfl;\ (The main strength and the 
militia) Chieh-fan^ jih-nao Hov* 2, 194-2.
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CCP could therefore afford to continue the policy of 
"cut troops and simplify the administration1' in 
reducing the number of regular troops, so that the 
economic burden could be lessened, and the party be 
in a better position to cope with the Japanese 
economic pressure.
In the Cheng Peng period, nev/ responsibilities 
were given to the people’s armed bands. Increased 
supplies of ammunition, firearms and weapons left over 
as a result of the cutting of regular troops were given 
to the militia, and the CCP believed this to be very 
effective in strengthening people’s confidence against 
the brutal Japanese attacks, especially in 194*2, and in 
marginal areas, where Japanese and puppet retaliation 
made local defence absolutely essential. These 
supplies, which inevitably made the people's armed
72bands better equipped, were welcome to the people.1 
As for the activities and operation of the people's 
armed bands, they were mainly localized at the village 
level. Although these organizations formed in
72. Kung-lun ch' u-pan- she ^  ed.), Chung-kung
chih pi-mi chtin-shih kung~tso 
"(The' Secret Military Work of"’the Chinese 
Communists), n.p.,same, 194-1,7-8; also see 
"The main strength and the militia",
Chi eh-fang rlih-nao, Uov. 2, 194-2
258
themselves a hierarchy extending from the border
73region to the village level, the tery nature of
guerrilla warfare and the need for independent and
mobile action made it necessary for the people*s
armed bands to operate from the local level,
especially the village, as the base of resistance
74against the Japanese*
Militia organizations in the village were
nominally uder the people®s committee of armed
resistance, which was elected by the people in the
village representatives* conference. The committee
itself was siib-divided into the combat, training, and
7 5explosion sections* Within the militia itself, 
there were anti“Japanese youth vanguard contin­
gents, comprising members 16-23 years of age, and the
73* 3?or a chart of militia organizations from border
region to the village level, see Li Chan , 
Chan-toil chung ti chieh-fang ch*h min-ping 
f*3 ’( The People's
Militia of Liberation Areas in Combat), Hong Kong, 
Chung~kuo ch*u-pan-she, 1947,chart between 29 
and 30, no pagination*
74* Tou FuX^Vi M Chieh-fang ch*ii yu ho fa-tung 
chtln-chung chien-oh1 ih k'ang-chan1*,
1 y ( T h e  way to mobilize the 
masses to persist in the war of resistance in 
the liberated are as), Ohlin-chung ,X,1, (Jan*I5, 
1945),14.
75* Li Chan, The People fs Militia* * *lin Combat, chart 
between 29 and 30, no pagination*
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model contingents, with, members 24-55 years old*
Phe nucleus of the militia was the guerrilla unity or 
yu-chi hsiaO”!iiSU/^ 3^ ^^ ’l^)someiimes known as the model 
platoon, comprising youths and active elements of the 
militia^ this was the teest trained and equipped, 
resembling to a great extent the pi'oper guerrilla 
forces*^ OOP control was greatest in these guerrilla 
units where the party-branch went beyond filling these 
units with 50% party members. In the villages of 
Hsien tsienT)i^/J> for example, 21 of the 25 men in a 
guerrilla unit were party members. Constant combats 
undertaken by these units also made it necessary for 
the Communists to provide them with some economic 
supplies rather than leaving them on theii* own produc­
tive efforts. lo promote class consciousness, the 
CCP also ensured that party members in the units were 
mainly composed of tenants and poor peasants supported 
by a minority of middle peasants, and the best weapons
y-V
76. Ch'eng tsu-hua/rx^F , "Chi-chung ping-yuan T 
hsfeang ti min-ping tou-cheng”,
(Ihe struggle of the militia on the plain of 
central Hopei) chhn-chung% X,15, (July 10,194-5)* 
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and equipment were entrusted to these proteges 
In fact, this policy of control was sometimes seen 
operating even in the self-defence corps* For
instance, in the 5th contingent of the self-defence
)>? /a 4.
corps in Ting hsieny4_zF/hin the southern part of
central Hopei, of the 35 cadres there, the majority
of them were poor peasants, supplemented by some
78middle peasants.
True to the Cheng Feng spirit, the COP did not 
hesitate to point out weaknesses inherent in the 
militia and the need for the party-branch to strengthen 
these units. The first obvious drawback mentioned 
was the poor quality and inadequacy of supplies in 
arms and equipment, andit became, therefore, all the 
more important for the militia to make the best use
77. Ibid*, 446*
78. Research Section, Central Committee for the 
Extermination of Communism, Kfhokuku selnabu 
homen ni okeru Chukvo no minshff kalmtoku kbsaku 
no :i it su;ib ~chbsa hokoku * if 3 ^  p-
"j)C^ dn :K ^  '-ft5'. ..
(Field Survey of Chinese Communist efforts to 
Win People in South-west Portion of Ilopei Area), 
May, 1940, R 114,T 995>^26202-26203,pp. 27-29.
A detailed survey.of the economic, social 
background of the cadres is available here.
va-? vVnfp -yrfsp 1
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79of all available supplies. ' Second, there had to be
good co-ordination between the militia on the one hand,
and the guerrillas and army regulars on the other*
Ch'eng Izu-hua, political commissar of the Central
Hopei Army, pointed out the danger of misplacing the
militia during combats in positions which should have
80been occupied by better armed units* Finally,
experience in H&ien hsien had shown that a concentration
of the militia on a large scale would make it impossible
for members to carry on economic production whilst
fighting the Japanese at the same time, because they
would then have to leave their local villages. Thus
militia units must be localized in the -villages. In
addition, they should also avoid attracting too much
attention from the enemy as it would result in Japanese
retaliation and unnecessary sacrifice as had happened
81
in Kao-chia-chuangi7yrin Hsien hsien.
79* 3?ou Fu, "(The way to mobilize the masses •••", 
chun-chung*X ,1, (Jan. 15, 194*5) ? 14-.
80. Ch'eng Isu-hua, n!he struggle of the Militia11,
chun-chun^, X,13 (July 10, 194-5), 4-4-7#
81: Ibid.. 44-8-449.
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By the end of 194-3, the CCP policy of shifting 
its strength of resistance against the Japanese from 
regular troops to the people's armed bands began to 
show fruitful results. First of all, CCP figures 
released in 194-4- indicated a rapid expansion of the 
militia in the period late 194-3 and early 194-4-:
Q p
Strength of the militia in North China.






In addition, the fierce Japanese mopping-up 
campaigns which had caused CCP territories to shrink 
in the period 194-1-194-2 had passed their peak, and 
the militia began to succeed in establishing themselves 
firmly in local villages in the defence of their own 
home, so much so that the party was then ready to 
mobilize them as a vital weapon in launching a new 
counter-offensive against the Japanese by the second 
half of 194-3.85
82. Cj^ung-cheng hsuan-ch1 uan pp. ”Huo-yupiio
yu ti-Kou c&an-chhng . ti min-pingfl,; % = /aX?
(The militia who are active in the battle field 
behind enemy lines) Ghieh-fang iih-nao.July.8.1944
83* For details see 2£7^“275 •
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DDhe expansion of the militia also contributed.
to improving the economic condition in the bases,
and helped solve some of the difficult economic
problems faced by the COP. Many areas within the
bases, especially the mountainous regions like Pei-
yueh and 1 1 ai Hang in the Shan si- Ohah ar ~H op e i and
Sh an s i -Ii op e i - Sh antung-H on an bases respectively, were
84most3.y unproductive areas* To -worsen the situation, 
natural catastrophes were frequent during the war up 
to 1943. Eon instance, the Shansi- Chahar-H op ei base 
experienced drought, flood, and locust pestilence 
whilst the 3?!ai-Hang area was also preyed upon by
85locusts, in 1942 and 1943, resulting in bad harvests. ^
84. Por a full report of economic difficulties in the 
f'ai Hang area, see Chin-Chi^u-Yu 
tiao-ch!a yen-chiu J
Kmo-rain chin&-ehi tiao-ch^a ch'u-nu yen-chiu 
7 g f \ i ' I ? r e l i m i n a r y  investigation 
of the People1 s livelihood and Economy) ,n.p. 
GPao-fen, 1944,24. 5?he report indicates income 
in Tai Hang per capita was very low, and in the 
second, fifth and sixth administrative districts, 
people had to live for half of a whole year on 
the husks of grain.
85* Shih Ching-tang et ,al,, (ed. ) , Chung-
3m o nung-yeh ho-tso-h.ua ytin-tun& shih-liao^F^'Iii^i
Material of the Chinese Agricul- 
tural Co-operative Movement), Peking, 1951, I,
304, 473-475.
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To counteract these economic setbacks, the
militia was mobilised by the party to co-operate with
the peasants in economic production. It has already
been mentioned that the peoplefs armed bands did not
normally draw supplies from the government, but relied
on their own resources for food supply* To go one
step further, a general campaign was launched in 1943
calling for close co-operation between labour and
armed forces, i.e.,Ia,o-wu ho-tso^t^f Basically, this
was a movement to utilise maximum man-power in the
economic production of the village, especially during
harvest, and it was practised throughout the four
86ma^or bases in i*?orth China. During the whole 
agricultural season, the militia contributed in two 
ways. First, they were posted as sentries, and kept 
a close watch on the nearby enemy, especially those 
stationed in fortresses near communication lines.
In addition, they also took part in economic production 
in areas closest to the enemy lines, as they were more 
capable of fighting the enemy than ordinary peasants.
As for farms and land owned by the militia, the labour 
forces in the village took over production on their 
behalf. To deal with this complicated co-operation
86. Li Chan, The Peoplers Militia ...in Combat» 28.
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between labour and armed forces, the people in tbe 
village were organized into different mutual-aid 
teams, which had varied forms in the different bases.^ 
The most common mutual-aid teams were the pien-kung tui 
(lab our-conversion team), and the Cha-kung tui 
(organized labour team). The pien-kung tui 
can generally be divided into three types. First, 
in areas where labour hands were insufficient, people 
were organised to help each other at a particular 
period. Second, where draught animals were in­
sufficient, two labour hands could be exchanged for 
say, one bullock. Third, knowledge and techniques 
in farming like sowing and harvesting could be ex­
changed to supplement inadequacies. Oha-kung tui 
took the form of an organized team working in a par­
ticular farm for a short period of time, normally 
during the busy seasons. Various complications like 
pay, food supply, and leadership in the team were
88involved and organization varied from place to place.
87* Ibid. Also see "Let us Organize", Mao Tse-tung 
jhsuan-chi. (1961), III, 934-935.
88. Shih I Shen-mo shih pien-kung ho oh.a,’-
kungn,tt^^sSa^;'c':L(VVhat is pien-kung and cha-kung?) 
Chieh-fan& iih-oao. Jan. 25, 1943
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These mutual-aid teams in their formative 
stage had actually developed in the village in China 
for generations, hut it was the Communists who took 
positive steps to turn them into highly organized 
economic production teams in the period 1943 onwards, 
as an essential step against Japanese economic pressure 
and the various kin$s of natural catastrophes* They 
were in fact the forerunners of the co-operative farms 
and the practice of collectivization developed in the
QQ
post-1949 period* y As for the promotion of co-oper­
ation between the labour and armed forces, the CCP 
utilized the conventional method of creating models and 
heroes , so that their examples could be followed by 
all* In 1943, the model example of such co-operation 
was in ry'orth-west Shansi and the hero was Chang Ch*u- 
yuan^t^Ah Chang was the commander of a militia de- 
tachment and also secretary of the peasants1 associa­
tion in a village in Hing-wu, a guerrilla area fre­
quented by the Japanese. He organized his militia 
into thirteen units with each of them having at least 
one cadre, who most likely came from the peasants* 
association. With these units as the nucleus, Chang 
began to absorb the rest of the labour hands into
89- Bee preface of Shih Ching-tang,et.al., Source 
Material* * .Agricultural Co-onex^ative
I, 1*
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mutual-aid teams# By harvest time 194-3, it was
claimed in Changfs village that 1,500 pieces of work 
which would have heen required to he done by labour 
hands at other times, were saved, and only 2 shih of 
grain were taken away by the enemy, as against 50 in 
1942.90
(Dhe. efficiency and success of Chang Ch'u yuan's 
village wa$by no means common phenomena in the north 
Ghina bases in 194-3, but results of the co-operation 
between labour and armed forces had convinced the 
CCPCC of the practicability of undertaking a full- 
scale economic production campaign in the front line*, 
i*e*, in the bases* fhus when the CCP Central Polit­
buro promulgated the all important directive specify­
ing a ten-point programme for 194-4- on October 1, 194-3, 
it stipulated the urgency and necessity to launch
op
a full-scale economic production drive• It was
progress made in the rent and interest reduction 
campaign, in which peasant consciousness was aroused, 
together with the achievements in the organization of 
the various people's armed bands, which prepared the
90* Let Us Organize, (ChinrSui), 129-132
91* Por the directive, see Chieh-fang nih-uao*
Oct* 1, 194-3*
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way for various campaigns and ambitious programmes 
in 1944* and 194-5* Apart from the launching of the 
economic campaign, the COP also promoted from early 
194-4 onwards a movement to further good relations 
between the army, the administration?and the people, 
with the party playing the role of leader in maintain­
ing harmony between the various organizations 
qp
concerned*y
92* Por details of the launching of this movement in
a) the Shansi-Suiyuan area, see Chi eh-fang- .iih-
pao, Jan* 2, 194*4
b) the (T'ai Hang area see Ohieh-fang ^iih-nao*
Dec* 31, 1943
c) the Shansi-Chahar-Hop ei base, see Chieh-f an& 
n rh-D ao * Jan * 8, 194*4
d) the Shantung base, see Chi eh-fang ,iih-pao 
Jan. 9* 1944*
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The Changing Situation in ITorth China, 1945*
The Cheng Feng Movement up to the end of 1943 had 
made it possible for the COP and its cadres to maintain 
leadership in the various bases of north China. At 
the top level, although there might still have been 
scattered cases of independent tendencies like warlord- 
ism, it could still be said that the party had on the 
whole persuaded senior army commanders to co-operate 
according to the principle of the army under the party* 
More important still, the party had succeeded in allying 
itself with peasants in the village in various mass 
mobilization programmes. Instead of being the mere 
prey of Japanese attacks, the village by the end of 1945 
became the base from which the CGP, with the staunch 
support of its prot^g^s, could launch counter-offensivesa 
against the Japanese and the puppets.
By the second half of 1943, obvious changes were 
visible in the war between the Japanese and the 
Communists in $[orth China. The Japanese Army began 
to feel the effect of a two-pronged COP offensive 
aiming at political and military counteractions. Before 
going into these new OOP manoeuvres, it is necessary to 
survey Japan*s fate in the Pacific war, and her 
relations with the puppets in China by the end of 1942 
and early 1943, as they played an important role in
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accounting for the changing war situation in the
latter half of 1943*
In the summer of 194-2, Japan's advance in the
Pacific was checked, and in June, she experienced her
first defeat at Midway, By the end of the same year
she was Beginning to be forced back from some of the
qx
Pacific islands, This had two important effects on 
the development in north China# First, it became 
apparent that the Japanese had to withdraw troops from 
horth China to sustain the counter-offensives launched 
by allied troops in the Pacific, Japanese military 
reports in the period September 194-3 ~ June 1944* indi­
cated that there was a partial withdrawal of Japanese 
troops fx^ om ilorth China* Second, Japan's changing 
fortune in the Pacific war made it necessary for her 
to depend more on hex* sponsored governments in China 
for moral and military support (military in the sense 
that puppet troops could relieve Japan of some
93* The Japan Biographical Research Department,
The Japan Biographical. FncycIonaedia and Who's Who, 
Tokyo, the Rengo Press, 1958 > 205*
94, Headquarters, North China Special Patrpl ^ Garrip on, 
dai ikki sakusen sento shdfao » ^  
“(Detailed Report of Military Operations of 
Japanese Garrison against Chinese Troops in North 
China), Sept* 20, 1943 - June 9, 1944 
R 134, T 1252, P 52708, 52726.
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responsibilities in local defence in the occupied 
area)* This new Japan-puppet relationship was evident 
in January 1943 • On January 9, Japan made Wang Ching- 
wei's National Government, which claimed central 
control over all occupied China, declare war on Britain 
and the United States of imerica* In return, Japan 
relinquished her extraterritorial rights and Concess­
ions in China.^ In addition, Wang Ching-wei obtained 
further concessions in a secret agreement with Japan 
made in December, 1942.^ The final effort on Wang's 
part at autonomous rule under Japan, was the conclusion 
of the Pact of Alliance between Japan and his govern­
ment on October 30, 1943» which extended to him further 
rights and future promises,^ The sum total of this
new Japan-puppet relationship was greater participation 
of the puppets in the administration of the occupied 
area. When applied to North China, it meant that the 
North China Political Council was given a freer hand
95* Nan-hua ,1ih-pao (Hong Kong), Jan. 10, 1943; also 
see International Military Tribunal for the Par 
Past, Exhibit No. 2610, Defence Document No.643,
S5H7-22389.
96. Por the secret agreements, see Lee Ngoh, The 
Later Career of Wang: Ching-wei 135-1867”
97. International Military Tribunal for the Par 
B m V T m B I t  No’7^ *5661 Wd&g-dU^l'oh^Jbcument No.
1451-E, 22398.
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in local defence, especially after the partial 
withdrawal of Japanese troops in 194-3. This with­
drawal, which might have been welcomed by the puppets 
at other times as further concessions on Japan’s part, 
turned out to be disadvantageous to the North Ohina 
Political Council, as it became an easy prey of the 
expanding CCP.
What happened in 194-3 was that the CCP did take 
advantage of the receding Japanese strength in China, 
and launched political and military offensives. In 
the political offensive, the main target was the 
puppets, and party cadres leading the militia in pro­
paganda campaigns aimed at the defection of puppet
98troops in the different bases. The partial withdrawal 
of Japanese troops meant that puppet troops were not 
given sufficient military support, and Japanese 
military reports indicated an obvious deterioration in 
puppet morale. In addition, people in the occupied
98. The CCP political offensives in 194-3 had in fact 
been started since the second half of 194-2.
The editorial in Chieh-fang; .iih-nao on July 22, 
194-2, for instance, announced the launching of a 
political campaign to win over the puppet troops. 
A report in T'ai Hang in October, 194-2 Indicated 
that it was the party bureau and the political 
department of the army which provided leadership 
for the militia in the launching of political 
offensives. See Chi eh-fang?; nih-oao. October 28, 
194-2.
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area were aware of the changing situation, and there­
fore began to lose whatever faith they had in the 
puppet regimes. By September 1943 onwards, Japanese 
military reports admitted of extensive CGP success in 
persuading puppets to defect to the Communist camp. ^9 
It is interesting to note that whilst the CCP Was 
scoring success against the puppets, KMT troops fight­
ing guerrilla war with the Japanese in $orth China 
defected in 1943 in the greatest number since the war 
to the Japanese and the puppets. For instance, Pang 
Ping-huan, KMT deputy-commander of the Hopei- 
Chahar war-zone, and Sun Tien-ying, commander of 
the Fifth Army, defected to the Japanese together with 
their troops in April 1943 , after being captured 
by the Japanese.
99* Headquarters, North China Special Patrol Garrison, 
Detailed Report of Military Operations of 
Japanese Garrison Against Chinese Troons in 
North China. September 20. 1943 - June 9. 1944.
B 134, T 1232, F 32701-52705, 52708, 52722, and 
52726. The above account especially described 
the defection of puppet troops in Central Hopei, 
the Hopei-Shantung border region and the 
T faiyuan area.
100. For a summary of KMT commanders who defected to 
the Japanese 1941-1943, see Qhieh-fanff ,iih-~pao 
Aug. 13, 1943*
274
The political offensives definitely contributed
to further OGP military counter-action against the
Japanese* The model districts set up by the Japanese,
the road-protection campaign, and the founding of the
Ai-hu villages, which caused so much COP hardship
101in 1941-1942, began to give way to the rising tide 
of CCP expansion in 1943* Tremendous activities 
were particularly undertaken by the CCP against com­
munication lines, with the people*s armed bands perform-
102ing their duty in sabotage work* Military reports 
of the Japanese Army in September 1943-June 1944 
recorded an upsurge of CCP military offensives, extend­
ing from Shantung, and eastern Hopei eastward across 
the Hopei-Shantung border, central and western Hopei,
101. See chapter four, £13^165*
102. For sabotage activities undertaken by the 
militia in Hopei and Shansi see Second Company, 
1st Patrol Regiment, North China Special Patrol 
Garr i s on, Kahoku~sho Ranken shuhen chiku dai 
ikki s ent0 sh$ho - n ^ ^ n ^ y ^ ^ ^ y f t o e t a i  1 ed 
Reports on Fighting in Luanhsien Area of Hopei), 
Sept. 6, 1943 - June 10, 1944 R 134, T 1251,
P.52636-52637; and Headquarters, North China 
Special Patrol Garrison, Detailed Report on 
Military Operations.. <» in North China* Sent.
1943 - June 1944. R 134.T 1252,P. 52703.
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105to the I'aiyuan area in Shansi.
The purpose of this chapter has been to indicate 
that whilst Cheng Feng reforms had strengthened unity 
and discipline within the party in the bases, CCP 
leadership had also succeeded through its many per­
severing efforts, mass mobilization programmes, and 
Cheng Feng indoctrination, in organizing effective 
resistance against the Japanese. The crucial point 
to note here is the CCP also succeeded in directing 
its anti-Japanese programmes into channels best suited 
for its own aggrandizement. In other words, the CCP 
not only mobilized the peasants under the anti- 
Japanese front, but also indoctrinated them according 
to principles of the national-democratic revolution, 
which by 194-5 amounted to Maofs sinification of 
Marxist-Leninism. Undoubtedly, peasant nationalism 
was the most dynamic force in the war of resistance, 
and the relentless Japanese economic and military 
pressure on the CCP bases in the period 194-1-194-2 
described in chapter IF clearly indicated how Japanese
103. For Japanese report on the expanding CCP 
military strength in Forth China, see 
Headquarters, Forth China Special Patrol 
Garrison, Detailed Report on Military 
Operations ... in Forth China. Sept. 194-5- 
June 194-4. R 134-, T 1252, F. 52701-52705, 
52708, and 52722-52726.
brutality must have won the hatred and contempt of 
the peasants, However, it is one thing to have 
peasant nationalism aroused and quite another to 
organise this dynamic force effectively against the 
Japanese or for other purposes, (This is where the
OOP came in to play the important role as the organ­
izer and champion of the peasantry. The various 
CCP programmes described in this chapter indicated how 
the Communists directed peasant nationalism, and 
peasant resentment of landlord exploitation, into
Communist orient d channels, thus succeeding not
only in mobilizing the peasants to withstand the 
Japanese attacks, but also in winning over the 
peasantry as the staunch supporters of its cause 
of expansion in the bases of China. Consequently, 
the CCP had by the end of 194*3 placed itself in a 
strong position in terms of mass support in anticipa­




The explanation of GCP success in expand­
ing the four bases in north China during the Sino-Japanese 
war is effective party leadership based on the principle 
of democratic-centralism* The staunch support of the CCP 
army for the party also constituted an important factor# 
Whilst the party at the top level was responsible for 
the direction of orders and general principles to be 
followed in the party hierarchy, the party-branch in 
the village undertook the difficult task of mobilizing 
the people from below* It was the party sub-bureaux in 
the four bases with power delegated from Xenan which 
united all anti-Japanese forces, from the poor peasants 
to the bourgeoisie, while keeping the army under control 
at the same time* Indepedent tendencies within the va­
rious army units were inevitable, especially when they 
were relied on for the conduct of the war of resistance, 
but the party*s efforts to reassert its authority and 
leadership in the Cheng Peng period had on the whole 
succeeded in keeping these indepedent tendencies in check, 
as was described in chapter five*
2 7 8
It was the maintenance of good relations 
"between Ye nan and the top level authorities in the va­
rious "bases which facilitated the success of the party 
leadership. The majority of the leaders "behind the enemy 
lines, especially the sub-bureau secretaries, political 
commissars and military commanders of the former First 
Front Army, consistently looked to Mao Tse-tung for lea­
dership and inspiration, and loyally worked for the reali­
zation of the national-democratic revolution# In addition, 
there was no indication of any significant influence 
exercised by Wang Mingfs faction in the bases# This means 
that during the Cheng Feng period, reform programmes 
there were basically different from those enforced in 
Yenan, in that they were mainly concentrated on the 
strengthening of party leadership in resistance to Japan, 
without the emphasis on the removal of non-Maoists 
(which was seen in the Communist headquarters*
The delegation of power by the party central 
in Yenan to trustworthy senior cadres and administrators in 
the bases also meant that the latter had good opportuni­
ties for exercising their talent and initiative in streng­
thening Communist power in particular regions# For instance.
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P'eng Chen in the Pei-ytteh area and Peng Hsiao-p*ing in 
T!ai Hang demonstrated their capability in mobilizing 
the peasants to support the Communist anti-Japanese 
cause« Similarly, military commanders like Xiu Po-chfeng 
in the Shansi-Hope i-Shantung-Honan base and Hieh Jung- 
chen in the Shansii-Chahar-Hopei base built up a seasoned 
peasant army which gained tremendous experience from the 
eight years of war* The discipline and morale of the 
OOP army proved to be much superior to its KMT counter­
parts in the civil war in 1946-I949, mainly because of 
the successful indoctrination of the political depart­
ments attached to the army units, especially in the Cheng 
Peng period. It is not surprising to find that most 
of the leading COP figures in the bases are to be found 
among the chief architects of the Chinese Peoplefs Re­
public after its establishment in 1949* The ascendancy 
of P'eng Chen, leng Hsiao-pfing, Lu Ting-i and others 
in the party, and the military prowess of commanders 
like P'eng Te-huai as demonstrated in the Korean War, 
are some examples. With the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution in August 1966, most of these CCP leaders
2 8 0
who had fought bitterly against the Japanese behind the 
front lines remained in the limelight, no matter whether 
they were Maoists, or supporters of the Chinese 
Khrushchev H »
In practical terms, CCP leadership in 
the bases achieved some crucial results s it amassed the 
support of the peasants under the banner of the United 
Front, aroused national consciousness in the countryside, 
and more important still, organized the population f'or 
the purpose of Communist expansion in China. In the first 
phase of development in the bases, up to 1940, the CCP 
had successfully broken through the hsien barrier to 
establish effective control in the administrative vil­
lage. Here the party-branch established its strength 
and authority • Village elections were held expensively 
in 1940 in the four bases In north China, with a view to 
entrusting greater local power to the OOP's prot^gds, 
that is, the tenants and poor peasants, as was seen in 
chapter three, fhe mild land policy in this period proved 
to be a prudent measure, as by securing cooperation from 
the rich peasants and landlords in a United Front it 
contributed to greater Communist strength in resistance
2 8 1
to Japan* Hie drawback to this policy was that the 
absence of struggles against landlords meant that the 
OOP had not yet been able to arouse fully the political 
consciousness of tenants and poor peasants, which was 
crucial to the success of mass mobilization* Another 
difficulty in this period was the low standard of edn™ 
cation of village cadres, which tended to impede coordina­
tion with the party and the administration at higher 
levels*
The initial success up to 1940 was 
challenged by the Japanese in 1941-1942, when tremendous 
military and economic pressure from the latter caused a 
reduction in the strength and territories of the COP 
bases* The Japanese in these two years fully realized 
that the effective means of counteracting'Communist 
power was to strike at the OOP source of strength, that 
is, t he c ountry s id e * Hilit ary ope r ati on s and e c onomic 
blockades against the Communists were highly localized, 
with elaborate organizations set up in villages in attempts 
to counteract COP success at this basic level* These were 
described in chapter four* As long as these efforts were 
well supported by the army, the Japanese did score some 
success in their rural struggle with the Communists, who
2 8 2
suffered losses in 1941"!942* However? the fact that the 
Japanese Array could not afford? for reasons explained 
in chapter six? to continue to apply effective pressure 
against the GOP bases? proved eventually to be disastrous 
to Japan* Pirst? she lost the chance of challenging the 
authority of the Communists in the village. Y/orse still? 
her punitive campaigns against the bases inevitably aliena­
ted the 0hi nes e pe asants * In ad di t i on ? the G ommuni s t s 
who had become fully aware of the Japanese menace began 
to strengthen their position through the introd.uction 
of the Oheng Peng Movement? with a strong emphasis on 
full-scale mass mobilization*
During the Cheng Peng period? the 
various party reforms in the bases were concentrated 
on the training of cadres and the maintenance of party 
discipline? thus making the Communists better equipped 
to launch major campaigns from late 1942 onwards. The 
greatest incentive to peasant consciousness was provided 
by the CCP revision of land policy? starting from 1942? 
which resulted in r©invigorating the rent and interest 
reduction campaign* The COP began to side with the tenants 
and poor peasants in their struggle against the landlords? 
although the seizure and redistribution of land were not
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yet allowed. Peasant consciousness thus aroused was 
also directed into specific channels. Peasants attracted 
to the Communist cause were organized into bodies? like 
the mutual-aid labour teams and people’s armed forces 
of various descriptions, which expanded tremendously in 
1943* The latter in particular had both military and 
political significance, as the CCP could not only streng­
then local defence, but also mobilize the armed peasants 
to support specific political campaigns*
It must be emphasized again that the vil­
lage occupied a unique position in the bases throughout 
the war as the basic level at which the elaborate process 
of rallying support from the peasants was actually under­
taken* In regard to the impact of the Cheng Peng Movement 
on the village behind the enemy lines, it should be noted 
that the ideological reorientation as represented by 
Mao’s sinification of Marxism-Leninism had no significant 
relevance at this level. The party-branch in the village 
mainly devoted itself to the introduction of Cheng Peng 
programmes which concentrated on the supervising of 
mass organizations, rent-reduction campaigns,the produc­
tion drive, and the maintenance of control over and 
good relations with the company units, as was indicated 
in chapter six.
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The fact that the expansion of the COP 
in terras of territory, as well as military and political 
strengths, during the eight years of resistance contri­
buted to the Communist triumph over the KMT in 1949 is 
well known. It is hoped that this thesis has contributed 
to a deeper understanding of how the CCP succeeded in 
allying itself with, and organizing, the peasants behind 
the Japanese lines, thus achieving a position from which 
it could control the countryside in north China* This 
rural control indeed proved to be vital to the Communists 
in their civil war with the KMT in 1946-1949* First, the 
various OOP bases offered the Communists convenient access 
to strategic regions in north China immediately after 
the surrender of Japan. For instance, troops under Lin 
Piao marched into Manchuria, whilst Liu Po-ch*engfs forces 
moved into areas north of the Yellow River in Honan. Fur- 
thermore, the Communist peasant army emerged from its 
eight years of apprenticeship, having been indoctrinated 
and disciplined by the party, and proved its mettle in 
the ensuing civil war. In the same way that they had 
succeeded in leading the peasant army to triumph over 
the Japanese, so the party, and for that matter, Mao, 
also directed the four newly organized CCP field armies 
to their final victory over the KMT in I949«
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Lastly, it should he noted that many 
programmes and policies enforced in the CCP bases during 
the war of resistance offered valuable experience to 
the new People!s Republic in later years . Perhaps it 
is sufficient here to quote two examples* First, the 
organization of the mutual-aid teams was in fact a step 
preparatory to collectivization and the organization 
of communes* Second, the reinvigoration of the rent and 
interest campaign, which succeeded in amassing a tremen­
dous peasant following, must have given the CCP confidence 
in enforcing the revolutionary policy of redistributing 
land after 1947 and in the early years of the new People*s 
Republic* Thus a knowledge of the COP wartime bases is 
significant for the understanding of later Communist 
policy, as well as for the study of the processes by 
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Other Communist Sources 
Japanese Army Archives
II, Other Chinese Sources
III, Western Works
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I * Primary Materials
A* Chieh-fang jih-paofe^feLiberation Daily) Yenan, 
May 1941 - August 1945*
This newspaper represents the mouthpiece of the 
CCP during the Sino™Japanese war. It "began publication 
in 1941 as a continuation of the Chieh-fang Weekly 1937 
-1941- The latter contained mostly important speeches 
and articles by leading Communist figures and declar­
ations of the CCP, but its scope was certainly limited 
by the fact that it was only a weekly periodical. On 
the other hand, its successor, the Daily, was during 
the greater part of its publication a four-page paper.
It is the most authoritative source available in tracing 
the development of the CCP movement in the period 1937- 
1945, b:6th in the Shensi-Kansu-Highsia border govern­
ment and the various bases in north and central China. 
Being the party mouthpiece, it is inevitable that a great 
deal of coverage was given to propaganda. However, care­
ful examination of the newspaper makes it possible for 
one to differentiate between serious party policies, 
directives, investigations and organizational instructions 
from anti-Japanese news aiming at boosting the morale 
of the army and the people. In the Cheng Peng period 
in particular, the Daily gave a great deal of attention 
to directives and special investigations aiming at 
achieving intra-party reforms rather than propaganda.
As far as information extracted from the Daily as source 
material for this thesis is concerned, it can be generally 
divided into three categories:
i). Official OOP directives and policies, and articles
by leading CCP figures.
The editorial, very often drafted by CCP leaders, 
was where important CCP policies and laws were drafted 
and published. Important directives of the CCP Central
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Politburo and the various party bureaux and sub­
bureaux also appeared as headlines. About equal emphasis 
was given to news on the development of the Shen-Kan-hing 
border region and the other bases in north China, and 
publicity was inevitable in reports given. When the 
different movements and campaigns were launched by the 
CCP, the Daily became the main organ to rally the 
support of the people, and a great dead, of publicity was 
also given. Significant articles by leading Communists 
like Chu leh, K*ang Sheng, M e h  Jung-chen, Lin Piao,
P'eng Cheng, and of course, Mao, were also published, 
normally with a specific objective, e.g., on Cheng Peng 
programmes, or guerrilla tactics in specified areas.
Coverage was given to reports of investigations 
on special aspects and problems in the north China 
bases. Emphasis was given to land problems and land- 
lord-tenant relations, especially in the Cheng Peng 
period. Detailed statistical surveys of the class 
structure in special areas, and the percentage of land 
held by the different classes were also published, with 
information provided by the various border governments 
in north China. Some of these reports were represent­
ative in nature in that surveys were taken from a cross- 
section of villages or hsien in a certain region.
Senior party cadres like P*eng Chen also contributed art­
icles on topics like problems involved in the rent- 
reduction campaign and landlord-tenant relations. In­
formation of this kind contributes tremendously to the 
understanding of the economic situation in wartime 
China, especially in north China.
iii). Propaganda materials
As the party mouthpiece, the Daily inevitably 
published a great deal of propaganda material, with 
the obvious objective of maintaining good morale in the
294
armed forces, strengthening the confidence of the people, 
and discrediting the enemies. Anti™Japanese campaigns, 
especially victorious ones, no matter how minor, were 
given detailed descriptions* Phis is especially so from 
1943 onwards, when CCO? troops were heginning to launch 
offensives against the Japanese* When CCP-KFT relations 
deteriorated, the Daily kept denouncing KMl actions*
For instance, in July"T943, when skirmishes "between the 
Shen-Kan-Hing garrison and the Ilvil troops under Hu Tsung- 
nan took place in Shensi,the Daily devoted a great deal 
of space to anti-KMT propaganda throughout the months 
July to September*
” A summary of the political offensive in Hfai Hang”, 
October 28, 1942*
” A survey in north-west Shansi”, April 20, 1942*
” GOP Central resolution on the method of leadership”,
(passed by the Central Politburo on June I, 1943) 
June 4, 1943*
” COP instructions on the method of investigations”,
June 4, 1943*
” CCPCO’s resolution on investigations and research”, 
September 8, 1941®
” Chan-tou,chung %chfeng-chLang ti Chin-sui pien-ch1& ”,
( The Shansi-Suiyuan
border region growing up from combats) July 16- 
17, 1944*
” Ohia-ch'iang tang-hsing ti tuan-lien”,
( 1 o strengthen the training of party 
characteristics), editorial, September 6, 1941*
” Chin~Ch1 a-Ch^ pien^ch *ti ts ! an-i-hui ti chTeng-kung” ,
hXJ ( Phe success of 
the assembly'in the Shansi-Ohahar-Hopei Border 
Region), editorial, March 10, 1943*
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u Ghin-ti ch’iang-hua chih«ann p
( The reinforcement of law and order undertaken 
by the enemy in Shansi), December 26, 1941*
n Ghin-ti^ch’iang-hua cluh-an yin-mou’1, ^  [J/ -
( The treachery of reinforcing law and order 
undertaken by the enemy in Shansi), Aug* 11, 1941*
n Ohu Chin hsi-pei lin-ts ’ an-lmi n,
(Congratulations to the ITorth-west Shansi Irovi- 
sional Assembly), editorial, Nov* 4, 1942*
n Chu~li yu min-ping n, ( The main strength
and the militia), November 2, 1942*
Ghu TeMjfiJ1 Pa™lu-cMtn hsin-ssu-cli$lnKk ’angrchun ti ssu 
cnou-nien", ✓ ^  ^  v?7
(The fourth anniversary of the war of resistance 
undertaken by the 8th Route Army and the hew 
pourth Army), July 7, 1941*
Chung-cheng hsftan-ch’uan pu Phfb £*0340 9 M’Huo-ytteh
yu ti-hou chan-ch'ang ti mi n-pi ng %
(The militia who are active in the 
battle field behind enemy lines), July 8, 1944*
Ghung Chf ing-s,he ^  f n Hua-pei ch’ing-ytin tung~
t ’ailtfA t ( Activities of the youth move1
ment in north China), .“February 3, 1942#
U0hung-kung chung-yang cheng-c hih-cM kuan-yu chien-tsu 
sheng-ch’an yung-cheng ai-min chi hsttan-ch ’uan 
shih-ta cheng-ts fe ■ti chih-shih11,
( The directive of the CCP Central Politburo on rent
reduction, economic production, support for the 
administration and care for the people, and the 
ten principal policies of publicity) October I, 
1943 * 1
t! Ohung-kung chung-yang kuan-yu k ’axig-Jih ken-cM-ti tfu- 
ti cheng-ts ’ e t'g chdeh^tingn, 4x 8
( CCP Central's resolu- 
tiori. on land policy in the anti-Japanese bases), 
^February 6, 1942
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" Chung-kung chung-yang kuan-yu t'iao-ch'a yen-chiu.
ti ch&eh-ting" , %_ '% ^  V5L.„
( OCPCG1s resolution on investigations and re­
search), September 8, I94I*
" ■ Directions of the Painty Bureau for north-west Shansi",
October 31? 1942*
" Directives of the OOP Bureau in the Shansi-Qhahar-Hopei 
base", March 18, 1942*
" Fan-tui kuan-liao chu-i", (In opposi­
tion to bureaucratism), editorial, December 18, 
1942*
Hou Shen " Hsin Shan-tung ti oh1ang-ch'eng",
<--\- ~|c ( The growth of
new Shantung), July 21, 1944*
Hsiang Sheng , " Chin-Oh’a-Ohi pien-ch^ -cheng
chien-she chung- ti cha.ng-chh " ,^f
( Spectacular 
progress in the rinancial'reconstruction of the 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region), September 
7, 1941.
Hstt Fan-tlng ^  J , « Ohih Shan-'hsig tu-huang-ti^ ___ ^
Yen? Hsi-shan^tjL^rf eng wu-chien-yen shu" ,h^ n-v\iojL=t''p 
jk5)j:£)OA ^ ( £ five-thousand-word letter
to Yen Hsi-shan, the local tyrant of Shansi),
August 24, 1944*
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Huang ChieTa-tfo Jih-dgbu tsai Hua-pei tsui-chin
ti tung-t1 ai M, )3 =^f ^
( Recent activities of the Japanese "bandits in 
north China), February 13, 1942.
_jiL
Huang Wei-wen Jk ^ a~, 1 Kuan-3m  ke.n-chtt.-ti cMen-tsu 
chien-hs;i. ti i-hsieh ts1 ai-liao",
5f i \ A 3 - 5~ ( Some sources on the
reduction of rent and interest in the bases), 
February 11, 1942.
u I-erh-chiu shih yu Chip.-Chi-Lu-Yu pienr~ohftt ", — —
litz ( T h e  I 2 9 t h
Division and the Shasosi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan 
Border Region), August 14, 1944*
1 Kai-ch!in ling-tao tso-feng ti i,-t\en chien-i11,
2 1)~~ f U k ( Some
suggestions of reforms regarding the attitude of 
leadership),editorial, September 28,1942.
1 K* ai-chan tui ti cheng-chih loing-shih" , "VJ ^
lEoC-© ( To launch political offensives
against the enemy), editorial,July 22, 1942.
2 9 8
” KMang-Jih ken-chi^ tl-ti min-chung t'uan-ti ti hsing-chih 
ho jen-wu”, jVii^trtdb
( The nature and responsibilities of mass organiza­
tions in the anti-Japanese bases)? editorial? 
September 29? 1942#
ICfang Sheng'^.i ? M Ti-ch1 ang kung-nung, tung-chih 
hsieh wen-chang”,
(To promote essay-writings amongst cadres of 
peasant and proletariat origin) ? Oct* 4? 1942*
1 Kao-kan hui yu cheng-feng yiftn-tung1* ?
( The senior cadres* conference and the Oheng Feng 
Movement)? editorial? March 4? 1943*
Leng Ping / i 77jh ?ia ,f ,Chieh-sha0 Chin-Ghi-Lu-Yu pien-ch* tt” ?
\ | td~ B & J
( To introduce the Shansi-IIopei-Shantung-Honan Bor­
der Begion), March 23? 1942*
Li Ghe.n^Jp ? ” I-erh-ling shih shih-chih i-ko-ytteh 
cheng-feng wen-chien hstteh-hsi chung-ehiehM,
—  jz, ( A report
of one month* s study of- Chong Feng documents by 
the divisional staff of the 120th. Division)?
November 9? 1942*
Lin Feng 9 ” Ohien-ch'ih ti-hou k fang-chan_ ti Chin
hsi-pei ken-chil-ti u ?
( The north-west Shansi base persisting in the 
war of resistance behind enemy lines)? July 8? 1944*
:u M n  I i-ko ts'un-chuang chtln-chung kung-tso ti cheng-lin?
( Beforms in the work of mass mobilization in a 
village in Lin 1 )? June 13? 1943*
Liu po-ch* eng 'jf’jlfe ?7% ” Ti-hou k'ang-chan ti chan-shu 
wen-tiH ? (Tactical
problems c onc e rning re s i st anc e behi nd enemy li ne s)? 
July 7 ? 1943 *
Lo Jui -c h * ing Jhij^® P? ” On party -mas s e s re lati ons1 ?Ivl ay 24 ? 
1942* 1
lu Ting-i ? ?  1 The reason why the rectification of 
the three unorthodox tendencies is an ideological 
revolution in the party”? May 13? 1942*
Mao Tse-tung? "Tsu-chi ch’i-lai” ? (Let
us organize), December 2? 1943*
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jfieh Jung-chen^ 1 :)^ ji 7 Ch’uan-mien chan-k7 ai cheng-tun^ 
san-feng ;bi hstjph-hsi yu cliieu^ cli!ay 
41U—)1\ gPg (0]o launch a full-scale
study and review on the rectification of the 
three tendencies), August 27? 1942*
Horth-west Shansi Commissioner!s Office* 7 Hsing-hsien 
ts7un-ch7 ang ts 1 e-yen7 ? 3%y^ jr^
( Xests on village chiefs of Using hsien), March 
1, 1942*
7 On army Cheng Feng programmes in the Shansi-Chahar- 
Hopei base11, September 27? 1942*
7 On KM?-CCP clashes since 193871, September 20, 1943*
7 On north-west Shansi77, November 17? 1942*
1 On party formalism in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base77, 
September XI? 1942*
7 On party leadership71? editorial, October 20? 1942*
71 On rent reduction in K Tolan77, December 16, 1943*
1 On rent reduction in Idnnan7 ? December 18, 194*3
7 On rent reduction in linnan and Linhsien", October 28,
1943*
7 On rent reduction in Hingwu1*,November 25? 1943*
7 On the collection of revenue and party instructions77, 
November 16,1941*
7 On the Provisional Assembly and administrative divi­
sions in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan border 
region7*, July 21, I94I*
7 On the Provisional Assembly in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung- 
Honan base77, July 12, 1941*
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” On the rent reduction rally in Using1 hsien1’, January 14, 
1944*
” On the rent reduction rally in Lin Hsien”, October 18, 
1943 *
” On the secret societies and Japan”, February 12, 1942*
” On the senior cadres? conference”, January 31, 1943*
” On the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Government ”, 
July 25, 1941 *
P’eng Chen-vyt , ” JCung-nung kan-pu yao hsueh wen-hua”,
( Feasant and proletariat 
cadres should study culture) January 16, 1943*
, ” On understanding the spirit and substance 
■"of the 22 documents”, May 14, 1942*
Shih I ” Shen-rao shih pien-kung ho cha-kung”,
(What is pien-kung and cha-kung?),
January 23, 1943*
Bun Yuan-fan 9 u pa™ni e n chTeng-kang ti Chin-0hf a-
Chi pien-ch’tl |£v
( The Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region becoming 
like steel after numerous tests) July 10, 1944*
” Tang-ti ling-tao pi-sui i-yuan-hua*1 j ^ P O ’ o.-)uiK, 
(There must be uniformity in party leadership), 
editorial, October 24, 1942*
r
Tao Chu)s^ )^% , ” Bup murchtan t^-hou chan-cheng ti tfe-
tien” ^  ( On the characteristics 
of the present war behind enemy lines) May 3,
1943 *, w Tsai-t’an cheng-ping chien-cheng”, y N
( A further talk on the policy to cut 
troops and simplify the administration),June 25, 
1942 *
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" The decree of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border 
Government '*, March 30 ,1942 *
H riThe defection of KMT commanders1’, August 13? 1943*
” The movement to further good relations Between the
army, the administration, and the people in 
the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Base1', January 8,1944*
” The movement to further good relations Between the
army, the administration, and the people in 
the Shansi-Suiyuan area", January 2, 1944*
” The movement to further good relations Between the army, 
the administration, and the people in the 
Shantung Base’1, January 9? 1944*
” The movement to further good relaHons Between the 
army, the administration, and the people 
in the T'ai Hang area", December 31? 1943*
1 The 12th administrative conference of the Shansi- 
Hopei-Shantung-IIonan Border Goverrnient",
January 27,1942.
" Ti-hou yu-chi chan-cheng ti hsin jen-wu",
( The new duty of guerrilla 
tactics Behind enemy lines), editorial,
December 7, I94I*
. i
Ti Huaf\^and Hsfteh Hui ” Ti-k'ou tsai Hua-pei
/ ' ti ch'jlang-hua chih-an ytln-tung",
■9 V:t5 'i-tllt) ( The enemy’s Movement
to Restore Law and Order), January 15? 1942.
" Ti-kao ling-tao kai-tsao tso-f engu
( To improve leadership and reform attitudes), 
editorial, November 10, 1942.
Y> -r L
" Tsui-chin Hua-pei ti-wei che.ng-chih tung-t1 ai” ;j)
 ^ ^  d T) - ( Recent political activities of




Wang Kuang-weiX 1 I^erh-ling shih cheng-feng hsueh-
hsi pao-kao", ( Report on
Gheng Feng studies in the I20th, Division) , Octo­
ber 30, 1942.
Wang Yueh-fei 7|e,1 Wo-men tsen-yang tsai- ti-hou
ken-ch&-ti chi an-she hsin-min-chu chu-i cheng- 
chih-,
( How we establish new democratic rule in the 
bases behind enemy lines), July 7? 1942.
Wei Wen 4'X, M Chin hsi-pei ti t!u-ti wen-ti1 ,-XuX
(Land problems in north-west Shansi), 
April 20, 1942.
Yeh Chien-ying , 1 Chung-kung k'ang-chan i-pan
ch1 ing-k * uang chieh-shao11, &S
( Ann introduction to the general situation of the 
CCP’s resistance), August 10, 1944*
n Yen-mi tsu-chi tsun-shou fa-chi" ,
^%&Cj(£o tighten organization and observe dis­
cipline), editorial, April 7, 1943*
Ying Yung/pVf), " Lueh-lun Chin hsi-pei ssu-cihi cheng- 
ch1 uan kung-1 s o t i cMeh-1 i en H , XF\Ib3 t VI37j£o J ^
( A brief talk on the defects 
of the administration in the Fourth District of 
north-west Shansi), July 2, 1942.
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B * Other Communist Sources
The following includes significant periodicals 
and journals published during the period 1937-1945? 
official government publications and reports of either 
the party headquarters or the various border governments 
in north China, and works by leading CCP party cadres 
and military commanders. All these sources are included 
in Chttn-tu Hsueh,- The Chinese Communist Movement, 1937- 
1949? Hoover Institution, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1962. Assessments of sources in this section 
have been given by Professor Hsueh, and the title of 
each can be traced in the index of his work.
Oh1 en Shao-yu f '/kg \k> , Ch* en Shao-yu chiu-kuo yen-lun 
hsitan-chi f B (Selected
works of Ch'en Shao-yu), Hankow, Chung-kuo ch’u- 
pan-she, 1938.
 ^4 l y  ■
Ch’en YtLa V , Tsen-yang tso i-ko kung-ch1 an-1ang
yuan / h i ( H o w  to be a Communist 
Party Member) , Canton, Hsin-hua, 1950.
’j!
Ch* eng Tzu-hua/1 0 7 , "Chi-^chung p’ing-yuan sjh.ang ti 
min-ping tou-cheng" , s (The
struggle of the militia on the plain of central 
Hopei) Chftn-chung, X, 13, (July 10, 1945) 446-450.
Chiao-tung chtba-ch'tL, cheng-chih pu (ed.),
Liang-chung tso-feng (Two styles of
Work), n.p., same, 1945*
Chieh-fang (The Liberation Yifeekly), 3-5,9,
11-23, 28-60/61, 63-68, 70-72, 74-82, 85-98/99.
101, 102, 105, 106/107, 127. 128, 130, 131/132, and 
133* Yenan, 1937-1941.
Chieh-fang-she , Cheng-feng wen-hsien
(A Collection of Rectification Documents) n.p., 1946
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(Comp.), K ' ang-Jih min-chu t 1 uns-i clian-hs i en
t c g . i l  » i — Mill 11 > u  4 *  i ■ !  ■ » ■ ■ ■  <   . W i m M  n . w  «  * . . . .  ■ >  . . .  m . . .  ^ M n  . x  ■  f i n  i n % u W
chih-nantx0 XrXfvX1 rf) C A Guide to The Ant 1- 
Japanese National Front), Il-X,n.p*, same, 
1938-1940.
Ghien-hsien yueh-k1 an ^V'K'^ t-VT'J (The Front Monthly),
5 and 6TfovT-I)ec. 1940).
Chin-Ch1 a-Chi jpi en-ch * ii hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui~'e>
It 1 "5 s (0omp,), Hsien-hsing fa~ling hui-chi
xfj\ ( a Collection of Current laws and
Ordinances), 2 vols., n.psame,1945.
Chin-Chi-lu-Yu elite-ch1 h cheng-chih p u /»•>#'&
(ed.), Sung Jen-ch'iung kuan-yu cheng-chih kung-tso
'  * *  m r i n u  11 mlfi i iw ' i r m a ~ » w i T r ir " r r i i a w r r n  ■  n  n n  \t m u i i - u  j > i i i i n . n iiil irif n i f  u r m i i  i i . i f M w y r n i ' M in i i  ~ t .  i M i ^ r n i i  n i i »i r r f - r j j r n  v n . - i r f M i M n w w i i . u i  ■ n j.i    th i n .  j  » ■ ■ ■ <  i i . a . u n w
ti pao-kao ?$?Y>rb x T J b { A Report on
PoXTFical™Work by Sung Jen-ch!iung), n.p., same, 
1947*
Chin-Chi-lu-Yu pien~chfh cheng-fu '-(■vV/V 7 ,  
Failing hui-pien (Oollected laws and
OrdTnances n  n.p., same, 1942 •
i Collected laws and Ordinances. 2nd ed., n.p., 
same, I94&V
r>  ? .? !
Chin-Chi-lu-Yu gi en-ch t fiao~ch!a yen-chiu shih
1 % h)CX, . Kuo-min ching-chi t 1 iao-ch* a chT u- 
pu yen-chiu )gj a:t4 J' (pFelTminary
Investigation of The People1s livelihood and 
Bconomy), n.p., T 1ao-fen,1944*
Chin-Chi-lu-Yu Yuan-chtt tzu-chueh t'uan-chieh vta-tung
XB^perience of the Voluntary Cooperation Campaign 
at Yuanchli in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Bor­
der Region),n.p .,n.pub.,n.d..
Chin-jih chih mo-t s T a wen-ti ^  ( Today's
r . r  invil i runr^ll* i wiiiwhmiiiiii.. ii i » iT.rmM-rwn*rTiiHil w t  m m  w ill ■■HIM ■— m m  m^i.w  y I > v
Rift Problems;,n.p., Chin-pu,1940.
Chu T eh? , lun Chieh-f ang-ch * U chan-ch! ang^ T ^ &f
(On the"Battle Fields of the liberated Areas), 
n.p., chieh-fang-she, 1949*
Chte-chung~ ^ V ( The Masses), I, 13; II, 11,12,14; III, 
~TC3, 6/7-11, 20-23, 25; IV, 1-6, 14,18; V,6,7, 9- 
10,11; VIII 1/2-5, 8-18; IX, 13,14; X,1-13,(March 
1938- July 1945), Hankow and Chungking.
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chen ti cMeh-ting.f j ij i—iiuw iiiinw ii jim « iinwrfnw*
ken-chh ti t fu-
3^h);^L(lhe OOP’s Decision Concerning land Policy 
in the Anti-Japanese Basies ), n.p* ,n*pub* ,1942*
Chung-kuo chieh-fang ch’tl 
pei wei™yuan hui pi
jen-min tai-piao hui-i ch * ou-






'o-hstieh yuan, li-shih yen-chiu so,




/J-thV b i/uuumyui/s ur une
Assembly of the Shensi-Kansu-lIinghsia Border 
Region), Peking, K fo-hstteh, 1958*
■chan wen-0 hung-kuo kung-ch*an~tang ^ l®  
hsien (Colle
thiPwar of Resistance ), Shanghai, Ilung-mien 
ch1 u-pan™ she , 1946 •
*. -  v  i u x x a .i i  u x i—
ection of Articles during
Chung-kuo kung-ch*an-tang, Ohin-Ch1 a-0hi chung-yang chit,
hstlan-ch *uan pu ^4f^7. ,  f*u~ti cheng-ts*e
c hung-yao we n-c hi e n hui-chi rt -± ^
~C“qoXlected ImpoFEaixF^ Bocuiiients on land Policy), 
n*fp*, same, 1946*
0 hung-kuo kung-ch * an-tang, chung-yang shu-chi ch ’ u 'f= liPitiL
(ed*), IC1 ang-chan i-lai chung-yao 
wen-chien hui-chi * ^ C o l T e u t e d
Important Documents since the Outbreak of the 
Sino-Japanese War), n.p*,n.pub.,1942*
0hung-kuo j£ung-ch1 an-1 ang chung-yang wei -yuan hui ^  fy,
Kuan-yu y&eh-kan li-shih wen-ti chteh-iy>
EEL s t oric a.l Problems), Peking, 1953
Certain
Chung-kuo kung-ch* an-tang ti■-ch1i 12 * u tai-pi a0 ta-hui 
yuan-shih t s * ai-li ao hui -pie n \p t' x W
l»— i^iiw>Lt*ini?T**«m^i^ iu »>***— Nii.rvi'»iiim — * m m iw  ih  m jin ir r * mwi *w i in »i imfn ij 1 i L i-J
(Collected Primary Sources of 
the Seventh Congress of the COP), n*p*,(OOP),1945*
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Chung-kuo kung-ch1 an-tang ti li~sh±h tzu-liao v)=
A Collection of Historical Material 
on the Revolutionary Struggle in Kiangsi under 
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party), 
Kiangsi, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1958*
Chung-kuo kung-ch1an-tang yu chung-hua min-chu
1 j y i A i u  I I i nTif mK 1 f  nVir tir~rrwi 1 fl— TtrrTir it I 1i“— Mm Ifcwinwnii^ inwirriwimw l^ m #  I'fin.numW q uiff ’ \
C Ihe Chinese Communist Party and China), 
Shantung, Hsin-hua, 1943*
n Draft of provisional regulations on rent and tenancy 
in Shantung province”, Summary Report on Land 
Reform (Shantung), 37-42.
Pan-kung ( Counterattack), 1,25 XIII, 1/2-3 5 X1Y, 2/3
and XVII, 1, Wuchang and Chungking,(Peb* 16,1938- 
Jan. 15, 1945)*
Pan Wen-lan e t • al •, Lun Wang Shih-wei ti ssu-
hsiang i-shih
wei1 s Ideology),  ^Shantung, Hsin-hua, 1942*
Hsin Ch^ng-ch'eng she^hh^i- (ed#), Pi-hou k ’ang-Jih
min-chu ken-cM-ti chieh-shao w-jx^ -k0kt+ ^ £ 
"(introduction to the Anti-Japanese Democratic 
Bases Behind the Japanese lines), Puyu, Chieh- 
fang, n#d • *
J-Isdeh Izu-cheng "/f ” Lun chan-lueh ±an-kung chung
ti o c hi e h -f ang-c h f h c han-c h 1 ang n ,i L ® £ 7?n Wf ^ ‘9 
/ I H  (On the battlefields of the liberated areas 
in the process of a tactical offensive),Chttn-chung 
X, 13 (July 10,1945), 439-445* — — ^
_vX
Hu Hua^^¥, Chung-kuo hsin-min-ohu chu-i ko-ming-shih 
ts’an-hPao tsu-liao -p\m%H
iReference Sources on the Hew Democratic Revolution 
in China), Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1951*
K 1ang-Jih chan-che ng shih-ch'i chie h-fang-ch1h kai-k* uang 
3 k bV 0?j 4 u \ f v p r X J  (fhe State of the
liberated Areas during the Anti-Japanese War), Pe­
lt ing, j e n-mi n ch1 u~p an-she k [\ i v 1 9 5 3 *
Liberations Army during the Anti-Japanese War),Peking 
j e n-mi n ch? u-pan-she, 1953 *
307
K'ang-Jih ken-chft-ti cheng-tsf e t'iao-li hui-chi % Cj■ch : hin-
T  ■ < r "  ~ ~  y !"' " ' v"-7^ ' P
( Policies and Statutes of the Anti-Japanese1 Bases: 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei), n.p. ,n.pub., 1941.
Kao Kang^S?1^), Pien-chftl tang-ti li-shih wen-ti chien^t’ao 
;?X>BitiX5PplXlt4 ( An Examination of Questions 
0 one erning Party EL s tory in the Border Begi on), 
n.p.,(COP), 1943.
, Shih-shih Ic! o~k1 o wei lao-pai-shen# hsing-li
W l l t y n * .  f c ' J » a > '.< I W W w . i i ^ T ^ V r t . T . 1  w r p i a a f c m  u  i. » -« V m r T  T « ^ > r n  f u n d i n ' —  m V  » ■ ■ » !  I I  I W \1 l~! m i  i i i i  I | t
cli* u»pi (Always Promote
That Which Is Profitable and Abolish That Which Is 
Evil for the People),n.p., Chi-Xu-Yu,n.d••
Ke HanArr', ,fChien-chTih Hua-pei k'ang^-chan shu-niu ti Chin-7 
Chi-Yu k 1 ang-Jih ken-chil-ti11, ^
■ii e$m (The Shansi -Hope i-Honan anti-Japanese 
base, the key to sustaining the war of resistance 
in north China) CMtn-chung , III, 1 (May 21,1939), 
842-843 *
Kuan-yu hsin ti chih-shih fen-tzu kan-pu ti i-hsieh wen-
-S>£ygg. r i l A e r  oj Tro-^ 
‘bTerns Relating to the Hew Cadi^ es Recruited from 
the Intelligentsia), Yenan, n.pub., I944«
Xi Chan 7\) f Chan-t ou chung ti chi eh-f ang ohMl min-
ping *(fEe PeopIe”rs Militia
of Liberated Areas in Combat), Hong Kong, Chung- 
kuo ch*urPan-she, 1947 *
v- f
Xin Plao , u K^ang-Jih chan-cheng ti ching-yenn,
9 ( Experience of the anti-Japanese
war) Chieh-fang , 28 (Jan. 11, 1938), 11.
Xiu Po-chf eng, ,fWo-men t sai T 1 aihangshan shang,l, J-vX
(y/e are on the T faihangshan), the 3?eoplers Daily,
„  ^  S\ *+ -^V   ■ mmi    n th* *
June 2i, 1962*
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Liu Bhao-ch'i ^9‘Vmy * Ch'ing-suan tang-nei Meng-sai
/  *  i i n n t t . i i u n i B w w » i  i n V * n  m i  i m  i i m m
wei chu-i ssu-hsiang > 4 ^ ^ i A C A 1 I U  
C Eliminate Menshevist Ideas Existing m  the 
Party),n.p., n.pub*, 1943*
, Jen ti chleh~chi hsing A-^^^^A*i( On Man’s 
'HIXass Nature")’? " H s i p e i I 9 4 I *
, Kuan-yu hsiu-kai tang-chang ti pao-kao 
’t v " T  The"Report "on tfie Revision of 
the Party Constitution), Chung-kuo chTu-pan-she, 
Hong Kong, 1949*
, "Lun chu-hsi min-chung ti, chi-ko chi-pen 
yuan-ts 1 e " (Several
basic principles regarding organizations amongst 
the people ) CMeh-fang 70, (May I, 1939) ,10-15•
, Lun kung-ch1an-tang yuan ti hsiu-yang
\ On the Training and Cultivation 
of'a Communist Party Member), Kalgan, Hsin-hua, 
1946.
, Lun kuo~chi chu-i yu min-chu chu-i
(Internationalism and Nationalism), 
Chekiang, Hsin-hua, 1949 *
, Lun tang APiAijn (On, the Party) ,Huapei,
Hs in-liu a ? 1946.
, Lun tang-nei tou-ehengA^fAfT^ ( On the 
intra-party Struggle ), Hong Kong, Cheng-pao,1947*
Liu Shao-“ch!i and P*eng Te-huai, Chung kung tsai
ti-hou tso-le hsieh shen-mo ? (Commu- 
. mist Activities behind the Japanese'Lines), 
Chung-hua chfu-pan-she, Kuala Lumpur,1946.
Liu Shao-chfi et. al., Lun chttn-chung lu-h sien
( On the Mass Line*7? Hong Kong, Hsin-min-chu, 1949*
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Lu-chung hsing-cheng kung-shu u uXh-'Wf , Lu-chung-ch1 it
k Tang~Jih min-chu cheng-chfuan chien-she ch!i-~nien
fjgte^-gwrgBM«*yi'frw«>Tiw>:i:ngjT<rTV»ar h«hw<umihm^iiw ih><' ■ t If f  aH>rpii*Tl«q»T»—*«awc->wp)m ir n to' p*WJ-iimi|'n^ t w U u< mtmmrjirnt* »mi innnw . « ^  hU],Ti »*■» »«■ »in HimwLLfcm>rtf
lai ti chi-pen tsung-chieh chi chin-liou chi-pen 
jen-wu 0
( A Summary of the Reconstruction of the 
Anti-Japanese Democratic Regime in Luchung in the 
Last Seven Years and Its Future Tasks), n.p., 
same, 1945**
*1 Lu 0hung- lin w e i-f an ku 0-1 s * ef 1,7 'tlSf. iJJ *■! yfh
( lu Ghung-lin acting against national interest) 
Chieh-fang, 70 (May I, 1939), 4-5•
tag9apvm**ttnrkrTwm
Lu Ting-i, "Chin-Ch ’ a-Chi pien-ch1 tt fen-sui ^ ti-^ejL.ch1in~ 
kung ti__ chi-ko chung-yao chi
Some important experience in crush­
ing the enemy's attacks in the Sbansi-Chahar-Hopei 
"border region) Chieh-fang, 67 (March 20,1939)»
_     ^  r a w K m n t W y m n C T i m i .iiw i  ^ a t  u ^ rn w g j  r-. fr'V *
29-37•
, 1 IC1 ang - ch an s an-ni e n-1 ai vjo- c httn ch e ng- chi h 
kung-tso ti chien-t1 aof{
( A review of the political work in our army 
during three years of resistance) Chien-hsienytleh- 
k T an hyi $%. ft ^ ' \ ( 1 he Fr ont M 0nthly77^7lDe c • 194HT*
•  H U . t W r 9U M . « V  l '  J  v )  ^
Lun kung-chfan tang ( On the Communist Party),
I-Iuap e i, H s i n-hu a, 194 0.
Mao
( The Role of the Chinese Communist Party during 
the Anti- Japane se War), Sian, Ch tin-chung j ih-pao,
1951*
, K'ang-Jih yu-chi-chan ti chan-lueh wen-ti
( On the Strategy of 
the Anti™Japanese Guerrilla Warfare), Peking,1955*
, Kuan-yu ling-tao f ang-f a ) i ^ ( On the 
Method ot .Leadership;, .felang, jjen-mm cn'u-pan- 
she, 1955*
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— lun hsln clileii“;'buan (On the hew
Stage)-, Chungking? Hsin-hua jih-pao kuan,I939*
l r w m e « * ' t o i R * t s r 3i f T O i i M * i * T f W i r M C ,6
Speech to Cadres)? Hsin-min-chu ch1u-pan-she,
Hong Kong,1948.
Isai Yen-an wen-i tso-tfan hui shang ti 
chiang-hna ^ y y h r t ( Speeches at the 
Ye nan Conference on Communist Policy for Litera­
ture ), Peking ? jen-min chT u-pan-she ? . 1953•
Mao 0.se-tung, e t * al •» Chung-kuo kuna-chf an-tang yu t7 u- 
ti ko-ming \ t - t d ^ p  C ihe Chinese
»tyte»awseMie6s^p«w.^’rerm-!WP«r»esstfil. ' j * \ '
Communist Party and Land Heform), Cheng-pao-she, 
1943*
Mao ‘Use-tung hsuan-chi (Selected Works), 4
vols•? Peking? 1961 reprint,especially:
t'Hstleh-hsi ho shili-chii'1 (Our study
and the current situation),111,941-1002.
uK fang-Jih shih-ch'i ti ching-chi wen-ti ho ts!ai- 
cheng wen-tiu
(Economic and financial problems during the anti- 
Japanese war), III,893-398*
-cheng ti chan-lueh wen-tiH, 
cilL ( lactic al problems of 
guerrilla warfare in the anti-Japanese war), II? 
395-428.
MKuan-yu ling^tao fang-fa ti ytteh-kan wen~ tiufV£}^ %
( Some problems on the method of 
leadership),III, 889-904.
n Tsu-chi chTI-lain (Xet us organize),
HI? 931-939.
i cheng-ch’ti ch'ien-pa-wan ch&n-chung chfin~i 
k5ang-Jih min-chu tung-i chan-hsien erh tou-cheng
•A?'? Nt^Xr-ytx^nh?*} f>
(To struggle for the sake of winning hundreds of 
thousands of people to join the anti-Japanese 
National United Front),1,269-270*
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Mu Iisin , Qiiin-sul chieh-f ang-ch *ii rain-ping k f ang-
Ji la tQu-ch.gnja; a f c - ^ v v f ' ^ T) yf^tj
T”B and om H o t e s of the Mi li t i a1 s Ant i- Ja.pane s e 
Struggle in the Shansi-Suiyuan liberated Area), 
Shanghai, jen-min chf u-pan-she , 1959*
IWu I tW, uChin-CJi! a-Chi ^ chieh-f ang-ch !tl ti min-chu chien-
she1 (Democratic achievements
of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Begion) Chthi- 
chung, IX,13 (July 15, 1944),550-556. ~
hieh Jung-chen, "lun ti-hou ti k ! ang-chan11, 9->fCf^s
(On resistance behind enemy lines) GhUn-chung, 
VIII, 17,(Oct.16,1943),498-499*
Pa-lu chdn chtln-cheng ts a-chili / V & if
(She Military and Political Affairs Magazine 
of the Eighth Koute Army),2,8-9,n.p., (Feb# 15- 
Sept. 25, 1939).
Pa-lu chtin, Shantung Ghiao-tung cMn-cli'fl, cheng-chih
pu f viM'jp* %i'i'1-1 IP>1 (ed .), Hsjieh-chan pa-nien
ti Ohiao-tung tzu-ti ping ^^YfgivfT *"
(ohiaoTung Soldiers m  the Eight Years 
of a . Bloody War),n#p#, Hsin-hua, 1945*
P feng Chen, n Comrade P'eng Chen on land policy in the 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei border region", Collected 
Important Documents on land Policy(Shansi-Ohahar- 
Hopei base7, 43^2 •
P 1 eng Te-rhuai  ^^  ^ , ,rPa-t! uan ta-chan chili i-i », 6
~^ '?>c(What the battle of the hundred regiments 
meant) Chiln-chung , V,9“I0 (Oct #30,1940*), 204-205*
n Shih-pa chi-t1 u an-c life P*eng-fu-chung-ssu-ling 
t!an chien-ch'ih Ho-pei k fang-chan yu kung-ku t ’uan« 
chi eh", -V /
(P'eng le-huai, deputy commander-in-chief of the 
I8th Army Croup,on the war of resistance in Hopei 




9 ” Yifo-men tsen-yang chi en-ch Tih_ Hua-pei l.'ui-nien 
ti k 1 ang-chan",  ^ LiP-'j-bbhAurk,
(How we persist for six years in the war of resis- 
tance) OMn-chung, VIII,f3-14 ( Aug.31,1943), 
347-3487™'------
’’Provisional regulations on land utilisation”, Hov.1,1941, 
Collected laws and Ordinances (Shansi-Hopei-Shan- 
tung-Honan h as e),2 2-36.
"Regulations on rent,tenancy, loans and interest in the 
Shansi-Chahar-Iiopei border Region11, Jan* 21,1943, 
Collected documents on Land Policy (Shanaju^Chahar- 
Hopei baseT, 58-82* ’ ” " " - ~ -
S hu 1 ’ ung b? 5 i ^  , trcE!ttn-c h M!i_ wu- chu ang t ung-y u an kung™ t s o 
ti c hung™ chi eh ” , 1^- b y \=>^
( A Summary of Work in military mobilisation in 
the military region) Political Work in the Army, 
lb 7i *
Sun Hs&eh-lu *s , t» Chi-nan t f ung-hsin11, 6,*\t (Hews
from southern Hopei) CMin™chung , II, 14,643.-642*
T 1 ai-hang ch1 £L hs ing-che ng kung-s s u 7^ 0 7\ i  ^\  , T T ai-
hang ch1*! ssu-fa kung-tso kai-k fuang ^ 7  
4 Jud ic Work in the I1 f ai Hang Are a), n. p •,
same, 1946*
Teng Hsiao-p•ing^p'^'J-, ” Chien-ku fen-tou chung ti
Chi-nan”, ( Southern Hopei in
a bitter struggle) Chieh-fang,7I,(May 15, 1939), 
8-19 •
, ”Tsai ^ ti-hou ti liang-t’iao lu-hsien” ,
( The two ways behind enemy lines) 
Chieh-fang,72,(May 30,1939),3-10*
Ti shih-pa chi-t!uan cMin , tsung cheng-chih pu,hsuan~ 
ch1 uan pu %-+
(ed*),Ti-hou chan-cli1 ang shang ti min-ping
pyr^ - "*Tm The Militia be nind 
Enemy lanes),n.p.,same, 1945*
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ling ling , I'-erh-chiu-shih yu Chin-Chi-lu-Yu pien- 
chtjtt
the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region), 
Shanghai ,hsin-hua shu-tien,I956*
Xou Eu 'ft di'n 9 1 Chieh-fang clrfi!i yu ho fa-tung chttn-chung 
chi en-ch1 ih k 1 ang-cha nH ,
(fhe way to mobilize the masses to persist 
in the war of resistance in the liberated 
areas) CMn-chung,X, 109 (Jan*X5,1945), 12-15*
Xsu-chi ch’i-lai Us Organize ) ,n.n., Chin-sui ,
h w t . i w . i u h i  m  t a a i n n w i mw 1 i » w m — c j i i m i i 'i  g t w t u m i'u j W E m w M C T t m *  ' * * —  0 #
1944.
T'u=fe± chung-chieh pao-kao (Shantung) _±.
111 iw 'u n 'i ' i1 ii^ ip       - —--— ■—■■-•»- ■ " ■ 1" —|-gn—* 1—-- - r i Qw' i 1 it  -inr~*-rii ry %
( A Summary Report on land Ref orm) ,n*p* ,n*pub., 
(1944?)-.
Tung Pi-wu’3rYA» Oliung-kuo chieh~fang ch1 tt shih-lu
r l V  ' " ' I v " *  1 1- - - - - ^ * t  t 11!  r-'-ir— ^ - r -■■-T-rinnVr*m'"Tf-„ n  h i t  u T r m r  im u T y j n riiii f i n  ■ i w im y n  m i u m  /  /
( A l'rue Account of the Liberated Areas 
in China), San Francisco, Ho-ts0,1946*
u \yo-kuo k 1 ang-chan erh-nisn-lai ti min-chung
*hmwjiWii»*ti iwtwHmifngTT^ iiia w s,* +~-r~* - VR'J 1 }—r —r „   ^ /  r? . * * W
yttn-tungt!, 9 tV3i£lti(Two years of the
mass movement) Chun-chung, IH,I0 (July 25,1939), 
272-274*
Wang Chia~hsiangJlfA4i> "Chung-kuo kung-ch1 an-tang yu ko- 
ming chan-cheng", CCP and the
Revolutionary War)Political Work in the Armv.I-23*
>yuL*niiwiT’im'iji'jL1.wi«.<*uw<rin-1— <nwtn*wii.iiiwwjmwt«niun'*n n u i w w m piiw w
Wang C hi a-hs i ang, e t»al *, 0 he ng- c hi h kung - ■t s o lun- chung
(FoH^icaTVorfc TntEe'"ArmyTTl, 
n.p* ,Pa-lu-chftn,±'94I*
Wang Shou-tao-^-ulA, ttpa-lu chtin jphung kung-chf an-tang 
ti kung-tsou ,/n (Q?he work of the
CCP in the Eighth Route Army) Political Work 
m  the Army,52-60*
* M » * * n w » a  f c » a n m i i K w i i W * « i t ¥ w
Wen-hua chiao-yd yen-chiu hui Y x Y ' ffiYA'tE (ed*), Ti^wo 
tsai hsuan-ch'uan chan-hsien shang
u  j j j Iii iW * ii* r i « * w » * * M » w i » w < » * i w a w » * y n * i r i y i f j <w * T ,«  . w T O i w a f f i r — h u ' . t ttt i w t m w ig — n w >w » J H . w * g * r w « K » f  m
{Pr opagand a Warf ©re), Ye nan, same ,1941
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0* Japanese Army Archives ( Rikugunshn )
Sources in this section are obtained 
in the form of microfilms from the library of Congress*
They are classified in John Young, Checklist of Micro-
„  V  ^  t g g i w . w u j i u W * i * ; i  ■ n u !>f t i w iii iiiii |*m W 'lw i H B  mi n mrrmwvmtmyefmjieuMtuvBfammt
film Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese
in i m i i imr rum  i i i i  Mnrn i  on ini* i> m m rrrn i n iivi'nrv ~rm iitt i m ii i ' im i rr ~ r t in im mr im rnm■■■ mrrr n riiaiwiiiii t i  hi r —rm m irrn Trmin * niT*-i n i * ni*-orr> mri>"in m i m mi   [» i mi i hm>i i n n w  i i n him i* h h i 1*1 i* 1 * ^ r-— irtm i t j m i—irT.*1^
Army, Ravy,and Other G-overnment Agencies, 1868-1945,
n r ~ f i r i ~ l T i r T T ~ f  m — ^ t r r  i r n T r r r  i f r n r n r r f f n -  i 1 1 i ri i r  l m "  r  "  ~ i t t t “  i 11 'i'itt  n i m  m i O T T r r i r i m m r r r i  w r r T m n ii n ' w i  * n  i i l r  n r r t h  Y - m i r i f i t i ~ ,w w r T i- m u  n m f i M i r o    i n  m  i m m m m      n i n  w i n m w i H M in
G-eorgetown University, Y/'ashington, 1959, as unders 
Y* Records from Various Army Area. Riles***, and VI* Re­
cords from Various Army Topic Riles Relating to Particu­
lar incidents* Por convenient identification of these 
archives, the numbers of the reel (R), and the frame (P) 
are used as according to Johnyoung*
Most of these sources are confidential Jap­
anese army reports marked secret and concentrate on deal­
ing with the CCP threat in north China, and are thus most 
reliable in giving' a true and analytical picture of Com­
munist activities in the anti-Japanese bases* Although 
reports by some army officers might tend to misinterpret 
certain CCP activities, they are by no means intended 
for publicity purposes. As secret files of both the Com­
munists and Rationalists are most likely to be inaccessi­
ble to the public, these secret Japanese archives there­
fore become a valuable source • in providing information 
of the internal organisation of the COP* Por instance, 
an exhaustive report on CCP military and party organiza­
tions, and personnel, supplemented by charts and maps, is 
available in R 1X5, I1 1022, and its accuracy is corroborat-. 
ed by other available Communist sources*
Army Ministry, Military Affairs Section, Uichi-Man-& j
keizai kensetsu ydkoan ni kansuru ken
°£ Proposal for Bcono 
mic development of Japan, Manchuria and China) 
Sept.,4,1940. R 109, I 798.
■.-j'
Army Officers, various, 
shisatsu hUkoku
Hokushi oyobi Manshu-kOku
  itJ & v  pe c -ti o n
Reports on jtforth China and Manchuria),0ct. 
6-18,1937. E 108, T 767.
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Central Committee for the Extermination of communism,
Research Section, Dokuritsu dai ichishi ni tsuites 
Kiser KOkokusho no
w w w ^ t S T » w a t w w i i r m a ^ a v a r R T ^ M M g a , i ii. .tf'iia « i a B c a )  c a a — * f c " T » y i i r T T T a m a u t i g j 't * i M T W B r M g n t « m w  \j “ ^ " y  / [  y  ^  [ ' r-' w  w
(Report on 1st Independent Division of Communist
Army in West Hopei), July 1940. R 114, 1 996.
, Kichu-ku chubu chi ho* ni okeru Chukytr no minshH
1* < H H . < H W j ftw i r t U v a i m J T » « t t e c s ± a t « a  w w * « » , » n M t m ! i a i » . ' . r t M a  i / - * r t e t E3 W X ' # c g ? r »  |m n « » i m t w B » a ! H i w i « l * v < w v f t . T r n t w ^ ,» a w i B * w  p t y  a v m n n a i . H i ' a f W ' t .
kakutoku kOsaku ii tsuriH chTfea h n k o k u u4>%p 3
^ S u r v e y  of Chinese Communist 
Efforts to Win Support of People in Central 
Hopei), May 1940. R 114, 1 999.
,Kihokuku seinabu homen ni okeru Chukyo no minshu
t M H n f m a a o u j  ■ C H U f n i t m o C T w i j J . J f  w * r m iw . n i— n p w . n M n n 'gf c»i.i c i a j f g t t f c a a r t > r A j a » w ^ V M B H iii n i x . M ) » i H T i<ui. o u m im  m u  W i n  ■  T T f i i i r  H I T II II III m r w
kakutoku kosaku — -i—
■ » * * « » » «  H*&&au0 i M M fM - j t  | M « . w w i n '
(PieId Survey 
Win Support of People in South-west Portion of 
northern Hopei), May 1940. R 114, T 995*
, KyHsangun naibu ni okeru butaiin narabini toin
* *  u H w i j f e u . j j i M j i w i f m m m _ i i m ^ f f w r n i O T j w i ^ m n w i i n k n t a n w n a w M M n » n u w i x « n j y t e » a « t w » * a a i » y < . r ' p j i 1 1  m w J B i i f ■      r n i i m m i . a < n i i  — n i p i i m
no shoHOkyU-^51 i W N>= MrTHTEary and 
Political Personnel in. Chinese Communist Army),
July 1940. B 114, T 997*
, Sanseisho seihokubu hilH ch(5sa hokoku h\
t  ,     "  ' r — "  i ' i r -       ' i — ■ "  1- r r r — n r r T iiirnr i r ‘ i M n i r — ' T r r T r ' ^ i i i  i"      t f r f i r o c a n i  » ■ ■ « . . m w i n p i i f  I
( Survey of Banditry in North-west 
Shansi Province), July 1940. R 114, 0? 994*
, Satsunan henchl tainichi sekka kosaku ,jitfai
x w i i w T t > w w p n  T H i . i i n W » i i n n n i n )i i m iiii i i r n iii i i i i . i i i  W h. p i.iii  . . .  ■ i i w n  r > |. . r n  ^ a n  w i*iiy j i i H ~w i i i w i i i m w i — ii— n . m M i « r w . n n > i |ii < . iti| * |.f| w i  KW H * * i ' l l  i f f i i H i r r n - r r i w u f M . - L ^ f r f
chfrsa hPkokulpb&^f^e
fField Study of Anti-Japanese Activities of Chinese 
Communists in and around SCuth Chahar),July 1940.
R H4, P 995.
ment in and around Shansi, Chahar,and Hopei),
Aug. 1940. R 114, T 998.
Commander-in-chief, Japanese Expeditionary Force in China, 
HLmitsu shorui clrosei no ken s Show a 11 nendo
- - - - -   , . . .  - - - - - - - - - - „      - - - .   . . _ . r m < r x a ^ J M . T T m M H t y r B g J f a f c r a
en^; v z % v b^ j) ^  %r£r&W
( Compilation of Secret Documents concerning 
Administration of Occupied territory of North China 
for 1936), Sept. 23, 1936. E 109, I 784.
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fourth Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Eorce in 
North China, Geppo, 5 gatsubun ,
> ^  ^  w — ^ n u ^ v M J ii iu i!  ifcnfmitw.'ww wmiiiM t i !■ 11 »■■. ■ iw p w n iw n w > n ii( j
(Monthly Report for May I9?T7* R 115, T I Oil*
, Geppo, 8 gatsubun , (Monthly Re-f     ■ nffUi. m m i     w>wt«|imi \  '  ' w
porFfor AugusTTT3?I ). H 1X5. T X0I2.
, Geppo, 9 gatsubun (Monthly He-gW — BfEfeglflfrafc, ipnira iJS»*anatwMtk<umat> faaHin n n r i $m> _  . \  *  V
port for Sep^einEer 1941). RII.5 , T 1015*
, Geppo, 12 gatsubun , (Monthly Re-
porETOTTSeoiSEerTgri ). R 115, X 1023.
Japanese Expeditionary Eorce in North China, Headquarters, 
Kita.~Shina homengun jokyo hokoku 15?
I IWITj. .■imawtw* p«M i fww a i, m, n e ,r,»i-a HW tot ft tffl I. . /.an V  wKrMgf t.t ■feuJwiCT HfoiiwiHHwWimMWi^M *
XiHHk = X-f!-%r V Report oiTTitate of Affairs 
of Japanese Army in Hforth China), March 18, 
1941. R 114, 1’ 1005.
, Senden oyobi minshu kakutoku kosaku ni kansuru 
ch£sa_Ebgo|u '¥)% %.y« a#|a3T ^  y W * *  fc?-
( Survey Report on Effectiveness of Propaganda 
in Winning Eavour of Chinese Masses), Eeb* 24, 
1940. R 114, T 981.
Kasahara Yukio, Chief of Staff, Japanese Expeditionary 
Eorce in North China, Pokumu kikanchU" kaigi ni 
kansuru ken ----
“(Report”"on"Meetings of Chiefs of Specidl Intelli­
gence Bureau), Oct. 31, 1939. R 114, 1 967*
iCo 1800th Corps, Anti “Communist Research Squad, Staff, 
Hokushi ni okeru Chugoku Kyosanto soshiki kei-
t w g i m ^Iiiw.nmuiiiH'Tiwiwrriraju.uBfl'Twr^Hiiipplaw >, , irmnmi nmr'iHini mimntTWHWimi \rmi>iimi».mui".».mm
tShyD ^ T Organi­
zational Chart of Communist Party in North China),
R 115, P 1022.
Noboru Group Army, Staff, Sho Kai-seki no KyDsangun fobat-m .  « — . rn « m yflftM rtll I r 'W M  » il i ■ i| lTM-r. ■ hm. ■ i —i .Mm  n».. ifc ■ .Tar*" UMi in. IHjifllTTlH, ||
su narabxm KokumxntG no bokytr taisaku no gaiyn
1,1 i— ■ ■»" j |  T1 rT ,|T1^.tr|TlrirTnrrn..||rlrtTl|rr|f.r||||)<T.|..| | n i  1 If  till ilih| i n
( Outline of Chiang Kai-shekfs Suppression of 
Communist Army and KMl1!s Defensive Measures against 
Communists), Eeb. 1941. R 114, 1’ 1000.
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Uorth China Special Patrol Garrison, 2nd Special .Recon-
tions against Chinese Troops in Central Hopei 
Area), Sept* 1943™ June 1944* R 134, T 1233*
Horth China Special Patrol Garrison, 1st Patrol Regiment,
XZt ^ ( Detailed Reports of Right- 
ting by Various Units of north China Special 
Garrison in Phase I of Operations against Commu­
nist Pocket in East Hopei Area), Sept. 6,1943- 
June 10, 1944. R 134, T 1249*
, Kite tobu chiku dai ikki sakusen senter shuhu
ITBetailed Reports 
of Righting in Eastern Hopei), Sept.6,1943- June 
10, 1944* R 134, T 1250.
north China Special. Patrol Garris op., He ad quart ers^ , Dai 
ikki^sakusen sent o shuho ^ ^ ^  “ •
XBe^aiTed RepoFT'of Military Operations of Japa­
nese Garrison against Chinese Troops in north 
China), Sept. 20,1943- June 9, 1944* R 134, T 1252.
Horth China Special Patrol Garrison,Second Company,Rirst 
Patrol Regiment, Kahoku-shir Ranken shuhen chiku
IlfcU. H  »  fclJULU «  , JJa-L JLHK.X fcScUVUfcSOLL fcSfcJUUU fciXXUIlU 'AJ-'-J? M
?) > sw ? 35ffafep5e!F a ^ ^  in
Phase I of Operations in North China), Sept.20, 
1943- June 9, 1944* R 134, T 1254*
North China Special Patrol Garrison, Klchu chiku dai ikki 
sakusen s exito shoho ^ 3= it, Y f  jfvjSRff 
(Detailed Report of Righting in Phase I of Oper-
>iDeiailid Report of
Righting in Phase I of Operations against 
Chinese Troops}/ , Sept.194
ptai ikki sakusen sentTJ sholio
T T f W i t t r t i  r&a&ms&ima i M j a a  ■ t w < i | i i ' i w < M i m ' i j i i . n < n R . u i i  i p i w
June 1944. R 134, T 1255
\ -ueiaiieci iteporrs on n g n r m g  m  nuannsien 
Area of Hopei), Sept*6,1943- June 10,1944*
R 134, T 1251*
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Second Section, Staff, Japanese Expeditionary Eorce in 
North. China, Senji geppo shirycr, I gatsubun, 
2f£o3^&;j£li4 t-flXJl T Monthly Wartime Report 
for January,I941). R 114, I X002.
Shlnozuka Corps. Headquarters, Kannai hirjo ySzu 'T ^  ^
T^ -^ cr®! (hough Sketch of banditry within Juris­
diction of Shinozuka Corps),Feb. 1941* R 114,
T 1003.
Sugiyama Corps, Pacification Unit, Sanseisho Wajunken
w  “ #»tprya,jL#E»^ pi?i"* n)nr>wn »»w,M >aiMJti f  »».B!r r» iwrftjtiluii imti
chiho Kyosan chiku ipkyo hokokusho...,
r\<:X^\H (Report on Communist Areas in Hoshun 
hsien, Shansi).R 113, 1 944*
fad a Corps, headquarters, KyTSsantO’ jokytr sono ta..*,
f  ,  ,  M |in T ^ j j i ra - iim w»ipi m wraim yi if lh .tM in ^ i i n . r fcnrB.11. —i i . .  h m  > >w ni#» ifr m niiai#nnm n>wn.W
sen,ii gepp-Q s h i r y t r -• Jh6*-§
R) (State of Affairs of Chinese
Communist Party.*., Wartime Monthly Report,
March 1941). S 115, I 1008.
, Shiryo" ffeppo, 2 gatsubun P ;)H ti *6. R'ip ')
>  u w J t ^  i . i w t L u . ^ t w t c t u n g i e a i » m * k . w i n » # j u . i n > f c t t w n M T m a < t w n y % B a < ^ ^  \
( Monthly Data Report for February 1941 ). R I15, 
I 1007.
, Shiryo geppo, 10 gatsu II gatsubun 
C -v- \?i, ^  - \s\Vt) ^ (Mont hly D at a Re p ort f or 0c t obe r 
and November, 1939). R 114, T 1006#
II# Other Chinese Sources
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Glossary
( A list of terms often referred to in the thesis)
Ai~hu village " care and protection1 village
Ai-lu chih-chta Road-protection home 
Patty 1V 3 lb.
Cha-kung tui organized labour team
Cheng-chih chih-tao yuan political adviser( ccmpany
level)
Cheng Peng yttn-tung Rectification Movement
Ch1 iang~h.ua chih-an ytin-tung The Movement to Rein-
force Law and Order (launched by the 
Japanese from 1941 onwards)
Ch'l^fen cheng-chih san-fen cMn-shih seventeenths
of effort on political manoeuvres and 
three-tenths on military actions
Ching-chi ching-oh'a economic police force
Ching-ping chien-cheng " To cut troops and simplify
the administration" -OOP retrenchment
policy in the face of Japanese pressure
Oh'ing-pi k 1ung-yeh " To clear the walls and empty
the fields"— —  a CCP measure to prevent 
economic supplies from being seized by the 
Japanese
Ch* ou-ti landlord*s right of repossessing land let
to tenants
Chu-jen tai-piao chief representative ( chief of
fcMWIII ■■ I H i  IM  I I II ■ >H1 iMilMIHlMTTbn " ll UtTTTIilTlB
the administrative village)
ch*a district
Chueh-ssu tui Dare-to-Die corps
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Qhto ch'd military region
Pen-chtL sub-bureau (party)
Ben-ch'fl. sub-region (military)
Hsi-meng hui Sacrifice League
Hsien county
,, line ( communication lines)
Hsin-min hui New People's Society
Hsing-cheng ts'un administrative village
Huang Tao (kodo in Japanese) Kingly Way
I-tang ohih-chttn party control over the army
Ken-ckd-ti Communist base with a well-defined strong-
hold, but also embodied areas with 
guerrilla activities
Kuan-min ho-tso cooperation between the people and
the officials
I&D-wu ho-tso cooperation between labour and armed
forces
Mien surface area ( referring to rural area)
Mu-fan ti-ch'U Model District
Pei-fang chft Northern Bureau (party)
Pen-wei chu-i Particularism
Pien-kung tui labour-conversion team
Ping-ts'un incorporating villages
Sankd-seisaku Japanese "three-all" policy: kill all,bur
all and destroy all
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Sh.ih.-wu _ohu-i Rout ini sm
Shu-ti the action taken by tenants to retain
land formerly repossessed by landlords
Tang chih-pu party-branch ( village level)
Three-thirds system The system in which Communists
occupied only one-third of the total 
number of members in government and 
elected bodies
Ti-fang tang-wei party committee at the area level
Tien point
Ts*un kung-so Village Administrative Office
Tsfun-min ta-hui Villagers* Conference
T*ui tsu special reference to tenants* demands
for the return of rent from landlords
Wei-ch*ih hui maintenance society Japanese-sponsored
local organizations
Yeh-chan pu-tui field-forces
Yu-chi ch*tt regions with guerrilla activities
Yu-chi hsiao-tsu guerrilla units-— the best organized
units in the militia
Yu-chi yiln-tung chan operational-guerrilla warfare-
basic military tactics undertaken by 
the COP in the anti-Japanese war up to 
1941
